Andrew Johnson: The Long-Lost Father of Canadian Confederation

Madeleine Robert- April 5th, 2023

Introduction

For those who know of Andrew Johnson’s presidential reputation, the title of this paper
would certainly seem paradoxical. As the 17th President of the United States, Andrew Johnson is remembered as one of America's worst leaders to date. If this was the case, how could he have served a foundational role in the creation of Canada? Throughout this paper, the answer to this puzzle will become clear. This research paper will argue that despite not serving Canadian interests at the time, Andrew Johnson unintentionally served Canada's best interest in the long run by effecting an extremely important and positive change for Canada, Confederation. To accomplish this, I will separate this paper into four sections; The first section will present a brief biography of Johnson and his presidency and highlight the concurrent state of Canadian affairs.

After examining Johnson's presidency, the next section will determine what kind of "bad
president" Johnson was through the analogous Richard the Second or Richard the Third framework while considering the perspectives of three respective nations. Further, this paper will establish what constitutes 'Canadian interests' through a defensive realist perspective and determine how Johnson's actions failed to uphold them in the short term but forwarded them in the long term. The final section of this paper will utilize counterfactual reasoning to determine if Confederation would have occurred regardless of Johnson's involvement.

Overall, this paper will consider Johnson's rank among American presidents from the Canadian perspective compared to the American perspective.

History 

In the 1940s Johnson was appointed to the House of Representatives as a Southern
Democrat for Tennessee and was later elected to the Senate in the 50s (The White House, 2021). Johnson's streak of controversy began when he opposed Southern secession efforts in the 60s and refused to leave the Senate with his fellow Southern senators, or to join the Confederacy when Tennessee seceded in 1861. The Democrats were outraged as Johnson declared himself to be an
"unconditional Unionist", which led to attempts to remove him from Senate (Trefousse, 1989,
p.132-33). Despite their attempts, Johnson remained in the Senate and managed to catch
Lincoln's eye when searching for a running mate for the upcoming 1864 election. Johnson's support of the Union made him popular in the North, and Lincoln wanted a War Democrat by his side in case he would need the vote of reconstructed Southern states (Trefousse, 1989, p.176-78).
Johnson was thus chosen, and officially took to the White House alongside Lincoln March 4th, 1865. His term as Vice President only lasted a little over a month, as Abraham Lincoln was shot April 14th, and died early the next day.   

As President, Andrew Johnson's most important role was to establish an effective
Reconstruction program. Reconstruction refers to the effort to readmit (to the Union) the 11 states which previously seceded before or during the Civil War (Foner, 2022). In May of 1865, Johnson published his first proclamations regarding his Reconstruction plan, and was met with serious disdain from Radical Republicans, due to the plan's significant leniency towards the
South (Trefousse, 1989, p.217). His requirements for the readmission of seceded states included: abolishing slavery, repudiating secession, and abrogating Confederate debt, which were ratified in December of 1865 with the help of moderate Republicans (Foner, 2022). His actions were described to have "resulted in the restoration of Rebels to power in the South, the near-restoration of slavery for the Negro, and the possible reestablishment of Democratic control of
the nation" (Castel, 1979, p.58). Tensions rose when Johnson attempted to veto the Civil Rights Bill of 1866, a bill intending to afford more rights to those recently freed from slavery. His presidential veto was subsequently overturned by a two-thirds majority in Congress (U.S. Senate, 2022). A growing dislike for Johnson culminated with his impeachment in 1868, where he narrowly avoided conviction by one vote (U.S Senate, 2022). That same year, Johnson announced his bid to run as the Democratic presidential candidate for the next election, which he
eventually lost to former New York governor Horatio Seymour (Trefousse, 1989, p.337-39). One of his final acts as president was to grant amnesty to all former Southern insurgents, on top of the 13,914 pardons he had already issued throughout his term for participation in the rebellion (Trefousse, 1989, p.346-47).

While Johnson was busy stirring up controversy in the United States, Canada faced a national security crisis as threats began to emerge from beneath them. The Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), whose members are referred to as Fenians, spent the first half of the 1860s preparing to invade Canada from the United States, in a strategic military effort against the British (Vronsky, 2011, XXXII). While British North America (BNA) had not unified to form the now-established nation of Canada until 1867, I will refer to the pre-Confederation BNA (including Upper Canada, Lower Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick) as Canada for the purposes of this paper. The IRB intended to 'take Canada hostage' so to speak, with the ultimate goal of ransoming it back to the British in exchange for Irish liberation and independence (Grodzinski, 2014). During the Civil War, the IRB encouraged members to gain military experience, and their insurgent efforts were tolerated by Washington just so long as they fought for the Union Army first (Vronsky, 2011, p.10). The Fenians managed to organize tens of thousands of battle-hardened Irish Civil War veterans (Haglund 2015, p.135), and purchased thousands of war surplus rifles and ammunition from the U.S. government (Vronsky, 2011, p.27). Fenian threats eventually culminated in the battle of Ridgeway in June of 1866, where the IRB managed to defeat a contingent of Canadian militia before promptly fleeing back to the United States (Haglund, 2015, p.137). While IRB insurgents had been apprehended by the U.S. government after the fact, many Fenians were not prosecuted and some of their arms had been returned (Curtis, 1914, p.245). The lack of punishment from the U.S. for Fenian participation in the Battle of Ridgeway could have, in part, facilitated further IRB raids into Canada which took place in 1870 and 1871 (Curtis, 1914, p.246). While their efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, Fenians, especially after the raid of 1866, were "nasty enough to represent a real threat, a reminder that British North America might be caught up in the quarrels of others" (Martin, 1990, p.10). This threat served as the final push for Canadians who had previously been apprehensive towards Confederation, persuading them to commit to nationhood (Vronsky, 2011. XXXII).

Other significant conflicts between the United States and Canada at the time include the
Trent Crisis of 1861 and the cancellation of the Reciprocity Treaty in 1865-66. In November of
1861, the U.S. Navy boarded a British postal steamer, the Trent, in international waters in order to take prisoner two Confederate envoys on their way to Europe (Vronsky, 2011, p.14-15). This event incited a brief conflict where "Britain and the Northern states came dangerously close to war", a war which would have placed Canada in the middle of the two powers (Martin, 1990, p.8). This threat was enough to turn Canadian public opinion against the Union, which had been previously critical of the Confederacy (Vronsky, 2011, p.14-15).  In 1864, the United States began to threaten canceling the Reciprocity treaty, which had been in place for 10 years (Martin, 1990, p.8) and served as a free trade agreement between the U.S. and Canada to lower duties andtariffs on certain goods (Tattrie, 2019). Britain's quiet collaboration with the Confederacy during the Civil War did not sit well with the Union, who, after the War ended, passed a resolution to abrogate the Treaty which received the approval of President Lincoln in January of 1865 (Haynes, 1892, p.25-26). The treaty was officially terminated in March of 1866.

Two Bad Kings and Two Bad Johnsons

Considering most accounts of Andrew Johnson's time in office, evidence suggests that hecan be classified as a "bad" president. The White House's biography of Johnson describes him as "one of the most unfortunate of Presidents" (The White House, 2022), while others have described him as "the worst possible person to have served as President at the end of the American Civil War" (Varon, 2020). While his failures in the United States have been documented meticulously, Johnson's take on foreign affairs, particularly considering the perception of him from abroad, has received little attention. This section of the paper will utilize the framework established by Philip Abbott in his article "Two Bad Kings and Two Bad Presidents" to classify Andrew Johnson as either a 'Richard the Second' president or 'Richard the Third' president. Abbott considers Richard the Second to be a bad king due to his ineptitude and lack of leadership skills, more specifically described as a leader who is "resolute and indecisive at all the wrong moments. He listens to bad advice and ignores good counsel. He is unable to inspire loyalty, nor does he acknowledge fidelity when it does occur" (Abbott, 2009, p.212).  On the other hand, Richard the Third was considered to be a bad king, not because he was incompetent but "because he acknowledges no limitations on his authority" (Abbott, 2009, p.214). He was able to pick up on the motivations of others and played the game of politics well, and thoroughly enjoyed devising plans and executing them, no matter the consequences they caused (Abbott, 2009, p.214).

From the American perspective of Andrew Johnson, he would certainly be classified as a 'Richard the Second' president. In his Reconstruction efforts, Johnson's leniency towards the South amplified divides within his government, and his efforts to obstruct the guarantee of rights for Black Americans deepened racial divides across the nation (Varon, 2020). Johnson's unwillingness to cooperate with Moderate Republicans in the House of Representatives resulted in their alliance with the Radicals on many issues, which worked directly against his best interest (Varon, 2020). He most definitely did not inspire loyalty, which can be exemplified by his impeachment in 1868 (U.S. Senate, 2022). He is largely remembered for failing in the role that many believed Lincoln would have thrived in (Varon, 2020). While all of these attributes constitute a 'Richard the Second' president, there is a particular gap in the study of Johnson's time in office which could change this perception. What lacks in the American analysis of Johnson in this regard is his approach to the Fenian situation. This is most likely because Fenians caused little controversy in American domestic politics at the time. Johnson's primary motivation in the steps he took regarding the Fenians, which will be examined further, was his desire to secure Irish support for the upcoming 1868 presidential election. Again, this is rather irrelevant to American history considering Johnson failed to secure the Democratic nomination in 1868. While irrelevant to the United States, Johnson's motivations and actions towards the Fenians constitute an integral aspect of understanding the history of Canada's unification and as I discuss further in this section, could change his presupposed classification as a 'Richard the Second' president. 

Andrew Johnson's true opinion of the Fenians and their cause has never, and most likely will never be agreed upon by historians. This is because he consistently changed the position he presented depending on who he addressed, and the level at which he wanted to appease them to further his own personal interests. Johnson's first priority was to ensure he did not alienate the Irish vote. From 1844 onwards, the Irish Catholic population in the U.S. was said to constitute the largest "ethnic" voting bloc in the country, who were usually reliable Democratic voters (Haglund, 2015, p.123-24). If Johnson had spoken out against the IRB and taken measures to quell their efforts, he by most accounts would not have been able to find success in his Democratic bid for nomination, a possibility he later ruined regardless. On the other hand, if Johnson had fully supported the Fenian raids, he would have broken American and international neutrality laws, and most importantly made an enemy out of the British. To avoid both situations,Johnson's policies towards the Fenians were "ambiguous, ambivalent, or complacent" as far as the general public was aware (Vronsky, 2011, p.25). Despite this, his actions quietly verged on Fenian support, probably due to the organization's massive growth during the Civil War, as "it was reliably accepted that at least 10,000 and possibly as many as 50,000 soldiers, from both sides, had become converts to Fenianism during the course of the fighting" (Haglund, 2015, p.135). This voter bloc was too large to pass up, so Johnson subtly facilitated their efforts by allowing them to "operate legally and openly in the United States" (Vronsky, 2011, p.5) and by selling them war surplus rifles and ammunition (Vronsky, 2011, p.27). While no records exist of Johnson ever communicating directly with the Fenians, possibly due to the clandestine nature of their organization, the Fenians took it upon themselves to declare openly that they had the backing of the U.S. government, specifically regarding their upcoming invasion in 1866 (Vronsky, 2011, p.124-25). Many historians tend to believe the Fenians, as Vronsky highlights a conclusion made by the Canadian Armed Forces historical branch; "there seems little doubt that the Fenian raids of 1866 were undertaken with, at the very least, the tacit encouragement of the President and Secretary of state" (Vronsky, p.25).

Once Canadians caught wind of rumours that indicated a possible Fenian threat in 1864,
they sought information from the U.S. government, who responded with a report of events for the British Minister to the United States (Curtis, 1914, p.225-26). From there on out, the U.S largely ignored Canada as a whole, opting to only communicate with the British. This would be the first indication that Johnson’s government only viewed Canada as an extension of the British,which rendered Canada’s position against the Fenians weaker overall. The British eventually became weary of Fenian threats, and the British Minister to the United States, Sir Frederick William Adolphus Bruce, met with Johnson to discuss the state of affairs in February of 1866 (Vronsky, 2011, p.26-27). This meeting was kept secret from the public, and the only report of this meeting at the time was found in a letter from Bruce to the British Foreign Secretary, detailing Johnson's response when posed the dreaded Fenian question (Foner, 1975, p.383). Bruce wrote, "he said with some emphasis, that this movement met with no sympathy on the part of the Govt., which on the contrary was anxious to discourage it" (Foner, 1975, p.385). Within the month, the British had agreed to a proposition from the Secretary of State, William H. Seward, to not make the Fenian situation a formal matter of diplomatic correspondence in order to ensure Johnson's actions were not known to possible Irish Americans voters (Vronsky, 2011, p.27). This meant that Canada was also not privy to any information given to the British, and the British had no intention of sharing. From that point, the British explicitly requested that the United States not interfere in any Fenian activities besides an invasion attempt, as they sought to exploit a growing divide between different factions of the IRB (Vronsky, 2011, p.27). The United States further helped the British by making unpublicized attempts to seize back the weapons they had once sold to the Fenians (Vronsky, 2011, p.27). When Canada was made aware of this confidential agreement, they almost wrecked it due to vigorous and public demands that the British denounce the apparent American inaction towards Fenian threats (Vronsky, 2011,p.27). Ultimately, Johnson did not uphold his end of the agreement by failing to intervene in the 1866 raid. 

From this account of Johnson's policies and actions regarding the Fenians, a new cunning and strategic persona of the former president comes to light. By analyzing Johnson's position, I have determined that when it came to the Fenian situation, Johnson was able to present three different faces to three different nations regarding a singular issue. To the United States, Johnson put on a face of subtle Fenian support, one that would ensure he remained in the Irish Americans' good graces. To the British, Johnson put on a face of British support, one that ensured America remained in Britain's favour, despite the lack of direct denouncement of Fenian activity. Finally, to Canada, Johnson put on a face of disregard, clearly letting them know he did not consider Canada to be legitimate enough or strong enough to be worthy of diplomatic communication. While seemingly inept in the eyes of American history, the history lived by the British and by Canada in regard to Johnson tells a different story of his character. These two nations experienced an Andrew Johnson who was strategic in devising and executing plans to further his interests, who could pick up on the motivations of the British and the Fenians, and who did not care about the consequences that the Fenian raids would have on Canada. Therefore, I argue that from the Canadian and British perspectives, he should be classified as a 'Richard the Third' president. Andrew Johnson was effectively a wolf in sheep's clothing, or rather a 'Richard the Third' president in Richard the Second's clothing.

Canadian Interests and Defensive Realism

To determine if Andrew Johnson forwarded Canadian interests, it is first necessary to determine what Canadian interests were at the time of Johnson's presidency, and what they are today. For this paper, I will consider Canadian interests through a realist lens, particularly defensive realism as defined by Fareed Zakaria in his book "From Wealth to Power". According to classical realists, a state "defines its interests in terms of power" (Zakaria, 1998, p.18). Where they differ from defensive realists, however, is the theory that when a state's power increases, is when they will be most likely to try to increase control over their surrounding environment (Zakaria, 1998, p.20). Zakaria explains that defensive realists consider expansion to be a state reaction which is derived from insecurity rather than increased power (Zakaria, 1998, p.21). While classical realists posit the theory that states expand out of confidence, defensive realists "maintain that states expand out of fear and nervousness" (Zakaria, 1998, p.21). For the purposesof this argument, I will consider the province of Canada's (Upper Canada and Lower Canada) efforts to convince Nova Scotia and New Brunswick to join them in unification as an act of expansionism, and thus Confederation as a successful effort to expand. 

The consequences of Andrew Johnson's facilitation of the Fenian raids hurt Canadian
interests previous to Confederation. This was not the result of Johnson intentionally trying to punish Canada in any strategic manner, but rather the result of his conception of Canada as an unimportant state which would not have the strength to seriously affect any negative impacts upon the United States, militarily or politically. While Johnson agreed to work with Britain, it's clear that he had no real interest in putting an end to the Fenian efforts, which was especially exemplified by the lack of prosecution for insurgents after the 1868 raid (Curtis, 1914, p.245). By allowing insurgents to operate from the United States, Johnson broke international neutrality laws which "requires a state to take reasonable measures to prevent action by private persons within its jurisdiction, directed against the peace and safety of friendly states or their citizens" (Curtis, 1914, p.6). At the time, Canada's standing in the international community was not legitimate enough to attract attention to Johnson's wrongdoings. As Johnson reinforced the idea that Canada was not a strong or legitimate state through his actions, Canada became a greater target for international mistreatment and other possible attacks. This left Canada in a seeming identity crisis, as "the surging Fenian threat tested Canada's civil and military institutions, the viability of its infrastructure, its capacity for autonomy, its tenor or loyalty, its patriotism, and its commitment to its heritage and traditions of personal liberty, justice, cultural and religious pluralism, and parliamentary integrity" (Vronsky, 2011, XXXII). Ultimately, the government-facilitated Fenian threats left Canada insecure and in fear for the future of their nation.

As theorized in defensive realism, Canada's insecurity led to their expansion and the eventual increase of Canadian power. At the height of their insecurity in 1866, the raids had the effect of rallying support in favour of Confederation in tentative provinces such as New Brunswick (Haglund, 2015, p.136). The Fenians managed to work in favour of Canadian nationalism (Neidhardt, 1975, p.135) despite their obvious malicious intentions, "it was almost as if the Fenians had been invented in the cause of Confederation" (Martin, 1990, p.9). Through Confederation, Canada was able to improve their military defenses and gain more economic power (Martin, 1990, p.11). If Johnson had followed international neutrality laws and subverted Fenian efforts, the insecurity which in large part facilitated Confederation may never have manifested. For this reason, it can be determined that Andrew Johnson unintentionally served Canada's best interest in the long term. 

Counterfactual Reasoning: Removing the Fenians.

To ensure that this paper is not affording too much weight to Johnson's role in effecting Confederation, I will utilize counterfactual reasoning, of which methods are presented by Robert Jervis in his article "Do Leaders Matter and How Would We Know?". This counterfactual will aim to determine the likelihood that Confederation would have occurred if Andrew Johnson had effectively subverted Fenian efforts and pre-emptively stopped the Fenian raids. A counterfactual involves changing a small but meaningful aspect of a historical situation to determine if that aspect had a true impact on the outcome of that situation (Jervis, 2013, p.160). In this counterfactual, I will remove the Fenians from the equation, thus considering the possibility of Confederation without the existence of the threat of invasion into Canada from the IRB. It is important to highlight the fact that predicting what would happen in a fictional scenario will never provide us with any sort of foundational discovery, but there is still value to the exercise of theorizing in this manner (Haglund, 2015, p.119).

To begin, I will consider other possible threats to Canadian security which would have produced similar insecurities regarding defense and power to those brought about by the Fenian raids. Some consider Manifest Destiny, an American expansionist movement which lasted roughly from the 1840s to the 1870s, to have presented enough of a threat to boost Canadian nationalism and eventually lead to Confederation (Robinson, 2019). While Canadians certainly feared the possibility of annexation by the United States for most of the 19th century, Canada faced very few substantial threats of military action from the United States in the 60s, with the latest legitimate threats being felt during the Oregon dispute. The Oregon dispute culminated when James K. Polk's expansionist administration pushed for the possible annexation of Oregon and its surrounding region but fizzled out after Britain and the United States signed the Oregon Treaty in 1846 (Noakes, 2021). Canadian worries of annexation rose after the U.S. purchase of Alaska in March of 1867, but due to its timing, I am unable to determine if this would have produced a threat strong enough to effect Confederation without the existence of the Fenian raids (Britannica, 2019). In 1866, the premier of Nova Scotia, Charles Tupper, had passed the terms of Confederation agreed to in Quebec City with the help of his government's majority in Nova Scotia's legislature (Tattrie, 2014). While New Brunswick did not formally agree to Confederation until July of 1867, the colony had elected a pro-Confederation government in 1866, which soon voted 38-1 in favour of Confederation (Tattrie, 2020). Since both Nova Scotia and New Brunswick had essentially committed to Confederation before the Alaska purchase in 1867, there is little literature which suggests this American move to have had any impact on the decision to sign Confederation in July of 1867.

To determine if Confederation would have occurred purely for economic reasons, it is important to consider the cancellation of the Reciprocity Treaty in 1865. By 1865, Canada was aware it would lose the economic benefits of the Reciprocity Treaty with the United States, which was officially abrogated a year after Lincoln would approve its cancellation in 1865 (Haynes, 1892, p.25-26). While the growth of Canadian domestic markets was a benefit of Confederation, and some say the cancellation of the Reciprocity Treaty played a part in the push to Confederation as it would allow colonies to increase their trade opportunities, it was ultimately not a deciding factor in the unification of Canada (Tattrie, 2019). This can be determined by considering the fact that the tentative colonies of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick attributed their ultimate decisions to support Confederation to the sense of nationalism created by the Fenian raids, rather than to the fact that unification would improve their economies. The answer to the counterfactual question presented earlier is that yes, Confederation would most likely have eventually occurred regardless of the Fenian raids, considering efforts to unify the colonies began before the Fenian threats emerged, but the official agreement to Confederation would have been agreed upon later than July 1867. Either another threat to Canadian security would have to come about to increase nationalist sentiment, or the economic situation would have to become so dire that the colonies would become desperate for thee trade opportunities that Confederation could provide.

Conclusion

By considering the history of Andrew Johnson's presidency, the kind of "bad" president he was and the impacts of his "bad" presidency on Canada, the ways in which Canada demonstrated defensive realism in response to the consequences Johnson affected for Canadian interests, and by considering the possibility of Confederation without him, this paper has concluded that Andrew Johnson played a significant role in effecting Canadian Confederation. This paper was also able to fill a gap in the broader scholarly analysis of Johnson's presidency by considering the character he displayed to the British and to Canada during his management of the Fenian efforts from 1865-1869. Considering the fact that Johnson's actions not only positively influenced Canada's ultimate decision to unify, but also provided an increase in the country's nationalist sense of identity, I can determine that he would rank quite high in the list of presidents from the Canadian perspective. While a specific position amongst presidents cannot be established without determining the Canadian perspective on all the other presidents, what can be determined is that Johnson would rank higher in the Canadian perspective compared to the American one, as they consistently place him (at the very least) among the worst ten presidents of all time. 

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