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Land Acknowledgement

The Arts & Science Undergraduate Society (ASUS) acknowledges that Queen's University is situated on Anishinaabe and Haudenosaunee territory. Acknowledging the history in which Queen's has participated and benefitted from colonialism, it is necessary to recognize how Politicus has benefitted as an organization. It is essential that those benefitting from the legacies of colonialism learn from history, look forward, and make positive changes toward a future where reconciliation prevails and Indigenous peoples are treated equitably. In this learning, we want to not only focus on the atrocities committed but also acknowledge the continued beauty, strength, and power of Indigenous culture. Moving forward, we aim to create new traditions that align with the spirit of reconciliation as we engage in academic theory and debate. Politicus is committed to seeing the growth of equity-seeking voices within our realm of academics and beyond.

While academia can oppress, divide, and colonialize, it can also be a source of power—to study possibilities of the unexplored, the unknown, and the controversial. Politicus strives to reconcile with the past by providing a platform for diverse voices to be heard. We are committed to providing a non-partisan platform where all political opinions may be expressed.

As a colonial institution, we recognize that learning about these histories is a privilege, we urge you to seek out sources to continue your growth as a learner.

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Foreword

Dear Valued Readers,

It is once again time to present our latest general volume at *Politicus*! Unlike the Special Issue topics, which are picked by the Editors-in-Chief each year, the works found in general volumes presents topics most important to students of politics at Queen's. In 2023, at the back-end of a global pandemic and front-end of an economic crisis, several themes have emerged in *Volume 9*. In the following articles, readers will face inquiries into the intersection of migration, freedom, and economy from historical, political-economic, and critical perspectives. Notably, the authors demonstrate how domestic and international political structures can aid or hinder the safety of vulnerable populations.

Volume 9 represents the tireless efforts of everyone who supports this journal. We must first give thanks to our *Politicus* team, whose promotion of the journal and evaluations of our undergraduate submissions have directly shaped the work presented in these pages. Without the dedicated work our of editorial team in particular, this journal and its publications would not thrive as it has for the last nine years.

To our supporters in the ASUS Academics Commission, we cannot give enough thanks for the opportunity to highlight student voices and promote the incredible work of our political undergraduate community. Next, we must thank the backbone of *Politicus*' editorial process, the professor reviewers: Dr. Rosanne Currarino, Dr. Jeffrey Collins, Rida Abu-Rass, Dr. Elizabeth Goodyear-Grant, Chris Abbott, Dr. Eleanor MacDonald, and Dr. David Haglund. Our professor reviewers lead us in research excellence and transform great student works into publications.

At the very beginning of careers in political studies, submitting work for publication is a daunting task. Taking that step, however, gives all of us the opportunity to build a community of political scholars. For this we are enormously grateful and must dedicate *Volume 9* to every student who took that step and submitted an article this year.

As we complete our terms as Editors-in-Chief and hand the reigns over to the next team, we are incredibly proud of our authors, our team, and our supporters for creating such an amazing publication. Happy reading!

Our very best,

Caitlyn Jenkins & Madelyn Scheid,

Politicus Co-Editors-in-Chief 2022-2023



How Did the British Abolition Movement Effectively Frame the Issue of Slavery?

Rocco-Emanuel Sepe

Introduction

The British abolition movement is a useful case study within social movements literature in illustrating the importance of framing. Broadly speaking, the abolition movement spanned the late 18th to early 19th centuries in Britain, influenced by and influencing abolition movements throughout the Americas and Western Europe as well (Antsey 1972, 306; Nelson 1942, 193). Abolition sought to end the institution of slavery, which occurred gradually within Britain through legal precedent, parliamentary action, and activist work from religious groups (Cotter 1994, 32). The sale of slaves within the British Empire was outlawed in 1807, and the ownership of slaves was outlawed in 1833 (Cotter 1994, 33). This is an important example of contentious politics, in the words of McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, as abolition was not a politically viable or popular sentiment until the late 18th century: begging the question of how the movement framed this issue in a way that quickly achieved its goal (Tarrow, Tilly, and McAdam 2001, 7).

I will argue that British abolition consisted of numerous sub-movements that had the same final goal. Various branches of evangelical ideology, from Quakerism, Rational Dissent, and Anglicanism, combined with and influenced shifting racial attitudes throughout the 18th and 19th centuries (Burton 1996, 200). These two concepts were used to frame and disseminate abolitionist thought throughout

Britain in a way that made abolition politically viable. After conducting this research, numerous other factors influenced the effectiveness of the religious and racial framing: broader changes in the idea of human rights occurring throughout the Atlantic world, including the American and French revolutions, which emphasized ideas and expectations of human rights (Burton 1996, 200, 208). The burgeoning Industrial Revolution also occurred during this period, further emphasizing the desire for consistently recognized rights (Page 2011, 742). These topics are beyond the scope of my research, though the rationale of my hypothesis remains the same: religious and racial ideologies were used by the various religious sub-movements – Quakers, Rational Dissenters and Anglicans – pushing for abolition to effectively frame their goals.

I will begin with a brief overview of the process of British abolition, before moving to a literature review on this movement from both a historical and social movements perspective (Drescher 1994, 136). I will then outline my plan for frame and discourse analysis, before conducting this analysis on religious abolitionist literature and abolitionist artefacts that exemplify the different religious sub-movements and changing racial attitudes. The power of these framings will then be judged based on analysis of subsequent parliamentary discourse on abolition.

Literature Review

The academic literature on British abolitionism focuses on several factors that influenced and resulted in the abolition of slavery in Britain in 1833: religious ideology, parliamentary and legal action, changes in the capitalist framework of Britain, shifting racial attitudes, and more (Antsey 1972, 304-320; Burton 1996, 212; Cotter 1994, 31; Drescher 1994, 137; Jennings 1977, 23-27). While academics agree that these causes were deeply intertwined, there is debate over which of these causes was most necessary. The literature can be categorized as follows based on the believed driving force of abolition: evangelical action, parliamentary/legal action, as well as the propagation of abolitionist artefacts that encapsulate shifting racial attitudes.

Evangelical Ideology

All scholars in this field acknowledge the importance of evangelical thought as a factor in the cause of abolition, with the caveat that this thinking was far from universal or linear (Coffey 2012, 850-854; Jennings 1977, 24; Page 2011, 747). Antsey posits that the evangelical sense of sinfulness and the desire for redemption was the key driver behind abolition, while Hudson argues that the Anglican ideology of piety and patriotism was most important (Page 2011, 742). These differing faiths helped articulate the abolitionist cause, as each group had an interest in its fruition: “Quakers sought to revitalize their denomination, evangelicals saw abolition as the spearhead of a wider reformation of manners...” (Page 2011, 743). Scholars of

this camp acknowledge the way that religious groups framed the issue of abolition within their own circles and among the broader public, using it as a means towards their own ends.

Scholars in this branch agree that this mix of religious antagonism towards slavery, from Quakers, Rational Dissenters, and Anglicans, provided different ideological bases for abolition. For Quakers, this stemmed from a denial of original sin as well as a conception of divinity that was internalized within everyone (Jennings 1977, 29). This “Inner Light” necessitates the following of the Golden Rule and disproves pro-slavery readings that focus on original sin (Jennings 1977, 29). Rational Dissenters shared this view on original sin and on the necessity of spreading charity, while Anglican abolitionists based their critique on divine Providence: the protective care of God that will “regulate[s] the affairs of men” (Coffey 2012, 846). Anglican parliamentarians co-operated with Quakers and Rational Dissenters based on a shared belief in a just God to argue for abolition in parliament (Page 2011, 765). These varied ideological bases provided a foundation for the framing of the abolitionist cause and public actions from a moralistic, and multi-religious perspective: whether that was based on fear of Providence, or in following the Golden Rule (Coffey 2012, 847).

The Framing of Abolitionist Artefacts

This faction of the literature argues that the abolitionist artefacts, including the famous Wedgwood cameo and the *Description of a Slave Ship*, encapsulate outdated racial attitudes of the 18th century

(Webster 2009, 315). The Wedgwood cameo token emblazoned with the phrase — “Am I not a man and a brother?”— depicts a slave in chains on his knees (Webster 2009, 317). This section of the literature stresses the racial attitudes behind the token, as it portrays slaves as “passive, depersonalized victim[s]” (Webster 2009, 315). This view proliferated as the token was commonly worn on necklaces, bracelets, cufflinks, and atop furniture – placing this racist framing into almost every facet of everyday life, making it the dominant framing of the time (Webster 2009, 315; Goffman, 2014, 17).

The proliferation of the *Description of a Slave Ship* brought the reality of slavery to the forefront of parliamentary debates and public consciousness, though in its proliferation the extensive text detailing the daily existence of slaves on the ship is largely absent (Webster 2009, 319). This removal underlines the inability of the abolitionist movement to fully grapple with the magnitude of slavery as a dehumanizing institution and serves to lessen the impact of the artefact (Webster 2009, 319). Authors in this camp argue that the proliferation and framing of such artefacts, while building popular support towards abolition, reinforced negative racial stereotypes that conflicted with the religious intention towards abolition.

Legal Approaches

Legal and parliamentary approaches highlight the importance of persistent pressure within parliament and legal precedent as key in abolition. Scholars in this camp believe annual legislative motions and interactions between abolitionist

campaigners and parliamentary leadership pushed abolition until it became a reality (Drescher 1994, 137). Likewise, scholars like Cotter affirm the importance of the Somerset case, which set the precedent that slavery had no legal basis of support within Britain, pointing to subsequent legal cases which upheld the rights of former slaves against slave owners (Cotter 1994, 34). Scholars in this camp also emphasize the Dolben Act, one of the first to legislate slavery within England, as important in spurring the abolitionist movement (Webster 2009, 319). This approach also relates to the artefact approach, noting the importance of the *Description of a Slave Ship* artefact in illustrating why this act was necessary (Webster 2009, 319). While this approach understands the religious foundation upon which objection to slavery was built, they believe the building of legal precedent and consistent parliamentary action was the most important driving force behind abolition.

Methodology

To answer my research question, “how was the abolition movement effectively framed in England?”, I will incorporate a mix of discourse and frame analysis, using the work of Goffman on three aspects of the abolition question: foundations, tools, and actions.

Evangelical Foundations of Abolition: Quakers, Rational Dissenters and Anglicans

I will begin by looking at the religious foundations on which the abolition movement was built, in terms of Quaker, Anglican and Rational Dissenting faiths. I have chosen these three faiths as the

scholarship on abolition posits the importance of Quaker ideology and action within the abolitionist movement, as well as the Anglican faith of many abolitionist figures and parliamentarians (Page 2011, 745). I have also chosen to analyze the faith of Rational Dissent as an important minority sect that had influence in the abolition movement and serves to provide a more complete picture of the religious multiplicity that underlined the movement. I will conduct discourse analysis on the meetings of the Quaker “Religious Society of Friends” from the years of 1750-1760, as well as the subsequent “Abolition Society” in 1787, which featured both Anglicans and Quakers, looking at the dominant themes and responses given to the question of abolition (Jennings 1977, 29). I will then conduct framing analysis on these meetings, to ascertain the importance of this time frame in generating abolitionist sentiment; looking at non-religious motivations in their stance, and the importance of their cooperation (Antsey 1972, 316; Page 2011, 742).

A similar mix of discourse and frame analysis will be used for the Rational Dissenting faith, using the sermon of Joseph Priestley entitled “A sermon on the subject of the slave trade...” as a subject of discourse analysis (Page 2011, 749; Priestley 1788). This document will be used to ascertain the ideological basis of Rational Dissenters against slavery, and then compared to the religious basis of Quakers and Anglicans. A framing analysis will then be conducted on this speech: the venue it was held in, to whom the sermon was delivered; placing this frame and Priestley himself in relation to other religious opposition to slavery.

Tools of the Movement: Abolitionist Artefacts

After analyzing the religious foundations of abolition, the interests these religious groups had in the movement, and how they were situated between each other, I will move to an analysis of abolitionist artefacts. The artefacts of focus will be the Wedgwood cameo, marked— “Am I not a man and a brother?”—and the *Description of a Slave Ship* (Webster 2009, 312). These two objects have been chosen due to their historical legacy within the abolitionist movement, remaining in British museums and used as instructional tools for teaching about abolition. The historiographic importance of these objects necessitates their inclusion. These two artefacts will undergo framing analysis; looking at the framing that their creators intended, with an eye to how these framings illustrated changing racial attitudes during this period. In this analysis, the origins of the artefacts and their locations within society will be discussed to ascertain the racial views they promoted, and the importance of these artefacts in the abolitionist cause (Webster 2009, 322).

Parliamentary and Collective Action on Abolition

Finally, I will analyze the efforts of collective resistance to slavery by Quakers, and in parliament. I will do this by examining the parliamentary discussions on the topic of abolition during two periods, 1791-92, and 1806-07. These discussions will be subjected to discourse analysis, looking at how the religious foundations of abolition were used to frame petitions in

parliament and parliamentary discussions. Furthermore, framing analysis will be conducted on these two parliamentary sessions (Drescher 1990, 568). These two time periods have been chosen specifically, as the 1791-92 session aligns with the dissemination of abolitionist artefacts and literature that I will be analyzing, allowing for analysis of how this content affected parliamentary discourse and action. The session of 1806-07 provides some temporal distance to see how the dissemination of this framing by these artefacts affected abolition in parliament.

I will analyze how religious ideology and changing racial attitudes affected the parliamentary discourse during these sessions, including an analysis of the progression of the movement at these two moments to compare how the discourse on abolition changed.

Analysis: Religious Ideology

Quakerism

The yearly meetings of Quakers, originally termed the “Meeting for Sufferings” in the 17th century, evolved into meetings of notable leaders within the faith from around the country in London (Jennings 1977, 26). The vetting process leading to the Yearly meeting was arduous: each local or Preparative sent representatives to Monthly meetings, which in turn sent representatives to Quarterly meetings involving the wider county. Each Quarterly meeting then sent four representatives to the yearly meeting in London, wherein Quaker doctrine was debated, decided and expected to be followed throughout the country

(Jennings 1977, 27). The numerical advantage of London representatives is an important frame to consider: London Quakers had first-hand experience with its seedy underbelly and bringing the distinguished delegates into this frame served as a reminder of work to be done (Jennings 1977, 30). Meeting at Devonshire House in Picadilly, members were aware of the chaos and moral decay that resulted in its burning in 1733, and keen on providing a cure (“Devonshire House,” 2022).

Quakers were no stranger to tumult—born during the English Civil War, Quakerism grew in popularity in part due to religious persecution (Jennings 1977, 32). However, by the peaceful 18th century, members complained of “a Great Declension of Numbers,” and members were encouraged to meet despite the “smallness of your numbers” (Jennings 1977, 33).

The tumultuous birth of the faith made the societal ostracization that came with an abolitionist stance welcome; religious persecution in the 17th century gave the faith attention and membership, something that was now lacking. Quakers chaffed at their growing material wealth as it conflicted with their self-image as God’s “peculiar” people, and as such used this societal ostracization to strengthen their bonds and their faith (Jennings 1977, 34). During the Seven Years War, a London mob stoned the houses of Quakers who refused to follow the war-time custom of illuminating their windows following a military victory. The meeting notes of 1758 describe the value of this persecution: “... 'twas good for me that I was afflicted, for before I was afflicted, I went astray” (Jennings 1977, 40).

Thus, this frame also explicates a sense of urgency among members wanting to combat dwindling numbers: a strong, decisive stand on an important issue seemed necessary not only from a moral perspective, but from the perspective of self-interest.

The Meeting of Friends in 1758 thus carried the weight of a diminishing following, in the setting that represented all that Quakers found reprehensible. In this frame, the discourse of the meeting illustrates Quakers' fundamental opposition to slavery, as "a most unnatural traffic, whereby great numbers of mankind, free by nature are subjected to inextricable bondage..." (Jennings 1977, 29). Man's freedom takes unique form within Quakerism, which rejects the concept of original sin and emphasizes God as ubiquitous. For Quakers, sin exists but is not the preordained condition of mankind—we are "...free by nature" in this sense (Jennings 1977, 29).

Furthermore, Quakers hold God as loving and caring, "who delighteth not in the death of a sinner, but willeth the salvation of all" (Jennings 1977, 29). God imbued all people with an "Inner Light," meaning everyone has an element of the divine within them (Jennings 1977, 29). This negation of original sin and incorporation of an "Inner Light" provides an ideological basis for abolition – how can anyone be a slave if all are sacred? Describing slavery as "a most unnatural traffic..." illustrates these beliefs: holding the "Inner Light" of God under bondage is "unnatural" for Quakers (Jennings 1977, 29).

Their abolitionist position was manifested in the 1761 Decree that all

Quakers who engaged in the slave trade would be disowned by the faith (Jennings 1977, 25). The framing of this decision considers religious ideology as well as self-interest. Quaker beliefs against original sin, and for a pious God who imbues all with his essence, counter slavery on a fundamental level. The downward trajectory of Quaker membership influenced this decision meaningfully as well: leadership wanted to avoid malaise and complacency, leading to a strong stand against slavery.

Thus, the ideological objection to slavery on the part of Quakers was based on religious ideology, as well as the self-interest of the faith, seeking to incorporate new members and energize a dwindling following. It is also important to note that this framing came in the mid 18th century, well before abolition was in mainstream British political discourse: it was the dominant framing upon which other sections of the movement based their objection to slavery.

Anglicanism

The Abolition Society was formed in 1787, and its first meeting featured nine Quakers and three Anglicans to fill its 12-person National Committee ("Minutes from the Abolitionist Committee," 2022). The frame of their first meeting in May of 1787 speaks to the religious and self-interested reasoning of Quakers already discussed, but also to Anglican religious ideology. This first meeting was held in the London print shop of one of the founding Quaker members, located in south London's affluent Camberwell district ("Minutes from the Abolitionist Committee," 2022). This

location represents the kind of resources that the Society would have at its disposal. The National Committee was filled with prominent parliamentarians, lawyers, bankers, and businessmen of Quaker and Anglican faiths. The print shop at which they first met would print tens of thousands of abolitionist pamphlets that would give voice to the cause throughout the nation. The Anglican slant on these views is clear from the minutes of this first meeting: “it was resolved that the said Trade was both *impolitick* and unjust” (“Minutes from the Abolitionist Committee,” 2022).

The framing of Anglican faith at this time in British history is important to consider: following the Reformation of the 16th century, Anglicanism became synonymous with the Church of England. Furthermore, Anglicanism and more mainstream sects of Christianity were exclusive among Parliamentarians: all MPs had to swear an oath to the King, which contradicts Quaker doctrine. Thus, Parliament largely excluded minority religious sects like Quakerism until the 19th century, making Anglican support for the abolitionist movement necessary (British Quakers in Parliament in the 19th Century,” 2022).

Anglican ideology was also crucial in framing abolition in a way that was politically viable. Anglican values of piety, patriotism, and a fear of Providence counteracted the more radical views of Quakers. Anglican discourse on Providence was especially important here: one of the founding Anglicans of the Abolition Society, Granville Sharp, wrote extensively of slavery as a “crying sin” that “would

bring God’s judgment crashing down on Britain...” (Coffey 2012, 853). Atlantic revolutions during this period were used as evidence of the punishment of Providence for Britain’s role in the slave trade: when speaking to an American colonist amidst turmoil in the colony, Sharp wrote that: “the impending Evils which threaten the Colonies abroad... may, with great probability of Truth, be looked upon as a just punishment from God for the slave trade” (Coffey 2012, 855). The use of the term “impolitick” in the minutes of the Abolition Society’s first meeting reflects the Anglican belief in Providence: engagement with the slave trade is unwise as Providence will “bring God’s judgment crashing down...” (Coffey 2012, 853). This term also reflects Anglicans framing of religious ideology in politically viable terms: using this fear of divine Providence as a tool to merit abolition not only as morally righteous, but as sound political policy.

Rational Dissent

Joseph Priestley’s 1788 sermon illustrates the religious framing of Rational Dissenters on the issue of abolition. This sermon demonstrates not only the framing of Rational Dissenters on this issue, but how the beliefs of different religious groups intersected to create a unified and powerful framing behind abolition. The sermon was delivered in 1788—a year after the birth of the Abolition Society, signaling a marked growth in the movement—in a city that would be crucial in disseminating abolitionist artefacts. 18th century Birmingham was a growing city in terms of industry and population, as the economy

boomed due to the mass production of factories, distributing crafted goods of metal, glass, and more (Page 2011, 750). Priestley's audience was filled with Protestant Dissenters, closely aligned with his belief in Rational Dissent, who worked in the booming metal and glass industries, and who would disseminate his message in their work.

Priestley himself was an accomplished chemist, theologian, and philosopher, whose life was guided by the pursuit of knowledge through reason (Priestley 1788, 6). He sought to blend Enlightenment values of reason and social progress with Christianity, taking a rational and critical look at the faith to find how it could best guide humanity on its proper course. A Rational Dissenter who represented this minority well, he used the concept of natural rights within his sermon to frame the Rational Dissenting opposition to slavery. He invoked a defense of natural rights, asking "What right has any man to judge for another, and even to better his condition by force?" and argued against slavery in the Bible as "...many ancient practices were now illegal..." (Page 2011, 749). This is where the framing of Rational Dissenters differed from Quakers and Anglicans, as they were willing to criticize aspects of Christianity while affirming others and were more willing to engage in a discourse on natural rights. Furthermore, Priestley acknowledged his belief in Providence; that "all serious Christians" believed in Providence; and his sermon is delivered in the hopes that Britain may avoid condemnation for slavery (Coffey 2012, 861). Thus, the framing presented by

Priestley is one characteristic of Rational Dissenters: a belief in Christianity through the lens of Enlightenment reasoning, believing in natural rights and Providence. This added element of natural rights was a powerful line of inquiry that emboldened the abolitionist movement, and its origins were largely from Rational Dissenters.

Analysis: Shift in Racial Attitudes

Abolitionist artefacts disseminated in support of the abolitionist movement encapsulated the religious framings of Quakers, Anglicans, and Rational Dissenters, as well as changing racial attitudes during the 18th century.

Wedgwood Cameo

The Wedgwood cameo illustrates these framings and these intersections well—it depicts a black man pleading to be freed of his chains emblazoned with the phrase "Am I not a man and a brother?" Josiah Wedgwood, the man who created the cameo in 1787, was present a year later at Joseph Priestley's sermon in Birmingham (Page 2011, 748; Webster 2009, 312). A staunch abolitionist, Wedgwood was intent on using his pottery skill to aid the movement. The phrase appearing on the cameo references the invocation of Natural Rights made by Rational Dissenters and the appeal to an "Inner Light" made by Quakers, though the illustration also portrays the shifting racial attitudes of the 18th century (Jennings 1977, 29).

Slave traders had long used religion as a justification for slavery: in the words of Coffey, slavery "brought Africans within reach" of civilization and Christianity

(Coffey 2012, 857). People of African descent were conceived as sub-human; not deserving of the free will God gave them, and as such were rightfully the property of more enlightened men (Coffey 2012, 857). During the 18th century, however, racial attitudes shifted from a perspective of inferiority to paternalism. Rational Dissent countered the idea that slavery was beneficial for Africans by highlighting their humanity; that even if it were better for them to be enslaved, forcing it upon them negated this benefit (Page 2011, 749). The fear of Providence highlighted by Anglicans cast events like the American Revolution as retribution for Britain's sin in terms of the slave trade, positing slavery as a sin and placing the fear of God within slave traders. The Quaker idea of "Inner Light" radically elevated the status of Africans; from ignorant savages to human beings with the divine quality of God within them.

The religious framing of abolition affected this paternalistic shift in racial attitudes, and the Wedgwood cameo encapsulates this shift. Kneeling suppliantly with hands joined in prayer, he pleads with God to recognize his humanity. As Webster notes, this illustration portrays the man as a "passive and depersonalized victim," praying for the white man to alleviate his suffering (Webster 2009, 315). The slave's skin is free from the physical scars and deformations characteristic of slaves, which combined with the suppliant image serves to remove any kind of guilt in the minds of whites. The black man is incapable of achieving personhood on his own, pleading for God's help, and as good Christians, the

English people must help him in that journey.

Furthermore, this racial framing was widely disseminated—as Webster notes, the token was commonly worn on necklaces, bracelets, cufflinks, and atop furniture, ensuring the dominance of this framing (Goffman 2014, 17; Webster 2009, 315). While the cameo explicates the altruistic religious framing of abolition, it also implies an outdated paternalistic racial framing as well.

Description of a Slave Ship

If the Wedgwood cameo portrays the forward progress of abolition, the *Description of a Slave Ship* artefact illustrates the horrors of slavery from which that progress came. Published by a founding member of the Abolition Society in 1789 and printed in the shop that held their first meeting, the *Description* depicted the stowage plan of the *Brooks* slave ship. The *Description*, unlike the Wedgwood cameo, was created for Parliament—the ship's measurements were taken in 1788 while it was docked in Liverpool by a Navy captain, alongside eight other ships, for discussions on the Dolben Act (Webster 2009, 320). The Dolben Act was the first real attempt to legislate overcrowding on British slave ships—giving the *Description* an air of impartiality and objectivity (Webster 2009, 319). Despite its official creation, the *Description* was released four months after the passage of the Dolben Act for abolitionist purposes—to illustrate the gross reality of overcrowding on slave ships. The plan elucidates the non-existence of slave

humanity in the sheer number of slaves that were to be shipped on the vessel, illuminating the grievous sin that would face the punishment of Providence in a religious framing. Yet in its mass publication, the horrifying corresponding text was largely removed.

This text draws on eyewitness accounts of the inhuman condition slaves had to endure, with measurements of their sleeping quarters (Webster 2009, 318). The removal of the corresponding text serves to sanitize the artefact, in the sense that the full extent of the horror of slavery was not distributed. This was a distinct choice: abolitionists played on paternalist racial attitudes that posit white people as teachers and helpers of Africans, not as the people who subjected them to inhuman conditions. While the *Description* was an extremely effective tool of the movement, it is important to recognize that it, like the Wedgwood cameo, catered to the racial attitude of paternalism that ignored the role of white people in the subjugation of Africans.

Analysis: Parliamentary Action

Parliamentary discussions on abolition illustrate the effectiveness of the religious framing promoted by Quakers, Rational Dissenters, and Anglicans, as well as the racial framing of paternalism. Seymour Drescher studied parliamentary debates at two different sessions, in 1791-92 and 1806-07. He differentiated the reasons offered in parliament into three categories: moral, economic, and security concerns

(Drescher 1990, 571). His findings illustrate the effectiveness of both religious and racial framings: moral concerns were invoked more frequently than economic and security concerns in both parliamentary years. The specific language used in these references points to both framings: the most common invocation was to the humanity of slaves, and the inhumanity of the institution of slavery (Drescher 1990, 571). This framing of the issue borrows from the religious framing of Quakers, Rational Dissenters, and Anglicans that was encapsulated so crisply by artefacts like the *Description of a Slave Ship*. Other popular concerns focused on justice, civilization, and morality, promoting the paternalistic racial attitude of the Wedgwood cameo that recognized African humanity with the caveat that they still required the education of whites in moral and civilizational terms. The topic of national guilt, shame and greed regarding slavery, and the opposing national honor and glory of abolition directly reference the Quaker, Anglican and Rational Dissenting religious frame of Providence (Drescher 1990, 572).

Further evidence on the effectiveness of the racial and religious framing lies in the voting patterns on motions related to abolition. Abolitionists almost exclusively voted in favor of abolition for moral reasons, while opposition focused exclusively on economic concerns (Drescher 1990, 573). This illustrates that abolitionists' religious and racial framing had superseded more outwardly racist religious justifications for slavery. Opposition no longer claimed slavery as a just institution in the name of God, as the religious framing promoted by

the Wedgwood cameo and *Description of a Slave Ship* became so prevalent. As such, their opposition was based on economic concerns only; that abolishing slavery would hurt Britain's economy in a world where the institution was largely maintained. The winning of this moral battle however illustrates the effectiveness of the religious framing sparked by Quakers, Anglicans, and Rational Dissenters, and the artefacts disseminated to spread that message.

Conclusion

The religious ideology behind the abolitionist movement, provided by Quaker, Anglican, and Rational Dissenting thought, combined with a racial attitude of paternalism towards slaves, effectively framed abolition as a social movement. The effectiveness of this framing is seen in abolitionist artefacts, like the *Description of a Slave Ship* and the Wedgwood cameo, which illustrate both religious and racial framings. These framings functioned to portray slavery as a moral sin, using the Quaker, Anglican, and Rational Dissenting concepts of Providence, Natural Rights, and an "Inner Light" (Jennings 1977, 29). This religious framing mingled with the paternalistic racial attitude of the 18th century, which characterized black people as human beings in need of guidance from a superior race. The effectiveness of these framings is illustrated by parliamentary discussions on abolition; which were dominated by moral concerns with religious intonations. Oppositionists worked within this framework, ceding moral issues and raising economic concerns as their counterargument, speaking to the

effectiveness of these framings. Though British abolition was complex and multifaceted, religious and racial framings were of the utmost importance to its success.

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A Deserved Solution: Rohingya Repatriation Considerations

Isobel Anderson

Introduction

Five years after the horrific violent targeting of the Rohingya in Myanmar resulting in nearly one million displaced individuals, there has been a noticeable lack of progress towards developing a practical and long-term solution. My argument regarding the current state of the crisis is that, though immediate repatriation would be the most desirable solution for both the Rohingya refugees and the Bangladesh state, the most sustainable and context-specific repatriation method is through medium-term, development-oriented planning. I will first demonstrate how the ideological root causes of the Rohingya Crisis should be used to inform a realistic solution. Then, I will argue that the most well-known repatriation solutions - local integration, organizational interference, and voluntary repatriation - are sub-optimal for the Rohingya case. Finally, I will discuss a medium-term approach that grants the Rohingya a safe and dignified repatriation within a defined set of terms.

Understanding and addressing the root causes that have led to the genocide and forced displacement of the Rohingya is key in informing an effective repatriation solution. Racial and religious persecution form the ideological foundation of the violence that has been committed in Myanmar by the Buddhist-majority state.

This prejudiced underpinning coupled with colonial policies and practices of the state have led to the horrific cycle of decades-old state aggression against the Muslim-minority Rohingya. This pattern continues to proliferate as the successive generations of politicians and military leaders maintain this colonial mindset against non-dominant ethnic populations and non-Buddhist groups (Zarni, 2020). Acknowledging the severity and prevalence of these mindsets within the Myanmar state is key in informing meaningful solutions, which will be discussed in the following sections.

Non-Applicable Solutions

Though other repatriation methods have proven historical results, the Rohingya crisis requires an alternate, context-specific approach.

Local Integration

A leading crisis solution is the local integration of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. Local integration follows an economic development path that provides rights and entitlements to refugees in the aim of increasing their potential to successfully sustain their livelihood, acquire a level of self-reliance, and develop less dependence on state support and humanitarian relief (Rashid, 2019). However, this process proves difficult due to the existing strain on Bangladeshi resources from the local

population, paired with an over-saturated labour market and local sensitivities (Rashid, 2019). Bangladesh's inability and hesitancy of fully integrating Rohingya refugees is understandable, albeit unfortunate.

Arguably more significant, the living conditions of the Rohingya who are currently in Bangladeshi refugee camps, specifically Cox's Bazar, are abysmal. With nearly one million inhabitants, Cox's Bazar makes up the largest refugee camp in the world (Kean, 2022). Inadequate infrastructure such as shelter, sanitation facilities, and education access paired with disasters including high winds, flooding, and landslides have created a violent and competitive setting within the camp (Kean, 2022). As more than half of the Rohingya refugees living in the camp are children, a lack of access to these basic services severely impacts their ability to grow and thrive in a safe environment. It is clear that while local integration may appear as an opportune and efficient method, it does not provide the most ideal solution, for both Bangladesh and the Rohingya.

Organizational Interference

Though pursuing a solution through international and regional organizations can appear effective, it has been demonstrated that such establishments lack the required consensus and mechanisms to impose substantial pressure on Myanmar to provide acceptable and dignified conditions for the repatriation of the Rohingya.

The ASEAN Charter's prioritization of respect for state sovereignty coupled with

the "decision making by consensus" principle demonstrates that in its current form, ASEAN cannot play a substantial aid role in the crisis (Shukri, 2021). While there are principles in the Charter regarding the responsibility of ASEAN Member States to promote and protect all human rights no matter an individual's background, these actors have significantly failed in their duties to uphold these fundamental freedoms ("ASEAN", 2012).

Though there have been multiple discussions of the crisis in ASEAN forums since August 2017, a hurried repatriation has been prioritized over seeking justice for the Rohingya and confronting the injustices that the Myanmar state has committed. In a leaked 2019 report from ASEAN's Emergency Response and Action Team, the ERAT Preliminary Needs Assessment grossly overestimates the simplicity of the Rohingya's repatriation ("Joint Statement", 2022). In the report, there is a notable lack of inclusion of the documented genocide committed by the Myanmar junta, including no mention of the accounts of murder, rape, torture, and displacement that has, and continues, to occur ("Joint Statement", 2022). The report fails to address the root causes of the crisis and instead focuses on the technical details of the repatriation effort, which include the colonial and racist ideology that is intrinsic to the Myanmar state. The conditions that are required for the voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable repatriation of the Rohingya are not present in Myanmar, and the report lacks the adequate pressure directed at Myanmar to providing them ("ASEAN", 2020). The report plays to the interests of the Myanmar

state to maintain a sense of territorial unity, while simultaneously discrediting the reputation of ASEAN as an intergovernmental organization.

The Gambia v. Myanmar case is an example of a positive process being carried out by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). On July 22, 2022, the ICJ decided by an overwhelming majority that it has jurisdiction under the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide to consider The Gambia's application of alleged genocide on behalf of Myanmar against the Rohingya (Islam, 2022). A selection of The Gambia's provisional measures is that Myanmar must immediately halt all actions that could be interpreted as abuses of the Genocide Convention as well as to cooperate with the United Nations in future investigations of the ongoing violence (Islam, 2022).

The underlying issue is that compliance with international law requires the cooperation of the concerned states. Myanmar's past actions do not inspire confidence in their ability to observe the ICJ's future decisions. While an ICJ Order is an important resolution under international law and ought to provide protection for the threatened group, it is only as powerful as the political will of the international community (Islam, 2022). While the ICJ's decision provides an important legal basis for the recognition of genocide against the Rohingya, the years of legal bureaucratic delays as well as the unlikelihood of Myanmar's compliance leads to the conclusion that a successful repatriation

solution should not rely on international organizations.

Ambiguous conduct on behalf of the international community will most likely increase the Rohingya's prolonged refugeehood and in-between status, thus leading to the further deterioration of their wellbeing and safety (Rashid, 2019).

Voluntary Repatriation

Voluntary repatriation is often the preferred solution in addressing refugee crises. For repatriation to occur, conditions must be met, such as adequate living standards of the home country and a protective legal framework that provides the refugees with a safe and dignified return. Guaranteeing the voluntariness of repatriation is another issue altogether.

The Bangladesh state has attempted to repatriate Rohingya refugees in the past, notably in 1979 and the mid-1990s (Rashid, 2019). These former attempts do not cast a confident light on the voluntariness of future repatriation efforts pursued by Bangladesh. Due to a lack of refugee consultation by Bangladesh, the supposition of their voluntariness was manipulated, most significantly by the interests of the host country. When the Rohingya arrived back in Myanmar, they continued to be violently persecuted, thus resulting in their return to Bangladesh (Rashid, 2019).

Voluntary repatriation can only provide positive outcomes when the return is genuinely in the interests and supported by the refugees. Otherwise, they risk a violent welcoming on behalf of their home country.

“Medium-Term” Solution

The above analysis demonstrates that traditional repatriation solutions often lack a connection to the lived reality of the Rohingya refugee crises. I propose an approach that consists of three components: a) tackling the root causes of the Rohingyas’ forced migration from Myanmar; b) dividing and distributing the problem by the international community and well-off countries until a sustainable solution is reached; and c) creating space and amplifying the voices of the affected refugees. The situation in Myanmar is incredibly complex and demands an integrated and context-specific solution. My proposed approach requires certain conditions to be met, most importantly that of Myanmar’s eventual interest in resolute dialogue with activists and community organisations.

Addressing Root Causes

The racial and religious prejudices that underpin the Rohingya genocide cannot be undone by UN intervention or criminal prosecution by the ICJ. Bridging the gap between the Myanmar state and the Rohingya requires a bottom-up solution centered around dialogue and understanding. These conversations should be facilitated by grassroots initiatives and community-led organisations, rather than external international bodies who do not possess the same level of historical memory of the violent atrocities that have been committed (Aung, 2021). The current militarized situation in Myanmar creates a dangerous

environment for groups to pursue action but brave indigenous activists, have, and continue to participate in protests to promote Myanmar’s diversity through public action (Aung, 2021). Razia Sultana, a Rohingya activist and feminist, formed a network in Bangladesh’s refugee camps alongside ADI (Asian Dignity Initiative), that promotes women’s rights and aims to end targeted sexual violence. At the community level, her network of trained Rohingya women has created an environment of confidence and dialogue, and word is spreading (“Razia Sultana”, 2020). It is women like Razia who have the ability to promote understanding and discourse that could have the capacity to create a safer Myanmar for the Rohingya.



Razia Sultana with fellow network members. [International Rescue Committee]

International Aid

Until the Rohingya feel confident in their safety and ability to return to Myanmar, the international community has the responsibility to aid in their protection. Because Bangladesh has been subject to a

disproportionate financial, political, and social burden, they are unable to provide the Rohingya with adequate living conditions and protection, most notably in their overpopulated refugee camps (Rashid, 2019). As noted above, a legal and diplomatic approach by the international community is unlikely to produce beneficial assistance due to organizational constraints and an unlikelihood of compliance. At the very least, external states should strive to improve their financial commitments for Bangladesh's refugee support through infrastructure, development, and humanitarian investments (Huang & Gough, 2019). Humanitarian aid has the tendency to be displaced. Implementing a strict framework of accountability could help to ensure that it is being applied to education, housing, healthcare, and other key elements of life. The Humanitarian Accountability Framework by CARE International provides helpful guidelines towards applying aid in a quality-oriented and effective manner ("Humanitarian Accountability Framework", 2022). Bi-annual and publicly available reviews that include focus group discussions, key informant interviews, and monitoring tools to research local communities' opinions are a selection of accountability methods that could be implemented both by aid-providing countries and objective third party organisations ("Humanitarian Accountability Framework", 2022).

Prioritizing Narratives

For decades, the Rohingya have been passive recipients of aid, yet lack the structure through which they can voice their

agency in their own repatriation. Centering the experiences and voices of the Rohingya refugees in regard to their repatriation is a central tenant of a successful method.

The comic book titled *Rendered Stateless Not Voiceless*, created as a collaboration between the Rohingya Human Rights Initiative (RHRI) and World Comics India, provides the opportunity for Rohingya refugees living in the Kalindi Kunj camp in New Delhi to document their life experiences both in Myanmar as well as their current struggle for survival in India (Nazeer, 2020). The comics not only act as a process of empowerment and healing for the participants, but also promote the role of grass-roots organisations in providing communication outlets for Rohingya to express their thoughts. Twelve-year-old Asmat Ullah told Al Jazeera, "I love drawing now that I have learned how to create a comic, I feel I can tell any story. I am now able to share my dreams with the world," (Nazeer, 2020).



Asmat Ullat putting up a poster of his comic: 'My Dream' [Tasnim Nazeer/Al Jazeera]

External groups such as the Bangladesh state, the Myanmar state, and national organizations have spoken for the Rohingya, often to their detriment. Uplifting and promoting the interests of the refugees is key in producing productive and context-related solutions.

Conclusions

The above analysis of the Rohingya genocide and refugee crisis considered the extent to which local integration, organizational interference, and voluntary repatriation can provide a safe and sustainable existence for the refugees. While productive solutions in their own right, I argue that the Rohingya crisis requires a context specific “medium-term”, development-oriented and dialogue-centered approach. Addressing the root causes of the conflict is the first step towards an effective repatriation, though it will take extensive energy and commitment on behalf of activists. Further analysis and planning are required to find the safest method through which community organisations and activists can work towards deconstructing internalized racist narratives in the Myanmar state, without the threat of violence from that very same military. International humanitarian aid should play a significant role in the financial support of the Rohingya in the meantime. Most importantly, the narrative of the Rohingya repatriation should be shaped by the refugees themselves, with their involvement and voices prioritised by the rest of the world.

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Over-Criminalization of Indigenous Women in Canada: Systemic Distrust, Marginalization, and Intergenerational Colonially-Inflicted Trauma

Cordelia Jamieson

Introduction

The injustices committed against Indigenous women in Canada are prime examples of an ever-present colonialist agenda. In fact, Indigenous women make up over 41 percent of federally incarcerated women despite representing only 4 percent of the Canadian female population (Ryan et al. 2020). Additionally, Indigenous women are 50% more likely to be imprisoned than non-Indigenous men, demonstrating the intricacy of the intersection between race and gender and its effects on the prison system (Baldry and Cunneen 2014, 279). When race and gender are taken into account at the same time, the commonly accepted "fact" that men are more likely to be imprisoned than women is demonstrably false. Instead, Indigenous women are far more likely to be imprisoned than both Indigenous and non-Indigenous men (Baldry and Cunneen 2014, 279). This paper argues that the over-criminalization of Indigenous people, substantially women, in Canada's carceral system is rooted in colonial history, systematic racism, and ongoing white settler prioritizing politics. This is demonstrated by Canadian history of superseding colonial structures, an examination of carceral vulnerability for Indigenous women, the over-incarceration using Vancouver's

Downtown Eastside as a central case study, and alternatives to conditional sentencing.

Carceral Institutions as Complacent Colonialists

"In Canada, justice and security apparatuses such as the police, courts and penitentiaries emerged during the period of early settlement (1763-1867)" (Chartrand 2019, 72). Prisons and penal facilities were established by and benefited colonizers by activating an abuse of power that explicitly hurt Indigenous communities and individuals. The ramifications of these institutions and the foundations upon which they were built have deep-seated repercussions on the over-criminalization of Indigenous people in the current context. These oppressive judicial institutions lie alongside authorized historical injustices committed against Indigenous peoples in Canada and North America including land theft, the implementation of residential schools, cultural genocide, and material dispossession. According to Fran Buntman, "Prisons are a 'social phenomenon', not just imposed by official decree; they are shaped and reshaped by...societal form, staff, inmate resistance, and history—including colonialism" (2019, 215). Classing these injustices as stand-alone issues of the past, however, creates a detrimental narrative that "de-historicizes existing colonial

relationships and displaces an understanding of the links between incarceration, sovereignty, and the state” (Chartrand 2019, 68). Today, the penal system is subject to federal law and jurisdiction, and historically, “law was an essential way colonial domination functioned and succeeded in most of its goals of control” (Buntman 2019, 220). The ties between settler colonialist activity and the carceral institutions operating today are inextricably bound and necessitate reform.

Moreover, Canada’s penal system is notorious for casting Indigenous people as a “problematic population”, further implicating these institutions as complicit in modern projections of colonialism. Historically speaking, “a common reality of colonial regimes was to incarcerate anti-colonial rebels and challengers as part of the project of repressing political challenge” (Buntman 2019). These retaliatory legal enforcements were stifled using legalized tactics, such as the *Indian Act*, sections in the *Criminal Code of Canada*, and the implementation of residential schools. Another example of these legal enforcements in Canadian history includes the acting chaplain of the British Columbia penitentiary insisting that “something be done to separate young offenders from the hardened criminals and especially that the Indians and Half-breeds be permitted to associate as little as possible with the white prisoners” (Chartrand 2019, 74). This is incredibly telling of the perception of Indigenous peoples in Canada, restricting this group to a generalized idea birthed from White settler colonialism and oppressive bias.

Many would argue that the over-criminalization of Indigenous women and their subsequent over-representation in penal facilities constitutes a crisis. However, as of 2017, while comprising less than 5 percent of the broader Canadian population, the Indigenous prison population represented 26.4 percent of federal facilities (Arbel 2019, 450). Sure enough, in a 1999 ruling, the Supreme Court of Canada declared that the incarceration rates of Indigenous people in Canada constituted a ‘crisis’ (Arbel 2019). Since the ruling, Indigenous incarceration has not only escalated, “it has skyrocketed” (Arbel 2019, 450). The language employed in these formalized institutions, and the word ‘crisis’ in particular, rely on colonial structures that refuse to address the problem, and rather remain a large part of it (Arbel 2019). Dismantling crisis terminology in the Canadian legal system is crucial so as not to dismiss the issue as an unfortunate coincidence but rather to place these cases and imbedded problems in a context of federal responsibility. While the Supreme Court ruling acknowledged systematic privileges and a widespread display of racism, there is a distinct lack of accountability for the ties between Indigenous criminalization and over-incarceration, and colonial violence (Arbel 2019, 453). The term ‘crisis’ also insinuates that Indigenous mass imprisonment is a solvable issue with the potential to be resolved through administrative change or policymaking, as designated crises are (Arbel 2019). Crisis terminology in particular neglects the fact that the historic relationship between Indigenous individuals

and the federal justice system is already deeply flawed from a multitude of colonialist penal approaches. Subsequently, this framed ‘problem’ of criminalization has a firm stance of ethnocide erasure.

Exploitation of Indigenous Women in Canada

The carceral exploitation of Indigenous women is indissolubly linked to their over-representation in superseding colonial structures such as penitentiaries and correctional facilities. As formerly stated, Indigenous women make up over 41 percent of federally incarcerated women but represent only 4 percent of the Canadian female population, which is clearly a mass over-representation. Moreover, Indigenous women are the fastest growing population, which subsequently heightens this group’s exposure to dangers such as severe health implications, self-harm, and murder (McGuire & Murdoch 2022).

Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, a variety of health implications universally swept through prison environments and, because Indigenous people are an over-represented population in prisons, these health implications disproportionately affect Indigenous women in particular (Ryan et al. 2020). Naturally, because of “overcrowding and subsequent unavoidable close contact, poor ventilation, and decreased hygiene standards and healthcare services as compared with in the community setting, the prison environment is highly conducive to the transmission of infections, including COVID-19” (Ryan et al. 2020, 971). The human rights and public health implications of this pandemic in prisons are significant

and Indigenous women are unusually affected by it, compared to their non-Indigenous female inmate counterparts (Ryan et al. 2020).

Furthermore, “reports indicate that 97% of federally incarcerated Indigenous women were diagnosed with a mental health disorder and 92% were found to have moderate to high substance abuse needs” (Ryan et al. 2020). An important factor to consider when examining and discussing the issue of carceral vulnerability in the context of health and danger, whether self-inflicted or external, are the reasons these vulnerabilities affect Indigenous women almost exclusively. Indigenous women makeup 50 percent of federal segregation placements and statistically spend longer periods in segregation units than their non-Indigenous counterparts (Martin & Harsha 2019). This is pertinent within the context of self-harm exposure because this time spent within solitary confinement increases the risks of self-imposed danger and suicide among prisoners (Martin & Harsha 2019).

A decolonial framework must be applied to understand how “being Indigenous and a woman increases one’s risk of being victimized, murdered, and subject to colonial control by exploring the connections between the construction of Indigenous women as less than human and the use of carceral space to control, destroy, and assimilate this population” (McGuire & Murdoch 2022, 529). This is exhibited both inside and outside carceral facilities. The National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls in Canada “characterized this victimization, racism, discrimination, and brutal violence and

oppression as genocide” (McGuire & Murdoch 2022, 530). The women and girls who go missing are mothers, friends, and sisters, but above that, they are worthy individuals at the brunt of misogynistic, racist discourse. The state’s disinterest in the matter re-enforces the cultural perception of Indigenous women’s unworthiness and necessary living amongst societal racism. It assumes that Indigenous women are “biopolitical populations whose very lives, while not ‘worth’ killing, are equally not worth protecting” (McGuire & Murdoch 2022, 534).

Over-Incarceration: Over-Policing and Under-Serving in Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside

Not only do Indigenous women numerically overwhelm federal prisons, but they are also discriminated against in a variety of other standard legal proceedings including pre-trial detention. Pre-trial detention is strategically used as a method of coercion. This is exhibited as people held in pre-trial detention centres are twice as likely to plead guilty than those released on bail (Martin & Harsha 2019, 131). Consistently, Indigenous people are more likely to be denied bail than non-Indigenous people. In fact, as of 2019, 92 percent of Indigenous people are denied bail (Martin & Harsha 2019, 131). It is clear that Canada’s shortcomings in the penal system from an Indigenous perspective of criminalization differ immensely from the experiences of non-Indigenous people. This vastly perceived difference is because of the oppressive and discriminatory nature of Canadian law application.

The relationship between Indigenous communities and law enforcement is turbulent, accredited to White settler colonialism and the legal implications that were federally imposed, leading to a deeply rooted systemic distrust. This distrust is further exemplified by modern over-policing and under-serving of Indigenous communities. This over-policing results in the general over-incarceration of Indigenous people, particularly women in contextual poverty. This deep distrust of law enforcement and subsequent lack of reporting also stems from a multitude of factors, including fear of being labelled an informant, recognition of the person causing harm, and most prominently, prior negative experience with police either as a victim or as an accused offender (Martin & Harsha 2019).

Vancouver’s Downtown East Side, or the DTES, is a prominent instance of mass migrations of Indigenous people seeking employment, clean drinking water, or fleeing violence in the home who carried much of that trauma with them (Adams & Clarmont 2016). The Downtown Eastside is the only Vancouver neighbourhood with a policy enabling police officers to patrol the streets on foot, called the Beat Enforcement Team (Martin & Harsha 2019). While the Vancouver Police Department claims it intends to increase trust with residents by increasing engagement, the climate of criminalization and subsequent enforcement distrust only increase with excessive surveillance (Martin & Harsha 2019). This engagement, or over-surveillance, is exhibited in routine street checks, higher arrest rates, increases in detention, more

search and seizure, and excessive bylaw ticketing. For example, between 2008 and 2012, 76 percent of all minor infraction jaywalking tickets in Vancouver were issued to people in the DTES, which houses a substantial Indigenous community (Martin & Harsha 2019). Furthermore, between 2008 and 2017, 15 percent of all Vancouver Police Department routine street checks involved Indigenous people, making them an extremely over-represented demographic in 'routine' street check statistics (Martin & Harsha 2019). This demands reduction and re-structuralizing of police patrolling as a racially-profiled project.

Alternatives to Conditional Sentencing

Carceral institutions and conditional sentencing are inherently colonialist structures, so it is incredibly crucial for marginalized groups such as Indigenous women to have access to alternatives. Speaking to the colonialist foundations of carceral institutions, CSC-operated healing programs have recently undergone shifts in eligibility requirements that exclude Indigenous women from receiving equal access to services, despite traumatic history and growing Indigenous populations in penal facilities (Martin & Walia 2019). This is explicitly neglectful of Indigenous individuals' and community needs. It is, therefore, necessary and beneficial to implement healing programs sensitive to the colonially inflicted trauma experienced by Indigenous peoples (Sanderson et al. 2021).

The CSC-operated Mother-Child inmate program is one of many programs having recently undergone shifts in a worse direction (Martin & Walia 2019).

Correctional Service Canada states that the purpose of the Institutional Mother-Child Program is to "foster positive relationships between federally incarcerated mothers and their child, by keeping them together where appropriate" (2020). The program's eligibility requirements are also rather narrow, limiting participation to incarcerated mothers who are in minimum/medium security facilities, supported wholeheartedly by a child welfare agency, and cannot have a mental health condition that a professional believes influences the mother's ability to care for their child. This process is incredibly flawed and discriminative towards Indigenous inmates, even if not explicitly stated, because the facility's level of security, welfare agencies, and mental healthcare are inherently colonialist structures that are influenced by the perception of Indigenous people as a problematic group. To further issue this point, "program availability can be an issue in maximum security institutions where the majority of the prison population is Indigenous" (McGuire & Murdoch 2022, 538).

Firstly, this program was created in colonialist conditions, just like everything else created in a federal institutional context. Additionally, this program's functionality is not sensitive to the unique colonial trauma facing Indigenous mothers. Historically, in order to assimilate and culturally annihilate the Indigenous people who were in Canada before White settlers arrived, children of Indigenous people were taken away from their families and placed in residential schools. These schools were operated and overseen by the Church and resulted in

centuries of sexual, mental, and physical abuse, as well as an absolute stripping of Indigenous language, culture, and tradition. Indigenous mothers being separated from their children in a carceral context is not unlike the historical feeling of having their child forcibly removed by the government. Therefore, it is even more so significant that Indigenous mothers have access to services such as the Mother-Child program.

Pro-Active Solutions

Reassessing the processes in which an individual is deemed eligible for release is a central and effective solution to counter the mass over-representation of Indigenous women in Canada's penal system. Releasing incarcerated Indigenous women would massively help funnel them out of the system (Ryan et al. 2020). While there are currently steps and initiatives calling for the release of low-risk offenders, "it must be recognized that Indigenous women are disproportionately classified as medium and higher risk, and as such, many Indigenous women will not be considered for release" (Ryan et al. 2020, 973). This classification, excluding Indigenous women from the demographic considered low-risk, is largely accredited to the intricate colonialist history of Canada. Substance abuse issues and retaliatory violence are, as articulated above, results of intergenerational trauma, land theft, and the abusive nature of residential schools. Therefore, it would be more practical to observe the release eligibility of Indigenous women separate from the general population's consideration of being low-risk, because of the bias and prejudice that positions them in that position and withdraws the healing they need and

deserve. "Incarceration should be viewed as an opportunity for healing and growth before a successful reintegration into society is possible" (Ryan et al. 2020, 972). Being incarcerated should not be a result of the federal government's lack of motivation or care for a group that has been marginalized, victimized, criminalized, and oppressed since the White man's arrival in the 15th century.

Treatment centres with universal access must recognize individual and community needs, particularly in the context of criminalized Indigenous women. Healing programs sensitive to colonially inflicted trauma are also needed when dealing with groups who have been historically oppressed and marginalized (Sanderson et al. 2021). If keeping healing programs central to carceral institutions, restructuring programs such as CSC-operated Healing Lodges or the Mother-Child inmate program are vital to the attempted prospering of oppressed Indigenous communities (Martin & Walia 2019). The best way to implement these healing programs, sensitive to unique intergenerationally inflicted trauma, are through community-based initiatives for rehabilitative care and counselling.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the over-incarceration of Indigenous women in Canada is demonstrative of historically embedded and current colonialist perspectives, outlined by systematic distrust, settler political prioritization, over-policing, and under-serving. This calls for the dismantling of crisis terminology, a reassessment of the processes in which Indigenous people are

eligible for release, and the implementation of healing programs sensitive to colonially inflicted trauma. These incarcerated Indigenous women are products of their histories, environments, and represent the moulds that Canadian institutions have pressured and reformed them to be.

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Freedom and Employment in the Gig Economy

Jack Porter

Introduction

Much of the discussion concerning the gig economy and gig work rests on the notion that gig work is the ‘future.’ However, a brief analysis of the history of work in capitalism shows that the gig economy is not the future; instead, it is a tenet of capitalist production that devalues the worker to extract maximum surplus-value. Gig work, an increasingly prevalent work format where work is assigned based on a specific task (or gig), can take many forms as either skilled labour such as software engineering, or unskilled labour such as Uber driving. Ultimately, this form of employment is a regression from the truly liberal phenomenon of the emergence of the Standard Employment Relationship (SER) in the post-war era of capitalism. In the American context, the SER is the dominant employment model ushered in by the New Deal era of American politics, which offered numerous benefits for the worker and improved their net-freedom. Factoring in all conceptions of freedom put forth by Elizabeth Anderson (positive, negative, republican), I argue that gig work ultimately does not make us freer. A thorough analysis of the New Deal-era conception of the employer-employee relationship will allow for a greater understanding of the intersection of these forms of freedom pertaining to work and gig work.

I start by briefly summarizing Anderson’s conception of freedoms. Each form of freedom she defines have nuanced relationships with each other, where they can complement or contradict each other. I express why it is crucial to understand this. I then discuss how the SER radically transformed the rights and freedoms of the worker, while also acknowledging its drawbacks and the ensuing allure of gig work. Finally, I’ll synthesize many scholars’ critiques of gig work to explain how it impedes the notions of freedom set forth and how it is regressive from the SER. My second and third sections will revolve around how the SER legitimized collective action and the work-free time distinction and how gig work threatens these.

Freedom as Anderson Describes It

In her book *Private Government: How Employers Rule Our Lives*, Anderson argues that the democratically unaccountable power employers have over our lives is equivalent to a ruthlessly authoritative communist dictatorship. In her articulation of this point, she lays out three conceptions of freedom (titled positive, negative, and republican) that can form an argument to support the SER and critique the gig economy. ‘Positive’ freedom refers to the freedom one has to exercise their free will without any constraint (Anderson 2017, 45). One’s positive freedom is preserved and enhanced when one can assess an array of

choices and make the most personal decision based on their preferences. This idea will become further relevant when discussing how the distinction between free-time and worktime is critical to positive freedom. ‘Negative’ freedom refers to the freedom you have from anything impeding you or interfering with your actions (Anderson 2017, 45). This paper does not discuss negative freedom in as great detail as the other forms of freedom because the other forms are more specific to the SER and gig work. In the emergence of gig work, positive and republican freedoms are more centrally debilitated. Whether the employer-employee relationship emulates the SER or one of gig work, the obligation to the employer intrinsic to these relationships will interfere with a worker's negative freedom to a shared extent. Thus, I focus closer on positive and republican freedom. Lastly, ‘republican’ freedom refers to the absence of a subjugating, dominating force which restricts a person’s conduct (Anderson 2017, 45). It is different from interference in that the very presence of a force with the potential to dominate is an infringement on one’s republican freedom. Alex Gourevitch discusses how a dominating force contrary to republican freedom can extend beyond an interpersonal relationship, stating that “individuals can be dominated in a more structural way” (Gourevitch 2016, 312). This is an important aspect of gig work that I will revisit in the coming sections. In the next section, through the application of these concepts, we can see that they might hinder or enlarge each other.

Property rights are a clear example of positive freedom. Anderson believes that

without property rights, people would not have the necessary resources to exercise their will or cultivate their land (or life) to the greatest extent possible. However, Anderson rightly points out that this fact of exclusivity of property entails a massive net loss in negative liberty insofar as your interactions with others’ property are heavily restricted. This shows that freedoms can sometimes come into contradiction.

Anderson indicates that the restrictions on an individual's negative liberty can benefit their positive liberty (Anderson 2017, 47). Essentially, these concepts of freedom are flexible and heavily context-dependent. This means that in some instances, the restriction of one freedom can either enhance or further restrict other freedoms, or even in some cases, restrict a different interpretation of the same freedom. This is important to emphasize, as some arguments in praise of gig work make an assessment of freedom without understanding that they are only referencing a specific type of freedom. Further, this freedom they praise may be at the expense of others. I will discuss these types of instances in greater detail in the third section. Overall, the concept of freedom for a worker cannot be evaluated dogmatically. It is necessary for a critical analysis of gig work to evaluate benefits on a case-by-case basis, as some forms of employment might be better equipped for the gig structure of work than others, and many arguments in praise of the gig economy do not fully consider this fact. I will provide examples of how the SER accentuates two forms of freedom that are currently devolving in the gig economy.

Freedom and the SER

The SER is a concept that Jim Stanford invokes to explain the regressive nature of the gig economy. It refers to the dominant employment model used throughout the economic expansion that followed the New Deal in America. Some new features of this employment model included: year-round work, a consistent employer, full-time work conducted on the employer's premises with the employer's capital equipment, and an indefinite work term. There are two main reasons why this new formation of the employer-employee relationship was so significant. First, it was the first time in the history of capitalism that liberal, moral values were able to align with the alienating aspects of market behaviour, such as large hierarchical firms brought about through the division of labour. Alexander Kondo and Abraham Singer write, "The New Deal...was the historical process of bringing the liberal moral vocabulary of markets in line with empirical fact that transaction costs are endemic within markets, which, consequently, produce large and powerful hierarchical organizations" (Kondo and Singer 2019, 345). It allowed for legislation and policy to protect workers from firms that would otherwise demand too much work from them to extract surplus value. Second, the worker became more insulated from inhumane market pressures and the risks a business took on when producing a product or service were no longer so much the burden of the worker. It was in the firm's best interest to offer stable, assured employment, given different organizational and technological advancements. Stanford writes, "Norms about what constituted fair

treatment on the part of employers changed: workers came to expect stable employment and associated entitlements and benefits as normal features of work" (Stanford 2017, 390). The worker could no longer be considered another commodity; there were regulations and processes firms needed to adhere to for the fulfilment of the worker. In many ways, the SER brought about a new conception of freedom for the worker that did not have a set precedent. Much of the workforce could now live comfortable, affordable lives through the new relationship they had with their employer.

A significant aspect of the SER and its amplification of workers' freedom came with the solidification of collective bargaining rights. As Stanford points out, employers had "institutional bounds placed around collective action by workers" (Stanford 2017, 390). If employers were not adhering to the SER, workers now had the legitimate capacity to enforce their cooperation with this dominant employment model. Moreso, workers could also seek to preserve the values instilled by the SER that employers might attempt to undercut, such as workplace conditions and treatment. As Jeremias Prassl notes, "Instead of economic empowerment for all, we found workers tightly controlled by their platforms (which facilitate and allocate gig work), with low pay, long hours, and questionable working standards far more commonplace than we are led to believe" (Prassl 2018, 68). The legitimization and institutionalization of collective action was monumental in ensuring freedom for the worker, more specifically, positive and republican freedom. A worker's republican freedom

was enhanced because the arbitrary power of the firm was put in check. An employee could work without fear of their employers interfering without due process and cause. This was a key tenet in the emergence of the SER. Stanford writes, “Trade union and collective bargaining laws and practices were based on similar assumptions of a stable, cohesive workforce, congregated at a central location (the enterprise)” (Stanford 2017, 389). A ‘stable’ and ‘cohesive’ workforce increased the republican freedom of the worker, given that their colleagues empowered them through collective bargaining to offset the dominance and subordinating behaviours of large hierarchical firms.

The SER enhanced a worker’s positive freedom, as workers were now free from constraints on how they acted outside of working hours. Kathy Weeks’ idea of ‘hours for what we will’ emphasizes the importance of work and free time distinction. For Weeks, a substantial amount of our capacities for positive freedom (or to do ‘what we will’) occur within the time spent outside of work (Weeks 2011, 162). Thus, a clear and unanimous distinction between working hours and ‘free’ hours is important for one to realize their positive freedom. Stanford notes that “the attendance and performance requirements of capital-intensive enterprises made it too risky to allow workers choice or discretion in working hours” (Stanford 2017, 390). With the newfound stability in employment and a clearer distinction between work-time and free-time, workers could now further enjoy their time outside of work. Coupled with the necessity of a punctual and committed

workforce, a distinction was necessary between work time and non-work time. In turn, this allowed for the enhancement of the positive freedom of the worker; they could choose how to spend time outside of work without being berated or strong-armed by employers into working more. Further, Stanford says, “Casual, seasonal and contract labour were predominant forms of paid work as capitalism first emerged and consolidated” (Stanford 2017, 385). This mode of work was oppositional to this component of the SER, which was present prior to the conception of this relationship, and is a substantial infringement on the positive freedom of the worker. This is because they are exposed to market forces that will directly preoccupy their free time. The time necessary to find work and to maintain work in such precarity necessitates the preoccupation of the workers’ time outside work. This interferes with and constrains workers’ actions and thus, limits positive freedom. This is a significant drawback of the gig economy, which I will address further in the next section.

To gain a full scope of the SER, and why gig work is seen as an enticing form of work to an otherwise stable work-life formation, we must look at how the SER constrains freedom. The SER constrains the workers’ freedom by integrating them into a rigidly defined employee-employer relationship, whereas the relationship through gig work is more fluid and less defined. This ambiguity is beneficial for the employer because it allows for an increased commodification of labour power, in that it can satisfy business needs momentarily. Some suspect this to be a benefit for workers

too. If a worker has a greater ability to entertain more employment options, then this is a clear enhancement of their positive freedom based on the definition presented by Anderson. Further, if they are more empowered through increased options, they are less susceptible to the domination of individual hierarchical firms, thus amplifying their republican freedom. However, as noted in the previous section, the amplification of one freedom or a particular contextual realization of freedom will come at the expense of another freedom, or the same freedom that might be interpreted in another way within this same context.

Freedom in the Gig Economy and the SER

A prominent selling point for gig work is the notion of ‘freeing’ the worker from the constraints associated with the SER and stable employment. However, using two of Anderson’s conceptions of freedom, we can now begin to critically re-examine them from the discourse for one reason or another. Gig work is seen as liberating in the sense that a worker has more positive freedom. Workers can partake in multiple forms of employment, absent a fixed schedule, that can accumulate to a stable income. This is done while allowing the worker to entertain different work options to aid their search for fulfilment through work. Despite the normative assumptions the argument possesses regarding what “fulfilment” is, it is fundamentally short-sighted because it disregards what awaits the worker in the gig economy. It is true that a worker is not as dominated by a hierarchical firm, so there is

an initial promise of more republican freedom. However, the market forces consolidate to form a more oppressive, alienating structure than the one found in the firm (as the SER imposed limits on these aspects of the firm). Gourevitch discusses this consolidation process in that when a worker strikes, they do so against an oppressive labour market behaviour and not simply one employer. He writes, “structural domination makes its most immediate appearance in the threat of being exploited by a particular employer, even though the point of structural domination is that workers can be exploited by any potential employer” (Gourevitch 2016, 314). If all choices for work commit to the same oppressive conduct, then there is no choice. This structural domination is a rebuttal to the idea of enhanced republican and positive freedom in the gig economy. If the dominating individual hierarchical firm is exchanged for an even less accountable and more subjugating labour market force, then republican freedom is more suppressed in the gig economy.

Kondo and Singer put forth terminology to help define the current situation the worker faces within the gig economy to offer a legal framework that best counteracts the inhumane aspects of the gig economy. This term is ‘Labour Without Employment’ and means, “In the modern economy, some people are straightforwardly labouring for others, but are not being directed by them in the Coasean sense: they are responding to prices in the market, not to direct commands” (Kondo and Singer 2019, 352). In the gig economy, the worker is no longer interacting with an individual

hierarchical firm but rather a superseding oppressive structure comprised of market forces that are not accountable to the same legal or moral standards put forth by the SER. In many ways, this impedes all three forms of freedom which Anderson invokes.

The most evident loss in the workers' freedom comes from the lack of ability to unionize within the gig economy, therefore constraining the workers' republican freedom. As Gourevitch explains, workers are subjected to the market's hierarchical, unaccountable, and arbitrary power. There are a few reasons why collective action is harder in the gig economy. First, Friedmann Bieber and Jakob Moggia point out that within the gig economy, "in principle, all workers have the option of quitting or not accepting a job, of voicing their discontent and renegotiating their terms of employment. However, in practice, workers whose skills are in abundant supply and whose geographic mobility is limited tend to lack outside options" (Bieber and Moggia 2021, 290). With the increase in the supply of low-skilled work, workers are forced to adhere to the demands of the market, making unionization more implausible given that it is crucial they stay in line to keep their job. Another reason is that the isolation gig workers feel from one another is a strong technique to ensure no collective action. Luka Bulian writes, "Fully aware that isolation can be used to prevent collective actions... [researchers] found that, perhaps, unsurprisingly, platform workers report indeed greater levels of powerlessness and loneliness compared to the 'standard' workforce" (Bulian 2021, 117). This is a more prominent deterrent to unionization in

some forms of gig work rather than others (i.e. remote and platform work). However, with the high supply of labour in low-skilled positions, Bulian points out that workers feel compelled to compete with one another more, thus, minimizing the sense of comradeship necessary to unionize (Bulian 2021, 112). In both ways, the worker is subjected to an oppressive force that either disincentivizes collective action to the point of impossibility or attempts to ensure that a status quo of isolation is maintained so workers can never think to collectively bargain to begin with. Furthermore, Gourevitch considers the reason that collective action is so important for workers' freedoms. He states, "the right to strike is a right of human freedom claimed against the social domination that the typical modern worker experiences" (Gourevitch 2016, 308). This speaks to the moral necessity of striking as a claim to 'human freedom.' The impairment of the ability to take collective action, whether it be advertent through employers' hiring behaviour or inadvertent through the inevitable isolation of gig workers, and the resulting constraint on the right to collective action and unionization is a humane concern. Therefore, the barriers put up by the gig economy to prevent collective action are detrimental to not just positive or republican freedom, but *human* freedom.

Another way that gig work impedes a worker's freedom is by restricting one's positive freedom due to its precarious nature impairing one's ability to make long-term decisions. As I discussed in the previous section, the distinction between work and free time with the SER enhanced the

positive freedom of the worker. Now, the gig economy is eroding that distinction by emphasizing no fixed, expected work schedule. As noted earlier in this section, many believe the workers' positive freedom is enhanced through the gig economy, but with the line blurred between work and free time, a worker is much less free than one suspects. The first way workers' positive freedom is restricted is because they cannot now make long-term plans. Bieber and Moggia state, "on many accounts of human flourishing, being able to make plans is fundamental to the distinctly human capacity of shaping one's life (at least partly) according to one's own values" (Bieber and Moggia 2021, 289). Gig work restricts 'human flourishing' by not allowing the worker the financial stability necessary to make advanced, long-term plans for their life, which then restricts their positive freedom by limiting their life options. The precarity of gig work leads to both income volatility and a sense of unease as to where or when one might get paid for their labour. Not only does gig work impair one's long-term plans, but it also preoccupies their free time and resources with work-related matters. Bieber and Moggia note, "Owners of firms reduce their business risk by demanding more flexibility of their workers, thereby exposing them to greater personal risk" (Bieber and Moggia, 282). The SER managed to force employers to take responsibility for supplying capital equipment and premises to conduct the work. The gig economy's demand for workers to be flexible entails a burden on them to supply their own equipment and work on their own premises, which restricts

their positive freedom because time spent outside of work must be devoted to the acquisition or maintenance of these work resources. The SER preserved the workers' positive freedom outside of the workplace, but the gig economy has now weakened the work and free time distinction to the point where it is becoming nearly impossible to distinguish between them.

Conclusion

The gig economy threatens to dismantle many of the liberal, moral aspects of work that the SER strove to preserve. The two main ways gig work is regressing from the SER are the demolition of the prospects for collective action and the abolishment of the work-free time distinction. These are two ways the New-Deal concept of work obtained positive and republican freedom for the worker. Arguments supporting the gig economy as empowering workers' positive and republican freedom are short-sighted because they disregard these two liberating aspects mentioned above. Further, such arguments do not acknowledge how the market forces consolidate to form one oppressive structure that dictates workers' conduct inside and outside the workplace. Gig work is not a single of progress into a new era of worker freedom, it is a veil covering the tendency of capitalist production to commodify work and identify every feasible way to extract surplus value from this commodification of labour. Without the SER, the worker is forced into an unregulated domain of employment that is more restrictive of workers' freedoms than previous individual firms were,

therefore ultimately failing to make workers freer.

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The BRI and It's Implications for the Liberal International Order

Jack Seabrook

Introduction

China's proposal to facilitate building the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has raised important questions about the fate of the US-led liberal international order (LIO). By establishing new institutions outside the grasp of US control, China will have created a medium to exact its growing geopolitical and geoeconomic power, both regionally and globally. Some scholars have argued the project will serve as a genuine agent of global development. Others see it as an existential threat to the LIO as we have known it since the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, in the event the current LIO is upended by China, it is curious where Canada, a middle power, would fall in the new balance of power. Would it remain loyal to its longstanding southern neighbour or realign itself with the new top dog? To correctly theorize about the implications of Xi Jinping's ambitions and the effect the BRI might have on the LIO and Canadian security, we must determine the following: China's true intentions, the durability of the US-led LIO, and where Canadian loyalties will lie given a rising challenger. This paper will argue that China intends to use the BRI to capitalize on flaws in American policy, creating new challenges for Canadian security. First, this paper will provide context to the issue at hand by explaining the BRI and by offering a series of potential outcomes for the project. Second, using a

historical lens, the paper will make projections about Xi Jinping's true intentions with the BRI, suggesting historical grievances and nationalist sentiment motivate the development of the BRI as a means to reassert China as a regional hegemon. Third, this paper will outline how flawed American policy permits the realization of China's geopolitical ambitions. Lastly, it will turn to discuss what a new multipolar order might mean for Canada, a middle-power that has relied on the US to pursue its own foreign policy objectives, but one that also tends to drift away from the US policy line.

Literature Review

Articles written by Mark Beeson (2018) as well as Jean-Marc Blanchard and Colin Flint (2017) thoughtfully explain the BRI. The project was announced in 2013, first proposed by Xi Jinping at the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) forum. In general, it is a plan to facilitate the construction and reconstruction of trade routes to stimulate economic growth. It consists of two different systems, one coined the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), and the other titled the Maritime Silk Road (MSR). The SREB will connect Central and South Asia to China and Europe. The MSR will connect the maritime states of Southeast and South Asia. The project will require extraordinary financial investment to create

the necessary hard infrastructure, such as ports, pipelines, railways, and highways. It will also require new soft infrastructure, meaning free trade and investment agreements. To fund the ambitious but attainable project, China established a Silk Road Fund (SRF) with 40 billion dollars invested, in addition to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) valued at 50 billion dollars. Furthermore, the China Development Bank has plans to invest 890 billion dollars, and other investments have been made by China Exim Bank, totalling over 1000 MSR and SREB-related projects in 2015 (Beeson 2018) (Blanchard & Flint 2017).

While China itself refuses to acknowledge the BRI as a mode of geopolitical competition, there are many opposing opinions which would claim otherwise. Some say the People's Republic of China is using their material capability to foster genuine economic development internationally. Others argue that the project operates under the guise of mere capitalist motives. Truthfully, however, China is using the project to create a modern tribute system and re-establish regional domination (Beeson 2018). China's historical legacy as the region's hegemon, its past grievances with the US, and its security competitions are what leads this paper to be more inclined to side with the latter argument.

The BRI could turn out one of three different ways. The first scenario is that the BRI bankrupts China. Xi Jinping is the most economically ideological leader since any of Mao's successors and has a great affinity for Marxism. If we are concerned with China's continued growth of geoeconomic power,

we must fear not. The BRI has allowed China to put its ideological fingerprints all over independent businesses such as Huawei. As a result, these businesses get associated with the Chinese state instead of the company brand, which is both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, BRI companies receive state funding for expansion, but on the other, BRI companies become a major security threat to foreign states (Green & Triolo 2020). Furthermore, greater state control yields lower growth rates, which is a win for the Western world. There seems to be an economic law which suggests when a state assumes greater control over the market, its economic growth decreases. Unless this law no longer applies to China, it may enter a state of decline relatively soon, with partial responsibility awarded to the BRI. For those fans of the LIO as it stands, this scenario would be the preferred one to run its course.

The second scenario is one in which the BRI is a success beyond Xi Jinping's wildest dreams. If the BRI develops without fault and China can continue building new multilateral institutions within and beyond Asia, therefore bolstering its geoeconomic influence, it will elevate China's capability to an extent that effectively disables former Western institutions from exacting their liberal democratic values internationally. China, through its BRI, will exterminate the LIO led by the US. In effect, China would shift the structure of the international order to a state of unipolarity. In relation to scenario one, scenario two is quite undesirable for the US and its allies. Fortunately, this is not the likely case. This brings us to scenario three, the most

probable scenario, which the remainder of this paper will be dedicated to explaining. In scenario three, a new multipolar world will emerge, consisting of two bounded realist orders on account of China's new institutional infrastructures (like the BRI), the self-destructive nature of the LIO, and inadequate American policy.

China's Resurgence as the Rightful Regional Hegemon?

To make projections about the future, it is always a good practice to consider the past. When Mark Beeson says China's primary goal is to dominate its own backyard, he correctly draws parallels between the BRI, therefore framing it as a modern tribute system and China's former Silk Road (Beeson 2018). China has a long-standing legacy as a regional hegemon, in the sense 'hegemony' is taken to mean 'leadership.' China's historical role as a regional hegemon can be attributed to its former material power, but it is primarily a consequence of its symbolic leadership through the tributary process. Rather than ruling by force, Chinese emperors would acknowledge lesser powers as members of their system in exchange for a gift given to them by the smaller state. It was this practice that granted the Chinese emperor the identity of a rightful ruler. It is the same practice that functioned as China's main source of nationalism and desire to prevail as the top-ranking power, an attitude that persisted after their regional domination ended at the beginning of the 19th century, preceding China's "century of humiliation" and persisting still well into the post-Cold

War period. (Ji-Young 2016) (Mandelbaum 2019).

The East Asian order, backed by the hierarchical tributary process which guaranteed Chinese regional supremacy, collapsed in the face of imperialism when East Asia was colonized by great Western powers. Japan put up a fight against the US-British order, but officially accepted their defeat in September 1945, following the US's decimation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki via atomic bombs. This begins the competition between the US and the Soviet Union, which the US responded to by building alliances with South Korea and Japan to wage a new war against the spread of communism. What is most significant about this sequence of events is that the alliance-building efforts on behalf of the US began a new era of US hegemony in East Asia, with the US acting as a regional "pacifier" (Singh 2020). After the Cold War, the US continued its institution-building efforts. As the US made individual bilateral ties, decreasing security competition in the region, a "hub-and-spokes" pattern emerged, and once the Soviet Union reached its end, the US became the East Asian hegemon (Mandelbaum 2019). The US continued by integrating parts of Northeast Asia into the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, G7/8, G20, and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. Then, following the 1997 financial crisis, China thought it necessary to pursue its own institution-building efforts and free trade agreements through ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), another institution subject to US influence.

Had it not been for ASEAN, China may have had an opportunity to regain regional control. However, this was not to be. The dissolution of the Soviet Union left a power vacuum which created a gateway for China to return as hegemon. However, ASEAN states had become quite happy with the presence of the US and thus, the US was able to maintain its military presence promoting peace among East Asian states (Emmers & Caballero-Anthony 2020). Consequently, the US, through its bilateral ties, economic interdependence, and multilateral institutions, could pursue the spread of liberal democratic values in Asia, much to the benefit of the LIO and proponents of a US-led unipolar world. Nonetheless, to think China would not plot to rid itself of US influence and liberal ideology would be foolish considering its national identity hinges on its past regional supremacy. Much like how the US seized their opportunity to hoist itself into a hegemonic through new alliances, institutions, and economic ties, China will embark on a similar endeavour. However, this time, the hoisting will be accomplished by the BRI, which mimics China's former tributary model and comes at a time of American vulnerability.

Ready To Self-Destruct: The U.S. and the LIO

Xi Jinping's pursuit of the BRI makes it seem as though the US is headed for troubled waters. However, there is much more plaguing the US and the LIO than China's geoeconomic ambitions. It is possible that the US-led LIO has been

primed and ready to self-destruct from the time of its conception.

Graham Allison, in his book *Destined for War* (2018), plays fast and loose with Power Transition Theory (PTT), outlining 16 cases of power transition. In this book, Allison found that war was the result in 12 of the 16 cases of power transition. In these cases, the top-ranking member of an international system was challenged by the number two power, in the sense that the 2nd ranking state's power became proximate to that of the 1st state. Drawing on the analogy of Thucydides Trap, Allison likens the US to Sparta and China to Athens during the Peloponnesian War, finding there to be a 75% chance of war between the US and China (Allison 2018). Unfortunately for Graham Allison (though fortunately for readers), Allison completely misunderstands PTT. He includes cases of power transition that did not occur between the obvious 1 and 2 ranking powers and thus many of his cases do not fit the PTT framework, rendering his projections for an all-out war between the US and China historically inaccurate. Allison is right to theorize about a potential conflict between the US and China and to bring Thucydides into the discussion. However, it is necessary to get Thucydides right, as Jonathan Kirshner (2019) urges.

Unlike the Graham Allison perception, which likens the US to Sparta and China to Athens, Kirshner's version sees it the other way around, suggesting the real trap threatening the US comes from within. This application of Thucydides is far more accurate. Thucydides suggests that the defeat of Athens can be attributed to "hubris

in the form of reckless overambition,” arguing that Athens was “intoxicated with its own greatness,” and was therefore unable to realize the limits of its own power (Kirshner 2019). In this perspective, the US would appear a close relative of Athens, both sleepwalking across the world stage and simultaneously unconscious of the fact that its greatest threat has been borne about by hubris.

The US is disturbingly similar to the type of intoxicated and overambitious state described by Thucydides. President Joe Biden has called for a faster modernization of the military, but at the same time, he has been criticized for a budget that does not reflect his ambitions (Sanger 2022). Furthermore, the Biden administration appears woefully unprepared for any major security threat, since after 20 months of being in office, the administration failed to produce the National Security Strategy. This makes it difficult to match spending to objectives and challenging for its allies to orient policies to support the US. Even worse, however, is that there is a disconnect between what Biden claims as US objectives and what the US is willing to do to achieve them. Biden has said on four separate occasions the US will send troops if China makes a move on Taiwan, and all four times no policy changes were made. There is also the question of US capability, and if it could even effectively defend Taiwan when the time comes. The US military budget is insufficient for getting the ships, planes, missile defences and troops in the Pacific adequate to fend off China (Schake 2022).

Most concerning, however, are Biden’s statements about ensuring North

Korea does not possess nuclear weapons, while Pyongyang is thought to have multiple. The US is currently overconfident and unbothered in its approach. However, it should not be as unconcerned. In October 2022, North Korea tested missiles by flying them over Japan, a US ally, without little regard. This is a testament to how indifferent Kim Jong-Un is to US capability. However, Un is far from the only one who no longer takes the US and its capabilities seriously. The Biden administration recently offered Iran sanction relief in exchange for additional constraints on their nuclear program. The attempt was ineffective, which is not a surprise considering the US still has not realized a return on their 2015 nuclear deal with Iran. According to Kori Schake, the US is consistently overestimating its military power, hindering international cooperation with its economic policies, and quite dangerously believing in its own statements despite its actions undermining them (Schake 2022). The culmination of these factors may cause the reader to ponder if the US’s time as hegemon has already come to pass.

An internal threat previously plaguing the US and the LIO was its fascination with Emerald City, characterized by the commitment to globalization and unfettered capitalism after the Cold War (Bacevich 2020). This fascination was based on the old understanding that globalization leads to economic interdependence, decreases security competition, and promotes cooperation at an international level. From this logic, it follows that deglobalization would increase security competition by weakening economic

disincentives to compete. However, the old 'Peace-Through-Interdependence' theory which underpinned the Emerald City consensus is no longer supported. An alternative perspective is offered by Norrin Ripsman, who argues that the great power restraint and cooperation which followed the Cold War, was not an effect of globalization but rather a cause. The Clinton administration pushed an enlargement strategy to expand liberal democracy and create stability. Globalization did have certain stabilizing effects, but there were other consequences. Emerald City rejects who did not reap the benefits of this new age of globalization on American terms felt as though they should challenge the liberal order (Ripsman 2021). Among those feeling anxious about the new Western-oriented order was the US itself. As it turned out, China and Russia found themselves seated on the winning side of a new order that disproportionately allocated its benefits, and the US was left looking for an alternative plan, ideally one that did not prop up its adversaries. Cooperation also began to falter on account of the US becoming less inclined to face up to the price of maintaining the system it created, which was characterized by Donald Trump's isolationist policies during his time in office. The Obama administration and its actions are also not blame-free. Barack Obama neglected to take Syria to task when they used chemical weapons in 2013 (Ripsman 2021). When a great power like the US fails to defend the values and institutions on which its leadership is based, it opens the door for a challenger to step up and replace them. This is what China thought in 2013, and it serves

as one of the reasons Xi Jinping saw it as an opportune time to announce the BRI.

One of the most damning internal threats to the US and the LIO is the LIO itself. According to Mearsheimer, the policies which underpin the LIO are inherently flawed, one being the mandatory spreading of liberal democracy, which Ripsman also notes hinder international cooperation. However, Mearsheimer believes hyperglobalization to be the most damaging policy. He finds it to have caused wealth inequalities, therefore undermining support for the system, helping China gain the upper hand over the US, and reviving Russian power. Hyperglobalization made it difficult to institute protectionist policies, as it became the norm within the LIO to refrain from economic interference or the imposing of policies that inhibit free trade. As a result, China has been able to benefit from a lack of containment and integrate itself into the world economy (Mearsheimer 2019). As Mearsheimer states that the LIO was bound to fail as a result of these elements, and it is only fitting that China and Russia are the ones looking to capitalize on American mistakes.

Scenario Three: A New Multipolar Order

According to Mearsheimer, the LIO will be replaced by two thick bounded realist orders, one led by China, and the other led by the US. Being realist orders, they will experience security competition with each other as they continue grappling for an upper hand over the other. As China continues to foster economic cooperation within its order, it will increasingly rely on the BRI as a

medium for new economic ties. As a result, there is a strong presence of economic and military competition in need of management in the future. In the case of China, the BRI will act as means to exert military and political power. What makes this order multipolar, not bipolar, is the fact that Russia has once again been revived as a great power by way of hyperglobalization. (Mearsheimer 2019). Admittedly, Russia's obvious military deficiencies, exposed by its recent missteps in Ukraine, casts doubt on the truth of Russia's resurgence as a great power. Thus, the Russian threat that Mearsheimer spoke of in 2019 is not the same. However, it is still much too early to pass judgements on what the Ukrainian conflict, in its totality, will say about Russian power. Henceforth, Mearsheimer's cautioning about Russia's realignment in multipolarity remains valuable.

Mearsheimer poses the question of where Russia will land during this systemic change and makes clear how critical it will be for the US to ensure Russia does not land inside China's order. If the US is unable to accomplish this demonstration of power, it will become increasingly difficult for the US to contain China and its allies in the global playing field (Mearsheimer 2019). Biden's recent comments about Russia have suggested his focus is on "restraining Russia" (Sanger 2022). While this is a good decision, the ideal arrangement would be one where the US restricts Russia from aligning with China by cultivating a mutually beneficial US-Russia relationship. Unfortunately, Russia has at least postponed this option, since anything resembling US cooperation with Russia will be a tough sell

considering Heir Putin's renewed fondness for Ukraine. Russia's self-defeating and conflict-based relationship with Ukraine has been routinized for the purpose of granting Russia certainty in its identity (Mitzen 2006) Russia-Ukraine tensions are unlikely to end any time soon. Similarly, the US is quite familiar with defending itself and its European allies from Russian threats. Without this routine conflict, American identity becomes less certain, and both the US and NATO would suffer from increased task proliferation (Webber et al., 2021). So, even if Russia's attempt at Ukrainian occupation fails, and the current crisis is resolved, it is doubtful that the state of affairs between Russia, Ukraine, and the US would change. Disrupting these routines to steer Russia away from China is a noble cause, but it will come at the cost of ontological security on both sides. This presents a great barrier to achieving a US-led bounded order capable of safeguarding Western values during systemic change. With regard to what America may perceive as the Russian problem, the future remains uncertain.

The Fall of the LIO: Implications For Canadian National Security

The Canada-US alliance is thought to be one of the strongest and most longstanding special relationships. It is maintained by a shared identity, mutual trust, liberal-democratic values, and common institutions, the fundamental features of any security community (Adler & Barnett 1996). However, there have been times Canada has pursued unilateral policies outside the US policy line, and some of the fundamental

features which underpin the security community have faltered as a result. Since Canada functions as a middle power, therefore aligning with stronger powers to pursue its policy objectives, a malfunctioning US could alter the complexion of the Canada-US relationship.

Canada and the US are seemingly similar in some of their policy and domestic intentions, but there is evidence suggesting the national identity of the two countries differs greatly. Canada's individualistic national identity fuels a desire for Canada to differentiate itself from the US. One example of this differentiation comes from the war in Vietnam, marking the first time Canada stood apart from the US since the beginning of the Cold War. The Vietnam war cultivated the perception amongst Canadians that America will pursue "aggressive and self-destructive foreign policy" (Bow 2008). Canadians felt as though American values, at least when it came to militarism, were not in line with their own or their priorities as a peacekeeping country. George Bush and his "war on terror" narrative following the 9/11 attacks presented a similar case. This narrative prompted questions about the American commitment to liberal values, weakening shared identity and mutual trust (Bow 2008). In 2003, when Chrétien decided to opt out of the Iraq war, he signaled to the world that Canada does not travel blindly alongside its southern counterpart (Vucetic 2006). This suggests that Canada and the US might not be on the same page in their military and policy intentions.

Donald Trump certainly did not do the Canada-US relationship any favours with his approach. Trump undermined mutual trust with his isolationist strategies when he neglected to support, and even threatened to withdraw from several common institutions, namely the WHO, NATO, NAFTA, and the WTO (Greaves 2020). Trump was noted as being untrustworthy in his approach, statistically racking up 6.5 false or misleading claims per day while in office and totalling 16,000 lies during his first three years as president. 43 of those lies were specifically about Canada's trade deficits and PM Trudeau. (Greaves 2020) (Nye 2020). This served as a breach of trust that damaged diplomatic relations between supposed allies.

Following that was the Huawei incident. The US called on members of the "Five Eyes" (Australia, New Zealand, Britain, Canada, and the US) to ban Huawei's 5G internet. every country immediately agreed, except for Canada. This occurred in 2019 and only in May 2022 did Canada agree to the US's ask. Canada's delayed reaction to what should have been an automatic response demonstrates it does not share the same concerns about China as a security threat that the US does. In all, this serves as a demonstration that the Canadian-American alliance might not be heading into a conflict with China in the best possible position.

Canada's postwar status is declining. American policy flaws and the BRI (if successful) can both be directly linked to this decline. Therefore, it is not outside the realm of possibility that Canada would think to realign itself with powers outside the US

to save its declining status. The ailments suffered by the Canada-US relationship only serve to highlight this possibility. However, this remains an unlikely case. Even though there have been times when Canada and the US seem to have been pursuing completely different policies, it has never directly meant that the two countries were no longer allies. It is to be expected that Canada and the US may promote liberal democracy differently, as the two countries have tactical differences in their approaches (Gilley 2011). In the 60s, Canada was very keen on opposing Soviet domination despite it not sending troops to Vietnam. Canada was also in support of addressing terrorism after 9/11, even though it opted out of the Iraq war. It is best to recognize these events as instances of differentiation and Canada's opposition to the illegality of actions taken by the US in Iraq, rather than the outright rejection of the other country's foreign policies (Haglund & Roussel 2007). These differences do not mean Canada and the US are not committed to their respective security community, or that the two countries are uninterested in promoting liberal values more broadly. This alliance shows how it is possible to approach security issues differently, while still being allied. When it comes time for Mearsheimer's multipolar world to take effect, readers will, at the very least, know which bounded order Canada will seek refuge in.

Conclusion

This paper aims to discuss Xi Jinping's BRI, framing it as a tool designed by China to capitalize on the fall of the US and the LIO. While China's ill intentions and BRI might

exacerbate pre-existing faults within the Canada-US relationship, therefore creating new challenges for Canadian security, China should not be seen to pose any existential threat to Canada-US loyalties. However, this paper's findings should still serve as a wake-up call for Canadian security officials. Canada is unprepared to defend against the modern age of terror which operates, largely unnoticed, in the cold dark corners of cyberspace. The RCMP itself, an institution dedicated to protecting Canadians, has housed multiple agents who have sold sensitive intelligence information to Russian operatives. Furthermore, as reported in 2011 by CSIS, private firms and other state-owned enterprises have been acting on clandestine intelligence supporting their home country with the intention of pursuing their interests at Canada's expense (Carvin 2021). In this regard, China is a primary offender in the world order. China is setting the stage to infiltrate the Canadian economy by introducing uncompetitive and inefficient enterprises backed by unlimited loans and the interests of the Chinese state (Carvin 2021). This is an official plan titled the Digital Silk Road (a subsidiary scheme within the BRI), therefore aiming to ensure the expansion of independent technology companies through Chinese state funding. To qualify to be a recipient of the funding, companies must sacrifice their autonomy and commit themselves to the pursuit of state interests. (Green & Triolo 2020) It is these types of modern threats that necessitate an evolved interpretation of what constitutes a national security issue. This warrants a perspective that goes beyond the conventional assessment of physical security

risks. Considering these threats, the biggest challenge facing Canadian security officials moving forward will be to recognize conventional and modern threats equally and simultaneously. To favour one over the other would produce blind spots, creating serious vulnerabilities in Canada's defence policies which its enemies would be more than willing to exploit.

US decline is primarily American-made. If an effort is not made to change attitudinal approaches and address shortcomings, the American dream may be in jeopardy. If the US wants to control the extent to which its power is limited by the new multipolar world, it ought to do what it can to resolve the Russia-Ukraine conflict in a timely manner. Only then can the US begin carefully crafting a plan to pull Russia into its orbit, despite Russia's recent wrongdoing. If, however, Russia was to come under new leadership, then the job of convincing the public would be made easier. To lose Russia to China at such a critical time would be catastrophic. Mearsheimer says the new multipolar world will show some resemblance to the previous state of affairs during the first Cold War. Ideally, Mearsheimer is not completely correct, and rather than constant security competition ruling the day, these two bounded orders can focus on common issues, like climate change, to maintain some level of cooperation. Canada, in addition to adopting a new holistic security perspective, should do its part alongside the US to cautiously engage with China, while committing to policies of multilateralism and friend-shoring. A safe and peaceful systemic change is possible, but cooperation is

necessary. For this to succeed, the facts must be accepted with little regard to pride.

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Transnational Capital at the European Border: neo-Gramscian Reflections on Authoritarian Neoliberalism, Surveillance Capitalism, and Necropolitics in EU Migration

Nicholas Donaldson

Introduction

Since 2000, over 34,000 migrants have died crossing the Mediterranean caused the intensification of border controls across Europe and Africa (McIntyre et al., 2018). The evolution of ‘Fortress Europe’ reflects a conflictual process between social forces, forms of states, and world order. Consequently, neo-Gramscian analyses are best suited to explain the emergence of the authoritarian neoliberal migratory regime of the European Union (EU). The intent of this paper is to revise Coxian frameworks (via Foucauldian, Liberal, and neo-Marxist scholarship) and develop an understanding of the EU’s migratory regime within the context of shifting social relations and forms of state. I do so with reference to neo-Marxist literature on the growing precarity

and fragmentation of labour, authoritarian neoliberalism, liberal theories of surveillance capitalism, and Mbembian necropolitics¹ in the global political economy (GPE).

I analyze the contributions of Robert Cox drawn from his 1987 text *Production, Power, and World Order*. Afterwards, I sketch the contemporary capitalist relations to illustrate the gradual shift social relations, forms of state, and hegemonic projects of the EUs migratory regime. Synthesizing these bodies of literature, I will explain how shifting social relations and forms of state have shaped the EUs migration regime as an expression of instrumentarian power² and necropolitics, demonstrated through the EUs constitutionalisation,³ privatization, and datafication of their border regime. For the

¹ Necropolitics is the “ultimate expression of sovereignty... the power and capacity to dictate who may live and who must die” (Mbembe, 2003: 11). A synthesis of Foucauldian biopolitics and decolonial literature, this research article deploys necropolitics to discuss the role of authoritarian neoliberalism in regulating the border as a means of categorising and datamining humans, sorting use-value and producing extreme vulnerability. It was coined by J.A. Mbembé to describe the biopolitical relations which define, limit, and subjugate marginal groups in society, with particular focus on (neo)colonial power relations.

² Instrumentarian power uses algorithms and AI to predict, know, and shape human behaviour towards others’ ends through “unprecedented asymmetries in

knowledge and the power that accrues to knowledge” (Zuboff 2019, 17). For this research article, instrumentarian power is viewed in relation to the proliferation of surveillance technologies and modes of border governance and their consequences for migrants, with reference to Foucauldian necropolitics.

³ Constitutionalisation describes the process of subordinating exercises of democratic power, procedure, or norms to legal or constitutional procedures and norms, both domestic and international (Carrera et al 2019). For this research article, it will include the enshrinement of EU principles via member-state treaties, as well as third-party agreements to de-territorialise the EUs migratory regime.

purposes of my analysis, EU border policies are interpreted as a holistic overarching regime. The creation of Frontex,⁴ consolidation of migration management under EU treaties, and the harmonization of policies around Fortress Europe indicate a broader European consensus on migration (Walia, 2020). Cox and a range of scholars have interpreted EU regionalisation through dynamics of globalisation and transnational elite politics (Cox 1987; Söderbaum 2005). While this concept may obscure intraregional or micro-level factors, it is unfortunately not the scope of this paper. Rather, this should be read as a call for further research into the intra-institutional dynamics which condition these developments.

Robert W. Cox: a neo-Gramscian perspective

In 1987, Robert W. Cox released the first of a four-volume series on the shape of these concepts GPE. In his theory, he concretely elaborated upon the neo-Gramscianism paradigm which he put forth in previous articles (Cox 1981; 1983). Drawing from Antonio Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks*, Cox (1987) develops a novel account of the international system built on the interplay between social relations of production, forms of state, and world orders. His perspective lies in the heterodox school of critical theorists whose work acknowledges its aims to change the world around it. There is explicit emphasis on historicity and neo-Gramscian perspectives,

⁴ The European Border and Coast Guard Agency or Frontex is tasked with "enforcing migration control at the EU's external borders" seeing its mandate, executive authority, autonomy, budget, and staff

juxtaposed against the orthodox or problem-solving school, objective, positivist social scientists seeking formulas to the world's answers. This is a common and practical ontological and epistemic distinction taken by scholars, though its rigid boundaries are overstated (Cox, 2015; Bruff et al 2011). He describes these as historical structures formed by ideational, material, and institutional forces. Cox emphasises the necessity to historicize one's research or to situate one's theorizing in its material contexts. Through his framework, Cox develops several key concepts. Though lacking a racial lens, I will use these as a basis for analyzing border regimes including the peripheralisation of labour, the hyperliberal state, and the transnational managerial class.

Production, Power, and World Order

In his investigation, Cox identifies a constellation of three interdependent and interrelated phenomena which constitute the basis for socioeconomic and political changes. First, he notes, the balance of *social forces*, which emerge from power relations nested in hierarchical and overlapping "modes of social relations of production" (Cox 1987, 1). They are forms of labour and capital accumulation from the most primitive or household to the corporatist or hyperliberal modes. Modes coexist as monads or "self-contained structures" (Cox 1987, X). Dominant modes or organizations displace and subordinate older modes into an integrated web, aided by

expand exponentially (Cossé 2021). Created in 2004, Frontex has an annual budget of € 754m, the largest of any EU agency.

forms of states and conditioned by their environments or structures. This network of modes gives rise to social forces with the potential to form coherent classes and eventually historical blocs. Second, *forms of state* are “historically specific” expressions of power within a particular historic bloc and find their basis of legitimacy and power in these same social forces (Cox 1987, 1). Forms of state reflect “distinct developmental processes... [of] mutual adaptation, and reinforcement,” and encompasses a wide complex of actors within state and civil society (Cox 1987, 103). They act as “creators... coordinators and regulators of configurations of modes [of social relations of production],” giving “pre-eminence to particular modes” in the process (Cox 1987, 103-106). However, they face constraints from both the “configuration of social forces” which “defines the limits or parameters of state purposes... the modus operandi of state action” and *world order* (Cox 1987, 105).

World orders are expressions of a hegemonic social class, or historic bloc. They conceptualize phases of stability and conflict between hegemonic social forces. Social forces, forms of state, and their various classes and historic blocs are “conditioned by the prevailing structure of world order” (Cox 1987, 109). However, they remain grounded in a national context and dependent upon these same interacting forces for constitution. For Cox, hegemonic “Pax Americana” was in decline and its future uncertain, having re-constructed the world economy and embedded neoliberal principles within it during the post-WWII era (1987, 211).

Interwoven through each concept is the notion of the historic bloc or a coalescence of social forces establishing relationships over contending social forces. The historic bloc is both formative of and conditioned by each historic structure. This synthesis of interrelated phenomena enables a complex and dynamic conceptualization of GPE. It attempts to satisfy interest in the agency of forms of state, social forces, nascent classes, and historic blocs, while avoiding the frequent neglect of structural factors and hegemonic orders which impede or enhance agency. When used as a framework for analysing the EU’s migratory regime, it provides the foundations for examining how global labour dislocation and technological changes are mediated by novel authoritarian neoliberal forms of state. I will elaborate upon this framework to elucidate how these forms of state construct and deploy border regimes to filter and frustrate migration in service of capital.

The Hyperliberal State, Peripheralisation, & TMCs

Beyond his core analytical framework, Cox canvases the ongoing internationalisation of the state and production by Pax Americana. For him, this is a major shift in social relations and forms of state, re-orienting social relations of production and forms of state towards novel markets, with significant and divergent consequences. Among these are the hyperliberal state, the peripheralization of labour, and the emergence of a new historic bloc between the transnational managerial class (TMC), national bourgeoisie, petty capitalists, and the middle stratum.

Cox imagines the Hyperliberal state as in a continuity with the Classical Liberal and Neoliberal forms of state which preceded it. He describes it in terms of its “restructuring... of the labour force [and] modes of social relations of production” to open competition, marketisation, and a weakening or total withdrawal of government intervention and regulation (Cox 1987, 287). In generating an “imposing list of disadvantaged or excluded groups,” the historic bloc engages in a “confrontational posture” which undermines and fragments the basis for legitimacy and solidarity (Cox 1987, 288). Cox’s hyperliberal state and modern theorisations of neoliberalism’s manifestations in statecraft have clear continuities (Poulantzas 1978; Hall 1979; 1985; Cox 1987; Harvey 2005; Bruff 2014). This is connected to the peripheralization of labour, or a bifurcation of labour relations between two increasingly divided classes. First, a core of established, secure, and well-paid jobs, intellectual, technocratic, and managerial in nature. Second, a growing majority of unestablished, fragmented, and flexible jobs on the periphery, manual, unskilled, semi-skilled, or gig workers. This coincides with the growth of the underground or shadow economy, the proliferation of subcontracting, self-employment, short-term contracts, and part-time work, all with increasingly higher turnover.

When situated within the ongoing process of neoliberal restructuring and the outsourcing of manufacturing to developing states with substandard or nonexistent laws and regulations, there can be only one consequence: the fragmentation of global

labour. It erodes fragmented and classless social forces’ agency, as well as their ability to support or subvert a historic bloc. These conditions of mass social dislocation, accumulation by dispossession, and inter- or intra-state conflict have prompted mass migration (Harvey 2005, 159-65; Walia 2020). New forms of legitimacy are sought by the emergent historic bloc, reinforced by the hyperliberal state to subvert democratic rule and spur support from marginal social forces. This bloc is constituted by classes conditioned by authoritarian neoliberal forms of state, TMCs, and surveillance capitalists.

The transnational managerial class are “managerial cadres of multinational corporations” alongside “public officials in the national and international agencies... experts, and specialists” responsible for the GPEs maintenance (Cox 1987, 359-60). Allied with national and local capital, they represent for our analysis the nascent authoritarian neoliberal historic bloc. Cox suggests one potential source of legitimacy for this bloc lies in “military Keynesianism” (1987, 288). TMCs spur economic and technological innovation, stoking patriotic nationalist sentiment to consolidate otherwise disparate or opposed groups in opposition to a fictionalized Other. The historic bloc seeks both legitimacy and to project its hegemony project outwards. It manages this task via constitutionalisation, threats to material scarcity, and the use of surveillance and machine intelligence to regulate movement, determine risk or value, and financialize people.

Contemporary Capitalism

This essay cannot chart the evolution of capitalism since Cox's time. Rather, it will seek to sketch some of the contours of shifting productive relations and their consequences for forms of state, emerging historic blocs, and border regimes. Cox's hyperliberal state has overseen significant technological shifts in production, which are mediated through authoritarian mutations of neoliberalism and novel post-Fordist social relations of production. The work of Ursula Huws, Shoshanna Zuboff, Ian Bruff, Cemal Tansel, and other scholars will inform the following section.

Technology, Labour, and Surveillance Capitalism

Like Cox, Huws (2019) sees technology and productive relations as intertwined. Through decades of research, she illustrates how peripheralised labour conditions in the neoliberal world. Workers confront a competitive and flexible global reserve of labour, internalized or offshore, enabling technical and manual work to be performed by those in extreme precarity with severe downward pressures on cost-savings (Huws 2019, 66-68). Her work follows a long neo-Marxist tradition. Generous welfare benefits are gradually subjected to austerity and converted to means-tested workfare benefits (Palier & Hay, 2017; Huws 2019, 66-70). Public services, utilities, and major sectors are privatised at low cost to local or transnational capitalists (Huws 2019, 66-70; Davies et al., 2022). Market relations and marketized logic intrude into non-market spaces, financializing social spaces, infecting institutions with the profit motive,

and removing any distance between the self, leisure, or the market (Leys, 2003; Harvey 2005; Huws 2019, 66-70). These are compounding pressures on a growing "invisible majority" within the European economies who are "unemployed, in atypical contract, at risk of poverty and inactive... [of] working age" (Ferragina et al. 2022, 26-27). In 2016, they were 49%, up from 35% in 2002 (Ferragina et al. 2022). Likewise, the growth of tertiary service and financial sectors has driven a dualistic demand for highly qualified knowledge-based and low-skilled flexible workers (Huws 2019, 66-68; de Haas et al. 2020, 53).

Each of these shifts in social relations of production is connected to technologies mediated by corporate and state power. The proliferation of global value-chains, the internet, and cyberspace as a social space and system of exchange has revolutionized the production, distribution, and consumption of goods. This continues to be facilitated by increasingly mobile global capital, flexible part-time contracts, and open deregulated labour markets (Phillips 2016; Huws 2019, 65-73). Platforms and the gig economy herald the centralisation and marketization of spaces of social reproduction, submitting peripheralised workers to algorithmic governance rendering their economic and social security precarious (Srnicsek, 2017; Into Black Box & Huws 2021; Davies et al., 2022). These correspond to a shift in the burden of the tax base. Many states now rely upon fewer progressive taxes on luxuries or the wealthy, preferring value-added or indirect taxation, whilst top or marginal tax brackets continue to fall (Harvey 2005; Huws 2019, 68). This

is reflected in growing global inequality within and between states (WID 2021; Piketty 2022). Zuboff (2020) describes “the yawning gap between the right of self-assertion and the capacity to control the social settings which render such self-assertion feasible” (49). It is this tension between individualisation and the neoliberal habitat which social relations and forms of state must mediate, defer, or resolve.

Abroad, developing states compete in a race to the bottom for foreign investment undermining land and labour rights while displacing millions (Harvey 2005; de Haas et al. 2020, 48-55; Walia 2020). The pioneers of this dislocation are transnational mining and fossil fuel firms, agribusiness, and insidious green grabs for sustainable development projects. Additionally, since 2008, 21.5 million people were displaced by weather-related events each year on average (Lustgarten 2019). Forecasting predicts as many as 1.2 bn displaced persons by 2050 due to climate change, while 19% of the earth’s surface will be unliveable hot zones (Lustgarten 2019). Facing mass displacement, the hyperliberal form of state must manage transnational movement and suppress labour solidarity, with facilitating ease of access to capital and deepened spaces of capital accumulation and exploitation. These have severe negative consequences for workers’ skills and abilities to bargain. Workers’ identities, once rooted in clear skills or qualifications have increasingly been supplanted. New “provisional identities” exist as nebulous universal competencies, software proficiencies, communication skills, or dirty, dangerous, and degrading

work both at home and overseas (Huws 2019, 76; de Haas et al. 2020, 48-55).

Under conditions of peripheralisation and unstable neoliberalism, surveillance capitalism emerged as a novel component within big tech and data analytics firms. Zuboff details the methods of this post-Fordist Coxian shift in the social relations of production. Firms’ data mine “behavioral surplus” from digital activities, behaviours, and experiences which are operationalized into code and fed as behavioral data into advanced analytical processes, machine learning algorithms, or AI (Zuboff 2020, 14). These aim to enhance products or services and produce prediction products to “anticipate what you will do now, soon, later” (Zuboff 2020, 14). The exchange of prediction products takes place on “behavioral futures markets” that become instrumental in the exertion of instrumentarian power (Zuboff 2020, 14). Thus, corporations become the tyrants of our desires and the instruments of their fulfillment. However, Zuboff’s project is a liberal one, seeking to re-establish a correct form of capitalist relations as opposed to revolutionizing them.

Zuboff (2020) also usefully theorizes about “surveillance exceptionalism” (114). She describes this as the affinity between big data analytics companies and state agencies which fostered fertile ground for growth under neoliberalism and shielded these groups from public scrutiny or democratic oversight. This situation is intimately tied to private contractors, the defense and aerospace industry, big tech & data analytics firms, and other major industrial or

knowledge sectors. All are recipients of the EU's €34.9 bn budget for migration policy from 2021-27 (Korkmaz 2022, 257-8). This European fortress is reinforced by rigorous lobbying and extensive political relationships, pursued in an unregulated and incomprehensible cyberspace.

Oxford research Emre Korkmaz (2022) suggests that surveillance capitalism's manifestations in migration and border management acts as a laboratory for capital accumulation and R&D, readily providing bodies for experimentation and data mining to be later deployed on global populations. This is one facet of the military Keynesian project, stimulating technological development and constructing internal legitimacy. These insights frame the shifts in social relations, which forms of state facilitate, govern, and respond to. These are also intimately tied to ways in which the EU's migratory governance serves to criminalize refugees as "an Other."

Authoritarian Neoliberalism & Racial Capitalism

In response to these shifting social relations, the state has co-opted social relations based on lucrative, violent, and anti-democratic practice to establish legitimacy and solidify their historic bloc. Bruff, Tansel, and others have sought to develop a new conceptual term to describe this mutation: authoritarian neoliberalism. It is not uniquely authoritarian; neoliberal capitalism has always exhibited these symptoms. Rather, it is the constellation of legal, administrative, and coercive state apparatuses to both legitimize and shield themselves from political and social

contestation. It is deployed to research a broad array of EU institutions including the troika's (EC, EU Central Bank, & IMF) constitutionalizing austerity (Bruff 2014), managing the Eurozone crisis (Ryner 2019), internal EU manifestations (Gallo 2022), EU industrial policy (Wigger 2019), and its global iterations (Tansel 2017). Recent scholarship has expanded the scope to analyze borders (Smith 2019; Keck & Clua-Losada 2021; Axster et al. 2021).

Several key ideas have crystallized in the literature (Bruff, 2014 115-116). First, it appeals to material scarcity and inability of the state to reverse the current neoliberal state of alienation, dislocation, and inequality. Second, the diminishing expectations of non-market institutions and deepening penetration of market logic, a recurrent feature of neoliberalism. Third, the retooling of the state towards antidemocratic, constitutionalized, and legal rules promoted as necessary for prosperity. It is easy to see how this novel organisation of social forces and state-society relations interacts with and influences migration policy. Authoritarian neoliberalism acts as a "reactionary recoding of the anxiety produced by the economic crisis and functional[ly]... solving a crisis of governmentality, without affecting the relations of power and production." (Brindisi 2021, 276). These provide points of intervention to discuss the EU's

privatization, de-territorialisation,⁵ and constitutionalisation of border regimes to defend regimes of accumulation. The border discursively and technologically filters and constructs (un)desirable migrants, instrumentalizes laws, and constitutionalizes security to produce economic dispossession and foreclose democratic space.

Cox (1987) makes few references to race or the effects of slavery in his work, though he critically references colonialism many times. However, any analysis of capitalism or the EUs migratory regime must acknowledge the racialized nature of migration in Europe (De Genova 2017). It is an essential lens of analysis. Cedric J. Robinson illustrated how racism and colonialism emerged with, required, and made possible the emergence of capitalism and borders regime (Song 2022, 1043-48). The racial-colonial lens is necessary to understand how migratory regimes' intensifications of processes or systems were tested and refined throughout colonialism and the history of racial capitalism. Historically, colonies from Algeria to Zimbabwe served as imperial laboratories for the experimentation of practises, technologies, and modes of governance which would inevitably "boomerang" back to the metropole (Axster et al. 2020, 422-3).

Migration control doubly acts as a form of racialized dispossession and accumulation. It is "central to the making of the global proletariat... as a tool to subordinate migrant labor and keep them in a place of legal vulnerability and super-exploitability" (Axster et al. 2021, 427). The EU continues to be implicated in neocolonial plunder and enacting violent border regimes (Rodney, 1985; Hickel et al. 2021). These manage the fallout from dispossession and displacement brought about by (neo)colonial and neoliberal practises (Harvey, 2005; Walia, 2020; Axster et al 2021). By "retool[ing] and reconfigure[ing] state and institutional power," authoritarian neoliberalism intensifies its function as a "regulatory node" (Smith 2019, 195-197). It acts to systematically lubricate the movement of some and frustrate others, servicing its control of, directing, and ordering goods, people, information, and capital. It acts as a sift, dictating the use-value of individuals to both the state and capital. As an expression of necropolitics, it produces constitutionalized boundaries and spaces of social, political, economic, and physical vulnerability.

Simultaneously, authoritarian neoliberalism channels and subverts working-class frustrations and constructs migrants as terrorists, criminals, smugglers, and threats to the waning welfare state. Its

⁵ De-territorialisation describes the ongoing process whereby that states borders, actions, and interventions extend far beyond their physical borders, before and long after arrival, and involve a broad array of public, private, state, and supranational actors. De-territorialisation is frequently discussed in conjunction with externalisation, or the linking of control of

external borders to the protection of the security of a broader community of states facing common threat of migration, which often leads to the outsourcing of migration policies, practises, and norms within the defined community. Both here will be used to describe the processes of the EUs migratory regime.

racialized character serves only to further differentiate and distance irregular migrants as targets of class animus and as victims of a criminal smuggling industry, as opposed to asylum seekers and displaced persons. In the context of new social relations of production, surveillance capitalism enables unprecedented interventions to deter migration through machine intelligence and military operations equipped with ‘situational awareness.’

Fortress Europe

The EU has roughly “10,000 kilometres of green borders, 50,000 kilometres of blue borders and 1,800 official ports of entry into the EU,” much of which is discursively constructed to demand constant securitisation⁶ (Broeders & Dijkstra 2016, 247). The de-territorialisation and militarisation of the EU’s border has been extensively documented. Frontex, member-states, and allied third countries in the ‘EU Neighbourhood’ conduct pushbacks and pull-backs with domestic and foreign military vessels aided by drone surveillance and authoritarian regimes (Akkerman 2018; 2021; Statewatch 2021). The EU finances vast fortified walls at migratory chokepoints rigged to survey, detect, and deport or detain both at home and abroad (Akkerman 2018; 2021; Cossé 2021). EU servicemembers train “counterterrorism and anti-migration force[s]” like “the G5 Sahel Cross-Border Joint Force” and deploy to participate in joint enforcement across Africa and Asia

⁶ Securitisation is both a discursive and material process. It discursively constructs threats and stokes fear of migrants necessitating extraordinary intervention and legitimating extraordinary powers.

(Walia 2020, 109). The externalisation of surveillance, detention centres, and border policing to third countries continues to subject migrants to “gross human rights violations in transit countries in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, West Asia and Africa” (Akkerman 2021, 1). The Common Security and Defence Policy, EU Border Assistance Missions, and NATO partnerships in Operation Sophia epitomize the military’s role in criminalizing migration (Akkerman 2021). The EU conflates irregular migrants, at worst guilty of administrative offenses, with criminal networks of mafias, smugglers, human traffickers, and terrorists.

This has not deterred the European Commission (EC) or European Parliament (EP) from expanding the mandate and budget of Frontex, seeking to hire 10 000 border guards by 2027, and expanding executive authority (Cossé 2022). Frontex’s accountability (or lack thereof) remains the subject of intense scrutiny. Frontex has continued to conduct operations rife with human rights abuses, and regularly evades state and supranational accountability. There is no independent oversight mechanism. There is extensive documentation of its executive board subverting internal mechanisms designed to check its authority, including lying, forging documents, and widespread corruption (EMHRM 2021). Additionally, the ambiguous nature of legal competencies of states and EU courts over the agency and its joint operations with member-states has driven fierce drawn-out

Materially, it results in the intensification of militarisation – the use of military resources, fences, walls, detention centres, forced deportations or interdictions, and more.

legal battles which have resulted in unsatisfactory rulings, enhancing Frontex's protection from scrutiny (EMHRM 2021). The degree of legal, administrative, and financial autonomy it enjoys combined with conflicts of competency enable a broad array of abusive practises (EMHRM 2021).

This comes at great expense to EU taxpayers, many of whom are living in more precarious positions. Rather, Fortress Europe continues to consolidate as the authoritarian neoliberal state grapples with new modes of social relations and increased dislocation both internally and internationally. Key to this consolidation is the constitutionalisation of security and practise, the construction of border as a space for experimenting with and profiting from novel technologies, and datafication as a function of categorisation and filtration of migrants.

(De)Constitutionalisation, Hyper-legalisation, and De-legalisation

Constitutionalisation is key to the authoritarian form of state, reflected in historical and current practises of the EUs migratory regime, serving to define and limit acceptable responses to migration, primarily militarisation, surveillance, de-territorialisation, and externalisation. It enacts constitutional or quasi-legal

instruments on EU states and negotiates them with third countries, conditionally bundled with foreign aid and trade agreements. It produces spaces of lawlessness and vulnerability for immigrants, subject to the whims and risk valuations of EU policymakers, bureaucrats, border guards, and private military and security companies (PMSC).

The gradual integration of the EU has resulted in the “constitutional securitising” of non-internal migration of its architecture, constitutionally binding its signatory member-states (Stępką 2022, 66). The Maastricht Treaty framed irregular migration as a risk to the EUs security, stability, its freedoms of movement, and internal markets, institutionalising technocratic agencies (Stępką 2022, 66). Subsequent treaties intensified this process and expanded space for the deployment or creation of agencies like Europol, Eurojust, and Frontex. The Amsterdam Treaty called for the creation of sophisticated data collection systems resulting in instruments like Eurodac⁷ and Eurosur.⁸ The Lisbon Treaty sought to shift towards a “managerial approach” to security which enabled de-territorialised policy frameworks and a retooling of foreign and developmental aid towards the militarisation of borders and the deployment of mass surveillance in third-

⁷ Eurodac is in part responsible for the “management of European asylum applications... storing and processing the digitalised fingerprints of asylum seekers and irregular migrants... identify[ing] new asylum applications against those already registered... establish[ing] the responsibility for asylum... and facilitating returns” (EU-LISA 2022)

⁸ Eurosur is a “framework for information exchange and cooperation between member states and Frontex

to prevent irregular migration and cross-border crime through the use of drones, vessels, manned and unmanned aircraft, helicopters and satellites with radar systems, thermal cameras and high-tech sensors... expanded through partnerships with Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Cape Verde, Guinea-Conakry, Gambia, Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania and Morocco.” (Smith 2022)

country partners (Stepka 2022, 68). Dublin III established a streamlined punitive mechanism to prevent the practise of ‘asylum shopping,’ reinforcing anti-migrant animus in the South. Migrants cannot travel between EU countries without jeopardising their claim and were expected to remain in the first country of arrival. These “forward the agenda for control and close surveillance of migratory movements” (Stepka 2022, 68). It also regularises emergency exemptions and inflicts a permanent ‘crisis’ over EU border control policy. Each EU policy constitutionally entrenches mandatory re-admission agreements, aggressive anti-immigrant policies with Frontex and member-states, and the conversion of foreign aid to border militarisation.

Simultaneously, the EU has pushed to de-constitutionalise migration policy. There has been a marked increased deployment of legal or quasi-constitutional mechanisms which “escape EU rule of law, checks and balances, and stand at odds with various EU general principles” (Carrera et al. 2019, 11). The proliferation of soft law instruments including mobility partnerships, mobility compacts, migration dialogues, and common agendas or statements under regionally developed and quasi-binding frameworks now govern the EU’s migratory regime (Vara 2019, 21-24). Other tools include informal agreements, bilateral and EU-level arrangements, and extra-EU instruments. The Joint Way Forward with Afghanistan and the EU-Turkey Statement are prominent examples, resulting in the financing of billions of euros to states for border walls, intensified security, detention

centres, and conditional re-admission agreements (Vara 2019, 24).

Each of these relate to the hyper-legalisation or an explosion of (extra)legal instruments and their simultaneous de-legalisation or an exemption from judicial or parliamentary oversight (Fahey 2019, 132-33). Authoritarian neoliberalism in this way construct “spaces of lawlessness” as “ultimate expressions... [of] sovereign power” (Behrmann 2016, 229).

Authoritarian neoliberalism constitutionalizes and de-territorialises its sovereignty, constructing extra-judicial spaces of potential vulnerability for border-industrial complexes’ profit. Mass surveillance, data collection, human rights violations, illegal deportations, and migrant deaths become global practise, centred on the colonial necropolitics and neoliberal practises of the metropole. In a way, the boomerang has been reversed.

Border as Laboratory & Industry

The authoritarian neoliberal state likewise constructs borders as privatised laboratories for TMCs, using racialized migrants caught in spaces of lawless vulnerability as test subjects for data harvesting and profit. The militarist Keynesian project both produces and responds displacement and migration. In this way, Coxian insights help frame a broader interplay between the state-society complex of the forms of state and their shifting social relations of production.

Behind the racialized border violence lies a vast industry of aerospace, defence, technology, and military firms

intertwined with EU-level and state interests (Akkerman 2021). Frontex and the EU collaborate with and contract out to PMSCs like *BAE Systems*, *Airbus*, *Finmeccanica*, *Leonardo*, and *Thales* which represent significant shares of the EU economy. They employ 1.7m people both directly and indirectly, generating over €100 bn in turnover each year (EP 2014). The total value of licenses issued for arms export by the EU to the 35 priority partners value at over €122 billion (Akkerman 2018). The EU accounted for 22% of global arms exports between 2016–2020; these arms could contribute to violent conflict and mass displacement across the developing world (Fotiadis & Bhriain 2021). EU member-states and NATO allies' involvement in direct military conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Mali, Somalia, alongside weapons sales to authoritarian allies across the globe prompts untold violence and displacement.

Member-states have significant investments in PMSCs in terms of ownership stakes and protection of regional defence, aerospace, and technology industries with beneficial spillover effects (Jones, 2017; Akkerman 2018). The top shareholders and beneficiaries of this 68-billion-dollar industry are also heavily represented by financial investments from funds like BlackRock and Vanguard Group (Sooriyakumaran & Jegan 2021, 1-3). Governments, financiers, and PMSCs partner with data analytics or big tech firms like Palantir, Google, and IBM to facilitate and reinforce operational effectiveness and consolidate border regimes. This profiteering is made all the darker by their direct implication in producing displacement

through arms and technology sales to authoritarian regimes in developing states (Fotiadis & Bhriain 2021).

The EU manages Horizon, a research initiative funding numerous consortiums experimenting with technology on migrants (Breyer 2022b). Two tools that support this analysis are IT tools and methods for managing migration flows (ITFlows) and iBorderCntrl. These are two of the dozens of programs investing hundreds of millions of Euros into researching innovative technologies to be deployed against vulnerable migrants. This does not include the ten funds and eight new instruments which provide billions to third-country partners and firms (Akkerman 2018). A key beneficiary of these contracts, grants, and foreign aid packages is the border-industrial complex, either directly from the EU and member-states or indirectly through third-country agreements to invest in border militarisation. The revolving door between government and industry solidifies the transnational managerial class's continued prominence, influence, and access to key individuals or forums for lobbying within the EU (Nielsen 2011; Jones 2017; Akkerman 2021).

However, this racial laboratory goes beyond privatisation. Smith (2019) identifies how the regime “convert[s] the irregular, unpredictable movements of migrant bodies into value... through a range of formulae and metrics” (210-11). The border industry is speculative, pre-occupied with “the indefinite delivery of services and the buying and selling of joint stock” (Mitropoulos 2015, 166). Here we see the

functions of surveillance capitalism and racial authoritarian neoliberalism and their respective social forces coalescing into a historic bloc, reflected by the interests of TMCs and transnational capital.

Surveillance exceptionalism serves as a discursive shield deployed to divert popular attention through appeals to (supra)national security, competitive advantage, and migrants' threats to material abundance and prosperity (however shallow or precarious).

Surveillance & Datafication as Shaping Migration

To respond to shifting social relations, the authoritarian neoliberal form of state enacts robust regimes of surveillance and datafication. The historic bloc takes advantage of novel technologies, mediates emerging social relations, and privileges certain social forces. Scholars have identified the use of aircraft, drones, helicopters, vessels, satellites, radar systems, thermal cameras, and high-tech sensors collecting vast amounts of data to improve real-time monitoring and situational awareness at the border. Surveillance technologies functionally enhance this sifting in preparation for differential treatment with the aim to “filter out... terrorists, irregular migrants, criminals...

[and] locate, categorize, and identify” (Broeders & Dijstelbloem 2016, 246). Eurosur and the interoperability⁹ of the new EU databases form “data-analytical or ‘informational’ programme[s]” to produce “risk analyses and tap into all data from the various surveillance systems to make ‘[machine] intelligence led’ border patrolling possible and coordinate efforts at the border” (Broeders & Dijstelbloem 2016, 246; Jones 2019). These extend and harmonize internal and external border policing to tighten the constitutionalized regime.

There are concerns from MEPs like Patrick Breyer (2022a) about broad-spectrum illegal data collection (cellular data, communications, air travel, etc.) retroactively made legal for Europol and other agencies by the EP, and how this affects their cooperation with big tech or data analytics firms. There is historic coordination and interoperability between EU agencies, African and Asian (para)militaries, PMSCs, industrial interests, data and big tech firms, or EU-funded consortiums. These highlight surveillance exceptionalisms' reach beyond EU borders, and the enmeshment of private and public: Cox's the state-society complex and authoritarian neoliberal form of state. Two

⁹ Interoperability describes EU practise of “extract[ing] biometric ‘templates’ from different EU databases to simplify the searching and cross-matching of biometric data such as fingerprints, facial images, etc. and will integrate a wide complex system of agencies (e.g., Interpol, Europol, Eurojust), programs (Eurosur, Operation Sophia, Joint Way Forward, EU-Turkey Arrangement, etc...), and databases (Entry/Exit System, European Criminal Record Information Systems-Third Country Nationals, Visa Information System, European

Asylum Dactyloscopy and European Travel Information Authorisation System) that constitute the interoperable infrastructure of EU migration and crime control” (Oliveira Martins et al. 2021, 481). The program refines and streamlines searches of multiple biometric data profiles by law enforcement to expedite identification, detention, and deportation of irregular or unwanted migrants, and accelerate the entrance of high-value workers, tourists, and elites into or within the EU.

projects are instructive here: iBorderCntrl (and e-border infrastructure) and ITFlows.

iBorderCntrl utilizes machine intelligence to analyze facial expressions and detect lies, using pseudo-scientific non-peer-reviewed methods derived from theories of micro-expressions (Beyer 2022b; Sánchez-Monedero & Dencik 2022). These are currently being experimentally tested at borders and components of a sophisticated network of e-border technologies. The deployment of biometric identification, surveillance, and information communication technologies serve to “categorize and control people, manage their movement, offer “alternatives” to incarceration, and generate risk assessments” (Axster et al. 2021: 428). One fundamental aim of EU foreign aid is non-migration (Sepos 2013; Berger 2021). These e-borders are de-territorialised as regimes for data collection and border militarization, funded through these foreign aid flows with conditional investments posed as development (Carrera et al., 2018). These are a few tools at the disposal of a “super-charged bureaucracy... [in] the race to AI... for the purposes of population management” (Sánchez-Monedero & Dencik 2022, 426).

ITFlows is in its test phase, expected to go live by August 2023. It uses machine intelligence “to predict migration flows and identify the risks of tensions linked to the arrival of refugees” (Campbell & D’Agostino 2022). Researchers feed data from Oxfam, Red Cross, Frontex, and other agencies, including 1000s of interviews in refugee camps to better coordinate and respond to migrant flows. Simply put, they

are using machine learning to adapt to new pathways for refugees to claim asylum status so both they and their allies can more easily intervene, deport, or detain. Two draft ethics reports were produced internally by the ITFlows consortium and later leaked to the public. Both discuss the potential for “misuse” to “stigmatize, discriminate, harass or intimidate people, especially vulnerable ones such as migrants, refugees and asylum seekers” and “create migrant ghettos” (Campbell & D’Agostino 2022). Frontex has designated their interest in its high “operational and innovative potential” (Campbell & D’Agostino 2022).

The racialized laboratory in which these are developed and deployed acts as a techno-colonialist appropriation of data for the identification, deportation, and financialization of migrants (Leese et al. 2021, 10). Data intensifies the granular sifting of individuals by use-value conducted an authoritarian neoliberal state, acting to accelerate or inhibit certain forms of mobility through e-borders, lie detection, and risk analysis. Those deemed valuable, high-skilled, knowledgeable, a tourist, and or citizen are trustable and therefore expedited. Those viewed as criminals, so-called ‘illegal’ migrants, asylum seekers, and low-skilled workers face barriers at every level of analysis or port of entry, generating numerous forms of social, economic, political, and physical vulnerability. It is the hegemonic project asserted regionally, entrenching necropolitics in the heart of migratory regimes.

Instrumentarian Necropolitics and Historic Blocs

The global peripheralisation of labour ensures forms of state intervene to accelerate and frustrate the movement of specific categories of capital, goods, and people. The Coxian model provides novel ways of conceiving how an emergent historic bloc configures new social relations and forms of state to reinforce their current regime, producing extreme vulnerability, experimenting with new capital relations, and reproducing colonial violence. Who is or is not valuable in the eyes of capital is connected to who lives and who dies. This final discussion serves to synthesize theoretical linkages and illustrate how Coxian frameworks offer unique analytical points of departure, with substantial potential for cross-disciplinary dialogue with critical Liberal, neo-Marxist, and Mbembian frameworks.

The proliferation of experimental surveillance, facial recognition, and AI constitutes a form of power designed to analyze, predict, and automate human behaviour. Their virtual ubiquity renders the technology both unavoidable and interoperable. It simultaneously produces marketized spaces of extreme vulnerability and condemns displaced persons to capitalist exploitation in the periphery, or facing deportation and death at the border of the core. Shifts in productive relations alter the constitution and tools available to social forces and forms of state. ITFlows and iBorderCntrl represent the flourishing market for surveillance capitalists as they collude and cooperate within the military

Keynesian industrial complex. They develop new tools to accumulate data and capital, predict and reshape migrants' capabilities and aspirations, preclude possibilities of better living standards, militarize borders, and demonize migrants among the domestic population. These technologies are mediated and organized by pre-existing and evolving forms of state.

The authoritarian neoliberal or hyperliberal state responds to the increased dispossession and displacement at home and abroad in varied ways. The border becomes constitutionalized as an area of security and suppression. The regime of accumulation is defended, ensuring dispossessed labour remains in countries of origin or facing irregular status in an increasingly hostile country. Displacement from newer social relations produces an additional surplus labour to be harnessed by transnational capital under conditions of peripheralisation. The regime of accumulation is also expanded. The state deepens market logics penetration and constitutionalizes a de-territorialised border regime under constant threat. The border acts as a laboratory for experimenting and refining novel technologies on racialized bodies, while profiteering on threats they have constructed. Forms of migration which support niche labour market demands (e.g., education, healthcare), the global race for talent across high-education or knowledge sectors (e.g., law, engineering, finance, technology), and global tourism are accelerated (de Haas et al. 2020). They move with ease due to the very same technologies used to frustrate (racialized) migrants.

This power to shape migrants' lived realities is intimately tied to the numerous forms and spaces of vulnerability produced by the authoritarian neoliberal state. Here, instrumentarian necropolitics can be instructive in conceptualizing how power is doubly exerted to predict, intervene in, foreclose, and reshape migrant behaviour, towards the "maximum destruction of persons and the creation of death-worlds"¹⁰ (Mbembé 2003, 39). Migrant deaths crossing the Mediterranean are soaring year over year: over 27 000 have lost their lives since 2014 and over 5 000 since the start of 2021 (IOM 2022). IOM officials have openly admitted the death toll of those crossing the Sahara to Morocco, Libya, and other transit states is double that of the Mediterranean, though they have done little to track these statistics (Nebhay & Miles 2017). Meanwhile, irregular migration across the water continues unabated and is rising: 228, 522 in 2021 (IOM). It presents millions with a choice. You must acquiesce to neoliberal deathworlds and peripheralisation at home in the global south in a desperate bid to cultivate economic, social, and human capital. Otherwise, you face violence, detention, and death in a desperate bid for opportunities in states hostile to your existence and integration as an Other.

Declarations of crises reflect a political manufacturing of hysteria as a means of intensifying militarisation. Crises

¹⁰ Achille Mbembé argues necropolitics produces deathworlds presenting "new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of living dead" (2003, 40). Deathworlds are experienced by migrants not only at the border, but in

merely present opportunities and elucidate the underlying logic. COVID justifies an intensification of interventions, blocking visas in the name of containing contagion (Ghezelbash and Tan 2021). Ukraine's white refugees are worthy of sympathy while millions of Syrians starve under dictatorship and the few who sought refuge in Denmark must return (Venturi & Vallianatou 2022). Even black or dark-skinned immigrants and Ukrainian citizens fleeing Russian violence are subject to discrimination, harassment, filtration (Venturi & Vallianatou 2022). Race becomes the marker for value and worthiness, a signifier for firms, the state, and populations writ large of danger, criminality, and threat to the motherland.

Finally, Cox's TMC remains clearly entrenched. PMSCs, public officials, transnational financiers, managers, high-ranking bureaucrats, politicians, and now surveillance capitalists shielded by national security interests have intensified the regulation of movement. The new use of risk analyses, biometric identification, and predictive products is yet another link in the chain. While the wealth may insulate themselves from the consequences of neoliberalisation and climate crisis, they require additional safeguards to maintain forms of accumulation. There is little concern for the algorithmic violence enacted on migrants, and they do not probe the consequences of giving authoritarian regimes access to sophisticated military,

every step of transit, including within the host country's borders. It goes beyond marginalisation to describe the economic violence, cultural erasure, social death, political restrictions, and calculated suffering inflicted on marginalised groups.

surveillance, and biometric technology (Bellanova et al. 2021). They do not analyze the repercussions of embedding algorithms at the border which actively reproduce, amplify, and develop “data-driven discrimination... [and] dramatically reinforcing intersectional disadvantage and inequalities” through “feedback loops... redundant encoding... [and] algorithmic profiling” (Xenidis 2020, 740-1).

This collection of authoritarian neoliberal social forces represents an emergent or nascent historic bloc within the EU, situated in relation to the rise of China and the Asian Economies and the decline of American influence (O’Brien & Williams 2020). This is one facet of a broader political project to advance the EUs technological competitive advantage and enhance the filtering of (un)desirable migrants at the border in a global race for talent. It simultaneously seeks to deflate the economic anxiety of EU citizens about material deprivation and precarity while producing deathworlds experienced by irregular migrants at and beyond the borders. In doing so, it privileges specific forms of social relations of production, and intensifies their penetration into other sectors. While the material benefits are enjoyed by an upper echelon, reflected in current data on wealth inequality, those in middle and lower-middle strata are convinced of their benefits through continued deference to an abstract someone out there who has it worse. Under the current organization of social relations of production and forms of the state, it is this threat of material scarcity which inclines one to feel grateful for what one has, rather than demanding more. Whether such a historic

bloc will collapse, or establish itself as hegemonic, remains to be seen.

Conclusion

My focus has been on Fortress Europe and its diverse practises in migratory governance. I have argued that the EUs blossoming border-industrial complex can be conceived of as a historic bloc seeking legitimacy in a military Keynesian project. It deploys constitutional and quasi-legal instruments to intensify securitisation and produce new markets. I have also argued the datafication of migratory regimes reflects novel social relations of production which carry deadly consequences for racialized migrants. Cox’s *Production, Power, and World Order* remains a sorely outdated entry suffice that remains rich with analysis on the evolving capitalist order. His observations of the interplay between social forces, forms of state, and world orders forms a novel and valuable perspective of the GPE canon. Subsidiary concepts on the establishment of historic blocs, and the concepts of peripheralisation and the TMC therein serve as valuable points of departure and theoretical frameworks with which to elaborate on new literatures across disciplines. However, like Cox, we must place emphasis on historicity.

Surveillance capitalism, authoritarian neoliberalism, and necropolitics are rich theoretical literatures to enrich Cox’s work and construct an understanding of the neoliberal border as a regulatory node dominated by the influence of an elite TMC. Individual member states, NGOs, the European Parliament, and the EU Court of Justice continue to contest this

coalescing group of forces. Though constrained, EU-wide regulatory bodies have produced the General Data Protection Regime and the forthcoming AI Act. However, these must also be seen as negotiations of power between social forces, many of whom who could be co-opted by this emergent historic bloc. The AI Act has driven continuous criticism due to the corporate influence in its drafting and the lack of attention to specific forms of harmful machine intelligences. The exclusion of non-EU citizens from the GDPR places migrants in the care of the EU system in a different position from citizens. Specific attention in future scholarship should be directed towards the intra-institutional dynamics and competitions which characterize these evolving trends. The future is malleable, and must be dynamically negotiated between powers, rather than taken as essential.

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


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