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**Defence and Security in the
Globalizing World**



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WIIS-CANADA
Women In International Security Canada
Queen's University

Politicus. *Fostering a Community of Scholars.*

Defence and Security in the Globalizing World

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Land Acknowledgement

The Arts & Science Undergraduate Society (ASUS) acknowledges that Queen's University is situated on Anishinaabe and Haudenosaunee territory. As an institution, ASUS has benefited from colonization in its destructive nature. Our complicity has allowed us as both individuals and an organization to have and provide the opportunities that have made up our traditions for our now 130 years of existence. We are committed to learning more in a goal of allyship in standing in solidarity with Indigenous persons, and dismantling systemic racial and ethnic discrimination, and other forms of oppression, in and beyond our roles at Queen's to work towards a truly inclusive campus.

Further, as we engage in academic theory and debate, Politicus must recognize the ongoing legacies of colonial oppression that continue to affect our world and the study of politics today.

Politicus is committed to seeing the growth of equity-seeking voices within our realm of academics, and beyond.

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Forward

It is with great excitement that we present the latest Special Issue of Politicus Journal, Defence and Security in the Globalizing World. This special issue, presented in partnership with Women in International Security-Queen's Chapter, has enabled the publication team to review scholarship focussed on the topics of international defence and security in consultation and advisement from our colleagues at WIIS-Queen's.

This edition is published preceding our upcoming general volume to be released in

Spring of 2022. We would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the incredible work conducted by our entire publication team during an exceptionally unpredictable time. This special issue would not have been possible without the guidance of Dr. Johanna Masse, Dr. Thomas Hughes, Dr. J. Andrew Grant and Dr. Jeremy Wildeman of Queen's University. These dedicated faculty members generously donated their expertise and insight into reviewing our published articles and ensuring their academic credibility. For this service, the publication team is extremely grateful.

The topics of international defence and security come to Politicus during a time where so much of the world has seen the COVID-19 pandemic alter defence and security risks. The pandemic circumstances continue to expose issues and opportunities for research on a variety of topics and highlights the rapidity of globalization in our current context. We encourage all readers to investigate independently and with peers into some of the defence and security issues that take place within, and beyond, their surrounding environment. Some relevant topics of independent study include examining culture change in the armed forces, cybersecurity threats, great power competitions, securitization of migration etc.

We want to specifically express our thanks the Academics Commission of the Arts & Science Undergraduate Society (ASUS) for their constant support, advisement and strategic planning. This has provided our team the resources necessary to make this publication possible. Specifically, we would like to thank the Academics Commissioner Tiffany Yung and Deputy Academics Commissioner Alicia Parker for their unwavering commitment to Politicus. The success of this issue is shared between the Politicus Editorial Board, marketing team, EDII advisement team, interns and WIIS-Queen's who have dedicated endless hours into making this a possibility. Enjoy the special issue!

Sincerest thanks,

Benjamin Fisher & Bruce Baker

Editors-in-Chief 2021-22



Benjamin Fisher & Bruce Baker
Editors-in-Chief, Politicus Journal

Forward

On behalf of WIIS-Queen's, we would like to take this opportunity to express our deepest gratitude to the Politicus team, their hard work and dedication in creating this Special Issue! We are incredibly honoured to have partnered with Politicus this year to focus on the important topic of international defence and security.

Our network, in affiliation with WIIS-Canada, is dedicated to advancing women's leadership at all stages of their careers in international peace and security. WI-

IS-Queen's is committed to promoting research excellence amongst the growing field of young academics in the field of international security. This Special Issue seeks to address the gap of research promotion for youth expertise in peace and security in foreign affairs, which is at the forefront of WIIS-Queen's goals.

Through the creation of this special issue, WIIS-Queen's and Politicus have sought to adhere to these values. Our incredible teams have dedicated numerous hours and expertise to this project, of which we are incredibly proud. We want to specifically acknowledge the work of our Communications, Events and Logistics teams, without whom this Special Issue would not have come together.

We are beyond excited for readers to expose themselves to the ever-growing literature on international defence and security. We hope readers will take the time to learn and conduct further research on the topics within and beyond the realm of the Special Issue.

The accomplishments of this issue are shared between the entire WIIS-Queen's and Politicus teams who have been incredibly devoted to the success of this publication.

We hope you enjoy!

Best,

Kaiya Jarvis & Robyn Kim

WIIS-Queen's Co-Presidents 2021-22



Canada's Guide to Intervention: Rwanda, Kosovo & Iraq

Mike Cabral

Introduction

Acting in unison with the United States has always been implied in the discourse of Canadian foreign policy (CFP) (Vucetic 2006:140). However, following Canada's decision not to join the coalition with Iraq, this assumption ought to be challenged. With this challenge in mind, this paper seeks to highlight the Canadian decision for intervention in Kosovo and answer the research question: why did Canada intervene in Kosovo? In this paper, I will argue that Canada meaningfully participated in the Kosovo intervention because the crisis satisfied two CFP criteria necessary under its Prime Minister Jean Chrétien (1993-2003) following the Cold War: positive domestic support and willing international partners. I will separate this paper into three sections. The first section will situate my research within the discourse by overviewing the relevant literature on this topic. The second section will compare Canada's decision to abstain from meaningfully participating in Rwanda and Iraq to Canadian participation in the Kosovo intervention and argue that Kosovo satisfied both criteria while Rwanda and Iraq only satisfied one. The final section will briefly discuss Canadian military and logistical contributions within Kosovo, the motivations behind these contributions, and the policy implications of my research.

Literature Review

As Manulak (2009) finds, there are two prominent arguments for why Canada participated in Kosovo. The first explanation argues that Canadian politicians were simply ventriloquists' dummies and that Canada exercised minimal independence in its decision to participate in Kosovo. The second argument theorizes that Canada was primarily motivated by its human security agenda. However, both of these arguments fail to conduct a thorough analysis as they do not adequately explain why Canada did not participate in Iraq, or meaningfully intervene in Rwanda.

Moreover, both these arguments also rely too heavily on domestic considerations for CFP during this time. The first line of reasoning follows what Zyla (2010) calls the 'declinist school of thought'. Within this, proponents argue that due to threats to national unity from Quebec and federal deficit issues, Canada abandoned its role on the international stage. Zyla finds through empirical research that while Canada experienced an absolute decrease in its military and foreign policy budget, this decline aligned with its allies, and that Canada in the 1990s remained a capable and willing ally. This notion is furthered by Nossal (1999) who argued that Canadians did not lack the will but rather the ability to be internationally influential in the post-Cold War era. In summary, following the end of the Cold War, Canada experienced an overall decline in its military and foreign policy budget; however, this does not translate to an overall decline in Canadian internationalism. Canada remained a steadfast ally but without fear for the Soviet Union, Canada now had a criterion for its internationalism, and more specifically, for its interventionism. Canada's domestic issues, as well as what it was capable of as a middle power, all had to be considered. Thus, both of the arguments highlighted by Manulak do not explain the complete picture of CFP decision making in Kosovo. From this, I turn now to the relevant literature regarding the domestic considerations from Canada during this time.

In his paper, Vucetic (2006) highlights Canada's non participation in the Iraq war through a constructivist lens. He argues that liberal discourses and the Canadian identity allowed Canada to remain adjacent from the war. His analysis highlights four variables that impact Canada's probability of joining coalitions: the type and legitimacy of the coalition, military capability, and the dyad-level affinity with the U.S. However, these variables underemphasize the role of the Canadian public or the international structure for CFP decision-making. As Von Hlatky and Massie

(2019) argue, liberal democracies are motivated by three potentially conflicting objectives: winning votes, holding office, and influencing policy. This in turn gives the Canadian public, or at least the votes that leaders need to win, increased influence in the CFP decision-making process. Not only are Canadians moved more by humanitarian impulses than cold-blooded or rational calculations of realpolitik, but also, liberal governments are expected to be more dovish when it comes to foreign policy intervention. Thus, the Canadian public – especially Quebec – played a considerable role in the Canadian state’s decision-making process during the 1990s and early 2000s. To summarize Zyla (2010), Canadian identity, Canadian politicians’ self-interest, and the specific threats facing Canada during this time mean that CFP analysts could not ignore domestic considerations when analyzing the Canadian decision-making process during this time. Keating (2004) pointed out that a combination of international, institutional, and personal pressures helps to shape the participation of Prime Ministers in internationalism. He quotes Kim Nossal who states that when a Prime Minister assumes office, they also assume a wide range of responsibilities that propel even those who have no interest in foreign policy into the international system. The problem with Keating and Nossal’s theory in this regard is they both assume that Chrétien had no – or little - interest in intervention, which to some degree is true. However, it is an oversight not to consider that Chrétien himself is Canadian and moved by the same humanitarian impulses as other Canadians. This impulse is a critical element that helps explain the differences in participation from Kosovo to Iraq, but does not encapsulate the complete picture. A purely humanitarian agenda does not explain the inadequate participation from Canada in Rwanda. For that, Kirkey and Ostroy (2010) argue that there is a tendency for authors to focus too heavily on the domestic considerations for state decision making. While their research is primarily focused on Afghanistan, they argue that middle powers, without the bipolarity of the international system, are freer to increase the range and scope of their foreign policy interest. The critical part of their findings is that Canada, under the unipolar system, was less obliged to defer to the United States, and by extension, Canada could deny the United States its help if it chose to. However, as David and Roussel (1999) both point out, while Canada may be freer to pursue its own goals within the international system, middle power is, on the whole, significantly decreased under a unipolar system. These arguments help explain why Canada

declined participation in Iraq, while also helping to quantify why Canada, due to its absolute decline in power under a unipolar system, could not meaningfully intervene in Rwanda without international partners.

In summary, Canada faced significant issues at home: a threat to national unity, issues with the federal deficit, and its citizens’ unwillingness to allow a high defence budget under the unipolar system. These issues help explain the Canadian decision-making process under Chrétien. Furthermore, while the authors tend to focus the literature heavily on Canadian reliance to the United States, or even its domestic considerations for internationalism alongside the benefit of its Iraq non-participation, my research answers why Canada participated in Kosovo. This literature falls under the consideration of its domestic problems, as well as the international system.

Case Study – Rwanda, Iraq, and Kosovo

In the following sections, I will overview the three case studies of this paper: Rwanda, Iraq, and Kosovo. Each case study will consist of a brief overview on the background of the conflict and why intervention was deemed necessary. For Rwanda and Iraq, their sections will first highlight the criteria they satisfied, and then the criteria they lacked. Kosovo will consider domestic support firstly, followed by a discussion regarding willing international partners. Each case study will consist of academic sources and books that focused on the conflict itself and some academic sources that consider CFP decision-making under Chrétien. Compared to Kosovo, the case study of Rwanda helps further my argument as the need for humanitarian intervention was necessary. However, Canada still could not meaningfully intervene in the crisis, highlighting that domestic considerations – or even a purely humanitarian agenda – does not fully explain the CFP decision-making process. The case study for Iraq helps explain the opposite; willing international partners as a criterion for Canadian intervention are not enough to warrant intervention from Canada. Using these case studies as background further contextualizes my argument that Canada participated in Kosovo because it met the two criteria necessary for intervention under a unipolar system.

Rwanda

Since 1994, the country of Rwanda has become globally recognizable due to its being the site of one of the worst genocides of the 20th century. From April of 1994 through June, the army and government-run mili-

tias of the Hutu Rwanda regime ethnically cleansed the minority Tutsi population, and any who opposed the cleansing, even other Hutu groups (Storey 2010:386). In just under 100 days, more than 800,000 people were slaughtered, which was more deaths than the entirety of the two-year Bosnian civil war (Lemachand 2004:395). In addition to the violence, an estimated 250,000 women and girls were raped by the Interahamwe militia, resulting in more than 70 percent of these victims testing positive for HIV (Cohen 2007:1). What is clear is that the crisis called for international humanitarian intervention. Widely televised by Western media, states could not claim ignorance, and yet they looked on and provided no support. Even Canada, who had been involved in the region economically and politically for thirty years and prided itself as a humanitarian focused country, failed to adequately support the countries' population (Adelman & Suhrke 1999:187).

From a domestic standpoint, Canada as primarily motivated by Western media's depictions of the crisis, was eager to help in the conflict (Keating 2004:122). The need for a peacekeeping mission was widely supported by both the public and the leading liberal government under Chrétien. Thus, when the United Nations asked Canada to lead a peacekeeping mission, they provided Major General Romeo Dallaire some 2500 troops to command (Walter 2005:9). Initially, this force was part of an international coalition, primarily made up of Belgian forces. However, when the conflict heightened, states including Canada were caught flatfooted, and from then on, countries involved were primarily motivated to save their citizens first and foremost (Adelman and Suhrke 1999:199). Following this intensification of violence, Canada's partners pulled out of the conflict and Canada was the only country to reinforce its now dwindling contingent of peacekeepers in the country (Adelman and Suhrke 1999:200). This reinforcement meant that the Canadian government and, by extension, the Canadian public, still supported the intervention even if it put their citizens in harm. Thus, Rwanda satisfied the criteria for domestic public support; however, it lacked willing international partners.

Contrary to the accepted wisdom, the international community did not ignore the signs of impending genocide. They paid attention, but simply misinterpreted them (Adelman and Suhrke 1999:198). Thus, before the genocide, no further peacekeepers were provided by the United Nations (U.N.). When the conflict intensified, lacking ground knowledge, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) threw in the blood-

ied towel and all but abandoned the Hutu and Tutsi people to roaming gangs as they unanimously voted to cut back the blue helmets in the country (Melvern 2001:202). Likewise, Canada could not generate support from its traditional bilateral partners as both the United States and the United Kingdom had signaled to the entire international community that they believed the best course of action was to pull out all but a token force of U.N. peacekeepers from Rwanda (Melvern 2001:203).

In summary, the Rwandan genocide satisfies the criteria of positive domestic public support; as a result, Canada attempted to intervene in the crisis. However, the critical distinction here is that Canada's involvement was not tantamount to intervention; their willingness to intervene does not constitute a meaningful intervention as the Canadian peacekeepers in the region were helpless to stop the genocide without support from international partners. In totality, while Canada showed high support before, during, and especially after, the evidence from the overwhelming support Canada showed towards General Dallaire when he returned did not satisfy the second criteria. Therefore, Canada lacked the military presence required to act unilaterally to end the conflict. Thus, Rwanda did not satisfy both criteria necessary for Canadian intervention, which resulted in an inability to meaningfully intervene.

Iraq

Following the attack on the World Trade Centre on September 11th, 2001, American President George Bush Jr. declared a global war on terror. To that end, the United States and its international partners, including Canada, mounted an offensive in Afghanistan against the perpetrator of the attack, Osama Bin Laden and his terrorist group al-Qaeda (Bassil 2012:29). However, suspecting links between Iraq and al-Qaeda, Bush, and his government, began making plans for the invasion of Iraq. The rationale behind this invasion was three-fold. The first was the fight against terrorism, as Iraq under Saddam Hussein was presented as a state supporting al-Qaeda amongst other terror groups. The second was the elimination of weapons of mass destruction that the U.S. insisted Iraq had access to. The third was the arrest of Hussein, the abolishment of his regime, and the introduction of peace and democracy within the region (Bassil 2012: 30). To that end, along with a broad coalition of the willing, the U.S. decided to intervene in Iraqi affairs without a UNSC resolution, and most importantly for this paper, without military or

logistical support from Canada.

At the onset of the intervention, the coalitions consisted of 48 countries (Bassil 2012:354). These 48 countries represented some of Canada's oldest allies and most significant trading partners, consisting of the majority of the G-7, NATO, and OECD countries (Fawn 2008:526). Even with these relations, Canada still denied them all but philosophical support. What ought to be clear in this respect is that Canada did not lack willing international partners for intervention in this campaign. As Vucetic puts it, Canada was not militarily incapable but politically unwilling to intervene (Vucetic 2006:133). Thus, for Canada, the Iraq conflict satisfied the second criteria of willing international support.

The domestic consideration for Chrétien's decision was enabled by the United States' inability to sufficiently prove that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, which was sharply criticized by Canadian journalists, politicians, and the general public at large (Schmidt and Williams 2008:193). Throughout the decision-making process, many prominent politicians – even those within Chrétien's party – voiced their apprehension to Canadian participation in the conflict (Fawn 2008:527). However, I argue the most critical consideration in this respect was Quebec. While Canadians consistently polled disfavouredly to the invasion with an average of 30 percent in favour (Von Hlatky and Massie 2019:108), Quebec, on the other hand, routinely polled highly disfavouredly towards participating within the intervention as demonstrated by the quantitative metrics which indicate that only 23% were in favour of pursuing interventionist policy. (Fawn 2008:527). Given previous threats to national unity in Canada during this time, Quebec domestic consideration was undoubtedly a chief consideration for Chrétien's decision not to participate in the intervention. Another consideration was that those primarily favouring intervention were not electorally profitable for Chrétien or the liberals, as support for intervention was primarily situated among Canada's centre-right/right-leaning voters (Von Hlatky and Massie 2019:108). Therefore, the Canadian public – or at least those who mattered to Chrétien's electoral successes – were vocally against the notion of intervention in Iraq, especially Quebec. Thus, unable to satisfy the second criteria for intervention, positive domestic support, Canada decided against participating in Iraq.

In summary, Canada did not lack willing international partners for intervention in Iraq, but it did lack positive public support. What is clear here is that

Canadian domestic considerations are as important as international ones, as for the first time in its history Canada turned down both the United States and United Kingdom's request for help. Thus, unable to satisfy both its criteria, Canada did not participate in the Iraq intervention.

Kosovo

NATO had been involved in the Balkans since 1992 as it attempted to keep the peace in the former Yugoslavia (Schulte 1997:20). However, it would not be until NATO's 78-day bombing campaign that the alliance would become involved in an offensive manner (Henkin 1999: 828). Grumblings of the impending conflict began in 1989 when the Yugoslav government compelled the Kosovan assembly to repeal its once-extensive provincial autonomy (Manulak 2011:355). After years of passive resistance to the growing control of Serbia over Kosovo, the Kosovo Albanians began to favour more violent oppositional methods, such as those employed by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) who launched guerrilla warfare attacks against Serbian forces throughout 1997 and 1998 (Manulak 2009:566). The Serbian force, being ill-trained in counter-insurgency warfare and confounded by the arrogance of the KLA, often retaliated disproportionately against Albanian civilians (Manulak 2009:566). In the summer of 1998, a massacre by Serbian police of a central village in Kosovo became well-publicized, and NATO concluded that their non-military response to this conflict had been inadequate. On October 8th, 1998, NATO began talks of a military activation order, and on the 13th, the order was approved (Manulak 2009:568). This order called on all NATO members to support the air-bombing campaign with its mission of eradicating the ethnic cleansing that was happening in Kosovo.

The Canadian public was outraged by the widely publicized Serbian violence, and the intervention had broad backing in Canada from the start. At the campaign's onset, an Angus opinion poll reported that two-thirds of Canadians backed the bombing campaign, while 60 percent supported introducing ground troops in Kosovo (Manulak 2009:571). When the mission was being debated in the House of Commons in October of 1998, all five of Canada's political parties favoured the intervention (Manulak 2009:571). Throughout the entire mission, Canadians remained supportive of the humanitarian intervention (Geislerova 1999:17). This support from the public, coupled with the unanimous support from parliament and

favourable media coverage, allowed the government to increase its military operation in Kosovo. In totality, Canadians showed from the onset both high levels of public and parliamentary support for intervention in Kosovo.

With domestic support for the mission clearly established, Canada needed only to find willing international partners. These partner forces were found in droves. The mission was supported by all NATO allies, the philosophical support from the UN, and the tentative support from Russia (Kritsiotis 2000: 332). With the entirety of NATO's 17 member states providing support, NATO would swiftly and unquestionably crush the Yugoslav forces without losing a single allied soldier (Thussu 2000:346). While from the outset the shift in orientation from deterrence to offensive action generated confusion within NATO, at their 50th anniversary meeting in 1999, the alliance resolve was strengthened around the notion that NATO's credibility and new mandate would not survive defeat in Kosovo (Manulak 2009:575). Thus, with the full support of NATO, Canada had willing international partners for its Kosovan intervention. Satisfying both these necessary criteria for intervention, Canada would shoulder a burden consistent with that of its middle power status and likewise, was able to pursue its new human security-focused foreign policy agenda.

In summary, this section has argued that Canada participated in Kosovo because the crisis satisfied the two criteria for Canadian intervention in the post-Cold War era: positive domestic support and willing international partners.

Policy Implications

When Canada satisfied its two criteria for intervention within the Kosovo crisis, they would disproportionately contribute to the effort, ranking third overall for military force contributions (Zyla 2010:32). This support runs in contrast to the accepted wisdom of Canadian retreat from internationalism as referenced by Zyla. The point is that while it is true that Canada saw an absolute decline in their military and foreign policy capabilities, this did not translate to an absolute decline in Canadian internationalism. As Nossal (1999) highlights, the want to be international was not lacking, the overall ability was (Nossal 1999:91). In this respect, Canada, lacking the military capabilities and an overall domestic consensus had more to consider under the leadership of Chrétien. Thus, while Canada may not have contributed as much as it did in the Cold War era when it did participate, it did so whole-

heartedly. One, however, should not conclude that the Canadian state acted purely out of altruism within this intervention. There is considerable evidence to support the conclusion that Canada was acting in self-interest in Kosovo, being unwilling – or unable – to increase its military budget, it was therefore in Canada's interest for NATO to show strength in Kosovo and bring the conflict to a swift end and an unquestionable victory for NATO. This way, given the inevitability of future conflict, NATO would have a history of following through on threats. This show of strength was meant to ensure a foreign leader would be more likely to acquiesce to NATO's demands in the future, and in total, decrease the likelihood that Canada would be called upon for military contributions moving forward.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this paper has argued that Canada participated in the Kosovo intervention because the crisis satisfied the two necessary criteria for Canadian interventionist movements in the post-Cold War era: positive domestic support and willing international partners. This was first argued by critiquing contemporary research and situating my own arguments within the relevant literature. Secondly, this research highlighted the case studies of Rwanda, Iraq, and Kosovo and demonstrated that Kosovo, unlike the other two cases, met the criteria of positive domestic support and willing international partners. The final section discussed Canadian contributions to Kosovo and argued against the altruistic narrative of the intervention. Kosovo, as a whole, would also change the perceptions within Canada of cosmopolitanism. As John Polanyi argues, Kosovo made the clear case that there are limits to what a country can do within its own territory and created the perception that the duty to protect humanity being did not stop at Canada's border (Geislorova 1999:15). Beyond that, my research illustrates that CFP decision making is not dependent on the actions of the US and I argue that henceforth, the literature surrounding CFP ought to place more emphasis not only on the partners Canada has on the international stage, but also the domestic limits Canadian politicians face when deciding to commit military assets internationally to resolve conflicts of interest.

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The Case of Internally Displaced Persons in Columbia: Invisible and Inadequately Served

Rachel Hierholzer

Introduction

Colombia houses one of the highest populations of internally displaced persons (IDPs), accounting for 12.5% of their total population (Schultz et al. 2014). Displacement in Colombia is at the intersection of armed conflict and the lack of land ownership by IDPs, the majority of whom are campesinos, or rural peasants, largely of indigenous or Afro-Colombian descent (Fadnes and Horst 2010). IDPs also frequently remain invisible due to fear from the armed groups displacing them or their inability to meet support criteria, which leaves them unsupported and unrecognized by the Colombian government. Political elite and decision makers in Columbia are often wealthy landowners who have no desire to redistribute land to resolve some of the issues suffered by IDPs, causing harm for those facing conflict-induced displacement in their unwillingness to undertake reforms (Fadnes and Horst 2010). By contrast, the government has implemented several solutions that focus on repatriation, local integration, and humanitarian assistance. I argue that the so-called solutions in place to support conflict-induced IDPs in Colombia are inadequate because they ignore the structural causes of displacement and do not address IDPs' choice to remain invisible from fear of persecution. As a consequence of IDPs' chosen invisibility and the establishment of temporary and inadequate solutions, IDPs' extreme social and economic precarity is made worse.

In order to make this case, in this essay I will first define what constitutes an IDP and durable solution. After that, I will examine in which ways the Colombian government does not adequately offer working solutions of repatriation and local integration for IDPs. Then I will analyze how the focus on humanitarian aid as a solution is unsustainable and exclusionary to most IDPs. Finally, I will offer alternative models that focus on local governance, address structural causes of displacement, and promote proactive rather than

reactive support to IDPs.

Contextualizing Internal Displacement

The leading causes of conflict-related internal displacement in Colombia are drug trafficking and its associated illegal activity, and armed conflict (Schultz et al. 2014). Political violence involving paramilitaries, guerillas, and the national army has been occurring for decades, using rural land as a pawn and the site of conflict in attempts to gain power and legitimacy (Fadnes and Horst 2010). Rural land has been used by these armed groups to strengthen their territorial control and cultivate agricultural land for profit (Ibid.). Campesinos, largely poor populations from rural areas, are already marginalized. This makes them extremely vulnerable to displacement and in need of support once displaced.

The government has implemented Law 387, which ensures the right of citizens to not be forcibly displaced and allocates humanitarian assistance to IDPs, while following the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (Ibid.). Registro Unico de Poblacion Desplazada (RUPD) acts as Colombia's IDP registry system and also provides emergency protections (Carrillo 2009). Law 387 and RUPD attempt to provide working solutions to IDPs in the form of repatriation, local integration, and humanitarian assistance.

IDPs & Durable Solutions

Adopted by the United Nations, the Guiding Principles are a standardized tool for addressing internal displacement for governments and non-governmental organizations. (Mooney 2005). The Guiding Principles define IDPs as:

“Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized

violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border” (Mooney 2005, 11).

Repatriation and local integration to another part of the country are outlined as two durable solutions for IDPs in the Guiding Principles (Mooney 2005). They also state that internal displacement shall last no longer than required (Mooney 2005). According to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, “a durable solution is achieved when IDPs no longer have specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and such persons can enjoy their human rights without discrimination resulting from their displacement” (2010, 5).

However, the Guiding Principles are not legally binding and simply provide a framework for the issue of internal displacement. IDPs only become an international concern when domestic governments fail to support them. Therefore, it is ultimately Colombia’s responsibility to address the situation. Furthermore, Law 387 explicitly states it is the responsibility of the Colombian state to formulate policies and measures to address issues related to and the prevention of forced displacement (Fadnes and Horst 2010). So, the problem that arises is that Colombia has seemingly good protocols in place but does not following through on them with appropriate or durable measures. This will be explored further in the following sections.

Shortcomings of Repatriation

Land Ownership and Fear of Return

The current working solution for the repatriation of Colombian IDPs is inadequate because it does not address the lack of land ownership as a driving force of internal displacement and as an obstacle to repatriation. The issue of land ownership and rural land as a site of violence has been prominent in Colombia for decades (Fadnes and Horst 2010). By focusing on repatriation as the leading solution to internal displacement in Colombia, it frames displacement solely as a physical issue and ignores the political causes (Long 2014). Internal displacement is part of a larger structural issue of marginalization and political exclusion in land ownership in Colombia for campesinos, indigenous peoples, and Afro-Colombians (Long 2014). Thus, the prevalent approach of repatriation does not address the need for land ownership as a necessary element in preventing forced displacement and supporting IDPs who desire to return to their land.

The state has implemented a program that seeks to demobilize self-defence and paramilitary groups by granting them immunity and resettlement if they end their involvement in conflict (Fadnes and Horst 2010). This is problematic for the repatriation of IDPs, as the very groups that forced them to flee are now being settled on that same land to which the government wants them to return (Ibid.). In addition, the state lacks territorial control broadly due to the illicit drug trade (Ibid.). For these reasons, many IDPs fear returning to their homeland (Schultz et al. 2014).

Migration is a cycle and much more complex than moving from one place to another (Erdal and Oeppen 2018). IDPs often tend to flee to the closest town or urban centre, and then continue migrating onto the bigger cities like Bogotá (Carrillo 2009). Common secondary migration such as this demonstrates how repatriation is not the desired solution for most IDPs. The focus on repatriation as the main ‘durable’ solution by policymakers ignores what the majority of those displaced actually desire: “[r]ealizable rights... physical security, a livelihood, opportunities for education and development” (Long 2014, 5). In the case of Colombian IDPs, repatriation is not viable because of their fear of return and their lack of land ownership rights as marginalized communities. Therefore, the Colombian state’s failure to recognize the broader structural barriers to IDPs’ safe and sustainable return to their land makes repatriation an inadequate solution.

Secondary Migration and Chosen Invisibility

At least one tenth of the Colombian population has been identified as internally displaced, but the true amount may be higher as many IDPs go unnoticed (Højen 2015). The Colombian state’s focus on repatriation as the main solution to internal displacement is also inadequate because it denies that the majority of IDPs remain invisible out of fear, and therefore does not structurally address the issue of internal displacement. Many conflict-induced IDPs do not claim their status because they fear retaliation by the armed groups displacing them for spreading information. They also fear claiming IDP status due to the history of IDPs being threatened or killed for speaking out on the restoration of land rights (Schultz et al. 2014). The state’s framing of repatriation as the main working solution ignores IDPs’ agency because many IDPs prefer staying in urban centres rather than returning to their rural homelands (Carrillo 2009). Rosa Fierro is an IDP living in Piedras Blancas, an impoverished community

in Bogota, who speaks on her inability to return home: “they tried to kill my father and we managed to escape with our lives. If I ever went back I’d either be killed or recruited as a paramilitary” (O’Donnell 2017). This example is reflective of IDPs’ desire to stay where they are or continue migrating, rather than return to their homeland. The secondary migration and chosen invisibility of many IDPs in Colombia has led to a large population of IDPs in prolonged states of displacement, highlighting the failure of the state’s current measures (Long 2014). For instance, many IDPs have expressed intra-urban displacement as a common reality because they are exposed to violence and gangs and need to move, but do not want to lose the access to services in cities (Anyadike 2013). Repatriation does not address the fact that most IDPs remain invisible out of fear or want of continued migration and is therefore a flawed solution.

Depoliticization

Repatriation does not address IDPs marginalized position or their deliberate invisibility, and because of flaws in its contextual inadequacies, actually exacerbates their economic and social precarity. When repatriation frames the solution to internal displacement as technical and physical, rather than structural and political, IDPs become depoliticized (Fadnes and Horst 2010). Depoliticization refers to the removal of a subject, like internal displacement, from public policy making and public discussion (Feindt et al. 2020). Depoliticizing IDPs undermines their agency and societal role, thereby exacerbating their marginalization from society. This occurs by ignoring the individualized nature of displacement and their need for land ownership rights and protection from armed groups.

Yet, IDPs are very much political actors in Colombia’s armed conflicts. They are forced to flee their homes because their territory is valued and their potential allegiance to an armed group is weaponized by opposing groups (Steele 2018). In this way, displacement of campesinos is a conflict strategy to gain power over opponents by clearing the land of people who may be affiliated with that opponent (Amnesty International 2008). The state’s current repatriation model does not address the threat by armed conflict groups to IDPs as a barrier; current state solutions to internal displacement also does not recognize the necessary inclusion of the campesinos, indigenous peoples, and Afro-Colombians in land rights in order to integrate them into society and support their economic stability (Fadnes and

Horst 2010; Schultz et al. 2014). As the state pushes for repatriation of IDPs without addressing rural armed conflict and land ownership rights, IDPs continue to be marginalized and depoliticized.

Shortcomings of Local Integration

Similar to repatriation, the Colombian government frames local integration as a viable durable solution for IDPs, however, this solution is inadequate because many IDPs do not meet the criteria for support and are left unrecognized by the government, thereby increasing their social and economic precarity. A majority of the campesinos who are being forced off their rural land into urban areas have limited education and limited income sources, as their earnings are often tied to the land and therefore lost with displacement (Fadnes and Horst 2010). Of the IDPs coming from rural areas, 85% are living in extreme poverty (Carrillo 2009). Once in urban centres, these IDPs cannot get work because of their limited education and their lack of capital. This makes it difficult for IDPs to support themselves or generate their own income by creating their own work.

After initial temporary humanitarian aid, there are programs in place to support IDPs’ socio-economic conditions for local integration. The government offers worker training, economic incentives, and assistance to implement income-generating projects, but only 12% of registered IDP households receive this support. This is a fraction of the total IDP population since most choose to remain invisible (Carrillo 2009). IDPs mostly cannot get this support because they are not registered under the RUPD, they do not meet the education requirements, or they cannot afford the additional program costs such as paying for transportation (Carrillo 2009). To illustrate, the majority of IDPs living in urban centres are experiencing extreme poverty and only 3% of the money they do make is spent on education (Højen 2015). Many IDP children are unable to attend school because uniforms, books, or transportation costs too much, despite schooling being free to Colombian children (Højen 2015).

The government’s framing of local integration as a viable durable solution ignores the structural barriers to IDPs’ smooth transition to urban life as campesinos and ethnic minorities in Colombia. This prior marginalization structures their economic and social precarity, which is exacerbated when their livelihood is displaced, and they must adapt to a new environment. Local integration and the requirement to register to receive support also ignores the structural barrier of

IDPs' chosen invisibility as a result of retaliation from the armed groups that displaced them. Without permanent and long-term assistance from the government, IDPs are unable to meet their basic needs and smoothly integrate into the local society (Carrillo 2009). Therefore, the failure of local integration support programs to address IDPs' marginalization, economic precarity, and invisibility makes local integration an inadequate solution that does not relieve the structural causes and barriers to IDPs' betterment.

Local integration is also inadequate as a durable solution because the policy does not recognize the hostility between IDPs and urban dwellers as an obstacle to rural-urban transition. There is a large gap in Colombian society between the rural and urban populations that has existed for centuries, and IDPs as campesinos are viewed as a threat to urban culture (Fadnes and Horst 2010). IDPs are therefore met with hostility from hosting urban communities and viewed as a threat to available social programming, especially by the urban poor (Carrillo 2009). In Colombia, municipalities are categorized according to their population, but with IDPs continued migration and invisibility, these numbers are generally inaccurate, and the budget for each municipality is stretched to assist more than originally accounted for (Carrillo 2009). The solution of local integration fails to adequately address this rural-urban divide and lack of resources to support the IDP population.

Without support that addresses IDPs' specific needs as a marginalized community, their attempt to integrate locally exacerbates economic and social precarity. IDPs in urban centres often lack access to livelihood needs and secure employment opportunities, and instead must work exploitative jobs in the informal sector (Cotroneo 2017). Also, IDPs coming from areas controlled by armed groups are often believed to be affiliated with such groups, which leads to their persecution by the public (Amnesty International 2008). As a result, many IDPs coming to urban areas do not claim IDP status and cannot benefit from any potential local integration support. In short, this policy does not account for IDPs' structurally disadvantaged position in urban centres, making it an inadequate solution that does not address their economic insecurity or alleviates their social precarity; it may even make it worse.

Humanitarian Aid as an Unsustainable Solution

The government's focus on humanitarian aid to IDPs provides inadequate support because it does not address the underlying political and structural drivers

of Colombia's conflict induced displacement. The IDPs that choose to remain invisible out of fear do not register under the RUPD, and therefore cannot receive any of the emergency support designated to IDPs (Carrillo 2009). The divide between IDPs who are and are not registered under the RUPD highlights invisibility as a primary issue with proposing humanitarian support as a solution, as it is not available to all who are displaced. Law 387 and the RUPD outline the provision of humanitarian support to registered IDPs for three months, with the potential expansion of another three months if necessary (Fadnes and Horst 2010). The humanitarian aid is also facilitated by international organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross and World Food Program, who provide assistance to IDPs for up to six months (Carrillo 2009).

While this support is beneficial for the immediate needs of IDPs, support that helps IDPs achieve long-term success in their new environments is insufficient. Humanitarian aid merely supports IDPs to the point of basic survival (Long 2014). This makes humanitarian aid an inadequate solution because it does not provide long term safety and security nor an adequate standard of living, which are both markers of an achieved durable solution (IASC 2010).

Reducing IDPs to recipients of aid removes them from their linkage to political conflict and allows the state to address internal displacement without addressing the underlying and structural causes (Fadnes and Horst 2010). Humanitarian aid provided by the government and international organizations is short-term and does not address the structural and political issues faced by conflict-induced IDPs, making it an insufficient replacement for durable solutions. Consequently, the social and economic precarity of IDPs is inadequately addressed because the support given is unsustainable, and most IDPs receive no support as they are not statistically recognized.

Proposing humanitarian aid as a durable solution is inadequate because it victimizes and dehumanizes IDPs through misleading representation and frames internal displacement as apolitical. IDPs are represented problematically as humanitarian aid recipients: "images of... internally displaced people are commonly characterized by helplessness, suffering, and loss. This represents the displaced as a universal mass of victims, abstracted from the specific political and historical context which caused the displacement" (Fadnes and Horst 2010, 117). This representation removes the agency and political power of IDPs, and in doing so depoliticizes internal displacement.

Such representation of IDPs relates to the government's poorly formulated policy solutions, like repatriation, that fail to acknowledge the role of conflict and violence as a cause of displacement. The failure to address the structural and political aspects of internal displacement exacerbates IDPs economic and social precarity, because the majority are left unsupported and unrecognized by the government. Humanitarian aid is therefore not a sufficient alternative to proper durable solutions because it mischaracterizes IDPs and internal displacement as apolitical.

Alternative Solutions

I propose that the solutions to internal displacement should expand control to include local governance, address structural causes of displacement, and promote proactive rather than reactive support to IDPs. The lack of coordination and institutional capacity by the Colombian state is a major barrier to current durable solution strategies. Internal displacement is currently framed as a federal responsibility. However, delegating some responsibility to municipalities would allow for them to incorporate IDPs in their local development plans and resource allocation (Albuja and Ceballos 2010). Given that a large majority of IDPs settle in urban areas, it would be proactive for cities to have the capacity to include IDPs in their budget and urban planning schemes. In this model, IDPs are framed as a part of urban space rather than an external burden on urban resources. This inclusion would provide a better foundation for longer-term socio-economic support. To make repatriation more viable as a solution, it is essential that Colombia tackles the source of the conflict causing internal displacement. The government needs to take more responsibility for its own role in conflict and not remain a pawn in the illicit drug trade by participating in bribes and corruption that feed into the violence (Højen 2015). Government and law enforcement should take the initiative and proactively enforce the programs and laws that seek to protect the country's vulnerable populations. For example, the legal proceedings that are intended to help IDPs reclaim land or receive justice from perpetrators of violence are notoriously slow, which deters IDPs from seeking out such support (Højen 2015). The extreme economic and social inequality experienced in Colombia, especially by campesinos as an already racialized and marginalized population, needs to be addressed. The inequality in Colombia is an extremely complex issue, but a starting point could be expanding social welfare programs to include the poorest populations.

At the simplest level, the government should make obtaining identification cards much more accessible to IDPs, and not make claiming IDP status necessary in respect to their potential desire to avoid retaliation from the groups displacing them. Identification cards would allow IDPs to access government services like education and healthcare and have access to the formal labour market (Højen 2015).

Since many IDPs have limited education or are illiterate, establishing locations that offer translations to Indigenous languages or offer verbal transactions of information and support on gaining identification would be beneficial. Many IDPs have expressed that the support they want most is in obtaining secure jobs and income, so switching the focus to employment-based strategies would be suited to what IDPs actually want (Hanson 2012). Overall, the government needs to proactively work to address conflict and social and economic inequality in Colombia to prevent internal displacement.

Conclusion

Colombia's current durable solutions for IDPs are inadequate because they fail to address the structural causes and problems of internal displacement, which in turn depoliticizes IDPs and exacerbates their marginality. The solutions currently in place fail to address the fact that a majority of IDPs in Colombia choose to remain invisible out of fear that the armed groups that displaced them will retaliate, making the minimal support provided for them unattainable. Repatriation as a solution fails to recognize IDPs as important political agents and ignores the importance of land ownership rights in both preventing and solving internal displacement. No matter how many programs the government implements, repatriation will not be a safe or viable option while rural land remains a site of conflict and a pawn of armed groups. Further, local integration solutions do not adequately address the hostility of urban populations toward marginalized IDP populations, nor the inability of most IDPs to meet local integration support criteria.

Repatriation and local integration are not inherently bad solutions, but changes to the social and political climate of Colombia need to occur for them to be more beneficial to IDPs. Humanitarian aid provides for immediate needs, but also characterizes IDPs as apolitical victims, and does not provide long-term sustainability. The amount of Colombian IDPs in a prolonged state of displacement indicates that the state's current solutions are not working. The inadequacy of these

so-called durable solutions highlights how problematizing migration and allowing policy makers, like the Colombian state, to determine the needs of IDPs is not necessarily a solution. To create sustainable change, working solutions to internal displacement need to consider IDPs' agency and needs while also addressing the political and structural causes of displacement.

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Great Power is Back: New Zealand as a Template for Canadian Defence Strategies

Morgan Fox

Introduction

It is uncontroversial to say that the world is currently in a period of great power competition (GPC). This competition has been characterized by increased strategic and defensive positioning between the international system's great powers, primarily the United States (US) and China. What is less frequently considered in news headlines and academic literature is the role of middle powers in this new era of strategic competition, and how they are utilizing their unique skillsets to respond and react to GPC. This essay will attempt to better understand Canada's role as a middle power by comparing its defence strategy with another middle power: New Zealand. After situating this essay in the context of GPC, the international rules-based order, and the concept of middle powers, I will outline the path New Zealand's defence strategy has taken since 2010, primarily through the analysis of its several defence white papers. I will then use New Zealand as a case study of best practices for Canada regarding defence, and will thus argue that, like New Zealand, Canada should make better use of its reputation as a peacekeeper and foreign aid donor, rather than as a traditionally strong military.

Context

Before analyzing in further detail New Zealand's defence strategies, I will begin by explaining the general relevance of GPC, the rules-based order, and middle powers. While great power competition had been relegated to the Cold War, in the past five years, GPC has returned to the news headlines and has become part of day-to-day policy work. Despite this, its definition and goals remain vague. The US Department of Defence offers this definition of GPC: "when large nations vie for the greatest power and influence – not just in their own parts of the world, but also farther out" (Lopez 2019). In other words, compared to the

1990s, when the US did not have any serious rivals or peer competitors economically, diplomatically, or militarily (Lopez 2019), it now has several, and faces a world featuring "multiple powers with divergent interests and objectives" (Friedman 2019).

In practice though, the definition of GPC is not especially explanatory. It is unclear what success within the context of great power competition would look like, how a country would obtain it, or if it is even possible. Various scholars have suggested that, for the US, winning could mean: "achieving a favorable regional balance of powers" (Friedman 2019), all powers exercising a "degree of respect" for the multilateral system (Jones 2020), preserving the US's existing level of hegemony (Wyne 2019), or ensuring that US allies can "chart their own courses without interference from a domineering regional hegemon" (Colby and Mitchell 2019). Any of these are possible outcomes, but they are not guaranteed, and they are especially unassured if the US does not identify a long-term goal and strategy for getting there.

It is broadly agreed upon that, at the very least, the United States wishes to maintain the rules-based international order, despite recent upsets and disparagement from former President Donald Trump (Amirfar and Singh 2018, 443). Like GPC, numerous debates surround the definition, but it can be generally described as the shared commitment between nations to act in accordance with agreed rules (United Nations Association of Australia 2015), such as international law, trade agreements, and treaties. Moreover, it denotes a baseline level of predictability for interstate relations, and, while the content of these orders has varied over time, the most enduring ones usually rest on broader foundations than simple submission (Stewart 2016). Some of the most important rules of the current international order include sovereignty, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, an obligation to combat terrorism, promoting human rights and democ-

racy, and not altering borders by force (Stewart 2016). The United States would argue that its position as a world leader, and therefore, the rules-based international is at risk if they lose GPC (Freidman 2019).

In the context of GPC, it is also important to understand the role of middle powers. Like GPC itself, there is much confusion and disagreement regarding which countries can be identified as a middle power, what characteristics they have, and how they generally act in the international system (Patience 2014). Middle powers hold a position in the international power spectrum that “is in the ‘middle’ – below that of a superpower ... or of a great power ... but with sufficient ability to shape international events” (Robertson 2017, 359). In terms of their behaviour, middle powers generally seek multilateral solutions to international problems, advocate for compromise, and are typically considered legitimizers of the current world order (Jordaan 2003). Countries that are usually categorized as middle powers include Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, Norway, South Korea, South Africa, and Ireland, among many others.

I will now explain why I am choosing to focus on New Zealand as a case study for comparison with Canada. While they could not be further away geographically, New Zealand bears many similarities to Canada. Both share numerous historical and cultural ties as primarily anglophone, Commonwealth states – and as liberal democracies. Canada and New Zealand are both members of the Five Eyes intelligence pooling alliance, a “community” (Vucetic 2020) that also includes Australia, the UK, and the US. From a defence perspective, while Canada has a much greater number of active armed forces than New Zealand (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2021, 517), both countries prioritize peacekeeping and disaster relief missions (Mapp 2018). Despite their differences in size, Canada and New Zealand both rely heavily on the rules-based international order (Chase and Moroney 2020), as demonstrated through their respective reputations as regular participants in United Nations peacekeeping missions (New Zealand Government 2016). New Zealand’s unique position as a geographic peer of China – the US’s primary rival in GPC – also makes it an especially good case study. In short, New Zealand’s position as a Western democracy and a middle power in the American sphere of influence, with numerous similarities to Canada, makes it an ideal source for comparison and policy emulation.

New Zealand’s Defence Evolution

I will now elaborate on the evolution of New Zealand’s defence strategy over the past decade. New Zealand has historically straddled a unique diplomatic position of neutrality between China and the US, but in recent years has hardened its tone and begun making efforts to compete with China in the Pacific region. New Zealand’s modern defence evolution begins in 2010, when it strengthened its security ties to the US as indicated via the Wellington Declaration (Chase and Moroney 2020, 47). The US had suspended alliance commitments in 1986 due to differences in nuclear policy, (Vaughn 2021) but the Wellington Declaration (and the 2012 follow-up, the Washington Declaration) set out a framework for US-New Zealand “defense dialogues and security cooperation” (Chase and Moroney 2020, 47). This relationship has been further strengthened by other symbolic developments, such as US naval visits to New Zealand resuming in 2016 (Chase and Moroney 2020, 48).

Simultaneous to this, in the early 2010s, New Zealand benefited (and continues to benefit) from a growing economic relationship with China following the signing of a free-trade agreement with them in 2007 (Chase and Moroney 2020, 6). New Zealand had never had defence ties with China. Yet, this changed in 2015, when the New Zealand Defence Minister announced the development of a Five-Year Engagement Plan for defence engagement with China (Brownlee 2015), the first such plan between a Western military and the People’s Liberation Army (Chase and Moroney 2020, 49). Interestingly, it then appears that New Zealand for the first half of the 2010s was strengthening its relationship with the US without aggravating China and continuing to foster economic and security ties with the latter. As the New Zealand Defence Minister noted in a speech following the publication of the 2018 defence white paper, “we cannot face these challenges alone ... small countries need friends” (Mark 2018). Between 2010 and 2021, New Zealand published four strategic defence white papers in 2010, 2016, 2018, and 2019. How China, the US, and GPC are discussed in these respective documents varies greatly, and several insights can be gained from looking more closely at them. All four papers note that the foundational tenet of New Zealand’s security strategy is the international rules-based order (Mapp 2018, 14). The first security objective listed in the 2016 paper is to strengthen “the international order to promote security,” and explains that New Zealand’s “security interests are supported by the international rules-based order. This order provides

protection by disciplining the exercise of national power through international law, custom and convention, and accords the same rights to all countries, regardless of their size” (New Zealand Government 2016, 20).

Between the 2010 and 2016 papers, there is already a noticeable difference in tone regarding how New Zealand refers to the global strategic landscape. In 2016, the white paper noted that the international order had “come under greater pressure since 2010, most notably in the Middle East” (New Zealand Government 2016, 10). While New Zealand makes a point in the 2016 document of citing the US, the UK, and Canada as key allies, with the US-New Zealand alliance reaching “a depth and breadth not seen for 30 years” (New Zealand Government 2016, 32), they pointedly note China’s importance in the Asia-Pacific region, and its impact on New Zealand’s security and economy (New Zealand Government 2016, 33). Interestingly, the 2016 paper also states that New Zealand “does not take a position on the various territorial claims in the South China Sea” (New Zealand Government 2016, 31). It is clear then that New Zealand’s approach to China in the 2010 and 2016 white papers was to acknowledge China’s growth and its impact but was “careful not to be seen as saying this would be a challenge to the existing order, which has the implication of taking sides” (Mapp 2018, 16). Overall, from 2010 to 2016, New Zealand’s strategic policy was defined by a careful diplomatic dance where they revitalized their relationship with the US while continuing to engage economically and strategically with China. In other words, New Zealand chose not to take sides and was able to leverage its reputation for having “an independent foreign policy” (Mapp 2018, 17) to create its own approach to its US and Chinese relations.

In 2018 and 2019 though, there is a much sharper tone for dealings with China and a more obvious mirroring of the US and other western assessments of Chinese actions. This could in part be due to shifting public opinion in New Zealand regarding China and the US – while New Zealand perceptions of the US decreased during the Trump presidency, a 2021 Pew research poll found that 42% of New Zealander’s held a favourable view of the US, as opposed to 30% holding a favourable view of China (Silver 2021). But this change in tone could also be caused by China’s continued efforts in the South China Sea and its decision to not “engage with an international tribunal ruling on the status of sovereignty claims” (New Zealand Government 2018, 17), a forthright rejection of the rules-based order that New Zealand deeply values. China is dis-

cussed more than any other country in the 2018 white paper. Relatedly, the US-New Zealand relationship is only referred to in the context of the Five Eyes group, which could indicate that New Zealand is more comfortable with the strength of its relationship with the US or could indicate its disapproval of Trump’s populist presidency (in 2018, only 19% of New Zealanders approved of US leadership, but 55% were confident the US would defend New Zealand) (Reinhart and Ritter 2018). Great power competition is acknowledged in the 2018 white paper (unlike the 2016 one), and in the paper’s announcement, the defence minister opens by saying “great power competition is back” (Mark 2018). There is further evidence of New Zealand’s increased awareness and response to the burgeoning GPC. Defence spending (as % of GDP) increased from 1.46% to 1.68% between 2010 and 2020, and the biggest jump was from 2019 to 2020 (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2021, 519). For comparison, in 2020 Canada spent 1.25% of its GDP on defence. While the two countries spend very different amounts on defence in dollars (New Zealand spends \$3.008B and Canada spends \$22.854B USD) (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2021, 517, 519), the percentage is still notable. Because New Zealand “anticipates an increase in the frequency of responses the Defence Force will be required to undertake” (New Zealand Government 2019, 12) by 2030, the Defence Force has begun to materially prepare. In other words, GPC will lead to increased regional tensions in the Indo-Pacific, which could require increased military responses. There are plans for the Defence Force to grow by 1,500 people, including increasing the size of the New Zealand Army to 6,000 by 2035 (New Zealand Government 2019, 13). In July 2018, the then-coalition government decided to purchase four maritime patrol aircrafts, totalling \$2.4 billion, for “air surveillance capability” (New Zealand Government 2018, 14).

New Zealand is also continuing to focus on the influence it wields with soft power tactics, in order to counteract Chinese influence over small Pacific Island nations. In the 2019 white paper, New Zealand says that it is “a Pacific nation through geography, identity, and values. Our nation’s security and wellbeing are intrinsically bound to the peace and stability of the Pacific” (New Zealand Government 2019, 12), before further noting that both theirs and Australia’s influence and ability to have “a more positive impact in line with [their] values” in the region is under threat (New Zealand Government 2019, 12). New Zealand announced in 2018 that it would increase foreign aid by nearly a

third (Packham 2018). All of these actions rest on New Zealand's foundational goal of interoperability – the 2018 white paper posits that “groupings of like-minded nations are emerging to balance challenges to rules and norms, and to reinforce the rules-based order across the Asia-Pacific” (New Zealand Government 2018, 7). Similar repeated references to New Zealand's Five Eyes allies are also indicative of the focus on strong, like-minded allies, who prioritize the rules-based international order.

While it is unlikely that China feels materially threatened by four new patrol aircrafts, or a 1,500 person increase in active armed forces, the symbolism of these actions is important. Before the 2018 white paper, China could likely feel confident that New Zealand would work to remain neutral in great power competition conflicts. This confidence was likely based on New Zealand's political position from the 1990s to 2017 that “respects and understands China's rise, and [does] not automatically see this as a problem to be confronted” (Mapp 2018, 16). The fact that New Zealand stated in the 2016 white paper that it did not take a position on territorial claims in the South China Sea is one example of this (New Zealand Government 2016, 31). This confidence was also in part caused by the relatively frosty relations between New Zealand and the United States (as opposed to other western liberal democracies, such as Australia and Canada). The change in tone in the 2018 and 2019 white papers has led to “stern representations with New Zealand on the wrong remarks it has made” (Mapp 2018, 19), but nothing more serious than that. The broader worry for China is that New Zealand's “interests are likely to dictate less flexibility in managing [its] relationships with those who assertively challenge the rules-based order” (New Zealand Government 2018, 27). In other words, New Zealand will continue its trajectory in opposition to China, mirroring other allies in the US sphere of influence.

Lessons Learned for Canada

Having explored the evolution of New Zealand's defence strategy, I will now articulate which of these policies Canada can learn from, and which should be avoided. In this section, I will focus on two elements: increases in hard power and increases in soft power. Both countries have historically shied away from “identifying and openly pursuing [their] strategic interests” (Rivard Piché 2021, 4), but like New Zealand, Canada must now openly confront the rapidly changing global environment. Before making

further comparisons with Canada though, it is important to note the key difference between them: while New Zealand is in close geographic proximity to an American rival (China), Canada is in close geographic proximity to the United States, its most powerful ally. This obviously impacts how the two countries interact with US rivals – Canada has the luxury of not competing regionally with China or Russia (apart from in the Arctic arena), whereas New Zealand's regional zone of influence shrinks as China's grows. In practice, this likely means that New Zealand must be more proactive in its responses to Chinese hegemony than Canada does.

Regarding hard power, New Zealand has increased its defence spending significantly in the past decade. In 2010, its defence spending per capita (in current USD) was \$480, while in 2020, it was \$661 (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2021, 519). For comparison, Canada's defence spending per capita has decreased from \$567 to \$532 between 2010 and 2020 (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2021, 517). New Zealand has also made commitments to increase its personnel and acquire new equipment in the next decade. Canada should emulate New Zealand in both of these commitments but accomplishing this may be difficult. Recruitment in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has stagnated in recent years at around 67,000, despite efforts to increase numbers (especially among women and minority groups) (Beriault 2021). Defence spending is easier to increase, but this would likely be controversial during a time when the CAF is mired in numerous sexual misconduct scandals (Connolly 2021). Despite these obstacles, there is a strong argument to be made for increasing Canada's military powers and ensuring that it is not wholeheartedly reliant on US security protection, which is no longer a certain guarantee (Rivard Piché 2021, 5).

On the other hand, it would be much easier and more politically palatable for Canada to emulate New Zealand's increased use of soft power influence. Canada has a historical reputation for its role as a peacekeeper, its involvement in UN missions, and as a foreign aid donor. Like New Zealand, it is a promoter of the international rules-based order, so it is, in some ways, more logical for Canada to pursue a strategy that uses those tools. Features of the post-WWII liberal international order, including Five Eyes, NATO, the WTO, the UN, and CETA have benefited Canada enormously in terms of both visibility and influence (Rivard Piché 2021, 11).

New Zealand's foreign aid is both ambitious and diverse: despite its size, New Zealand was the third-largest donor in the Pacific as of 2011, after Australia and the US (Ratuva 2017). In 2018, New Zealand announced a 'Pacific Reset' program, to build "deeper and more mature political partnerships with Pacific Island countries" (Winston 2018). While it cannot compare to China from a military perspective, it can compete in its influence over Pacific Island states. Even without the same financial capabilities as China, New Zealand understands that countries in the region want partners who understand "their concerns and priorities, such as climate change. New Zealand's goal is for countries in the Pacific Islands to see New Zealand as the preferred partner" (Chase and Moroney 2020, 31). In the past five years, New Zealand has also created diplomatic and development offices in the Pacific region, further bolstering its role as a partner and ally (Chase and Moroney 2020, 31).

This is an entirely feasible model for Canada to mimic. By leveraging its reputation and infrastructure as a peacekeeper and aid donor, Canada could expand its role to prevent Chinese encroachment into Asia, Africa, or the Pacific. One example here could be for Canada to take on an increased role in the South China Sea disputes. As a group, ASEAN countries represent a huge trading bloc for Canada and if tensions increase significantly, the fluidity of economic exchanges in the region would be impacted (Carugati 2021). If Canada were to leverage its influence to support ASEAN countries in developing a binding code of conduct in the South China Sea, it would demonstrate Canada's influence as a promoter of the rules-based order and multilateralism and help deter further Chinese encroachment. Canada also has more economic clout than New Zealand, which means its reach would be wider and more deeply felt. If Canada chose to reach out as a partner and assistant for specific regions, it would be able to market itself as a preferable alternative to China, just as New Zealand is hoping to do. This would result in greater Canadian power and influence globally, ensuring that Canada is seen as a credible partner by its allies and a credible competitor by its rivals.

Overall, while it would be logical for Canada to continue expanding defence capabilities in terms of personnel, spending, and equipment, it would not be nearly as influential as a serious increase in soft power outreach, through foreign aid, peacekeeping, and strengthening economic relations, which would ensure Canada's continued position as a defender of the international rules-based order and demonstrate its strength

in the competitive global environment of GPC.

Conclusion

My analyses have outlined the implications of the evolution of New Zealand's defence strategy over the past decade. I explained how its tone towards China has hardened, as can be seen in its several defence white papers, and how New Zealand has begun to mirror Western allies in their responses to China. I also elaborated on how New Zealand's actions can be explained in the context of its prioritization and defence of the international rules-based order. Next, I explored the extent to which Canada should mimic New Zealand's recent defence policies. I then argued that increasing the CAF's material defence capabilities would be both politically difficult and not nearly as strategically helpful as it would be for Canada to increase its influence as a peacekeeper and foreign aid donor in regions at risk of being influenced by China. What is left unclear though, is what Canada would then do with this influence – a topic which would benefit from further study.

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