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Foreword

We are thrilled to put forward Volume 7, the newest edition of works from Politcus Journal! This volume is a culmination of student work over the past year representing some of the best and brightest of Queen's undergraduate politics. The works in this journal are thoughtful, well written, and critical of the world around us. It is no surprise that they have come from a time of global and domestic tension and have responded to them as such. These authors have written on a variety of topics across sub disciplines of International Relations, Canadian Politics, Gender, Race, Environmental Politics, Comparative Politics, and Development. The issues being addressed are all important and in need of critical engagement. We hope you can critically engage with these works and learn from the information and perspectives they are putting forward.

Within this Volume we have put special attention toward Environmental Politics, an issue we have chosen to focus on throughout the year through infographics, events and social media. While there are many important issues in Politics, we are particularly passionate environmental issues and feel that it is important to highlight issues of climate change and justice in the world of politics. Environmental Politics encompasses a variety issues, for example: the role of government in moving the climate crisis; environmental justice and injustice in across racialized, low income, and colonized regions; global governance and the role of international organizations in addressing climate change; and understanding the root causes of the Anthropocene. These issues are intersectional, interdisciplinary and essential to better understand to adequately mitigate the climate crisis and prevent adverse impacts on the world from occurring. We encourage you to look at the works on environmental politics together and consider them critically.

We would like to thank the Academic Commission of the Arts & Science Undergraduate Society, particularely Alyth Roos and Zach Galvanni, for their hard work, guidance, and support in putting this piece together. Additionally, we thank the Professors who contributed their thoughts and guidance to our pieces and were kind enough to compliment the incredible work our team has put in over the past year. We are so lucky to have worked alongside the team we had - your hard work, passion, and critical engagement with texts ensured the quality of products we have today. Lastly, we want to thank all of the authors for contributing and for putting in so many hours of revisions, copy edits, and re writes. Your hard work has been noticed and is more impressive than ever. With the backdrop of online learning and a global pandemic in place, we are incredibly proud to showcase your work in Volume 7!

We hope you all enjoying reading this as much as we enjoyed putting it together!

Claire Chilton & Rhianna Hamilton
Politicus Co-Editors-in-Chief, 2020-2021



Leading the NDP to Victory: Rachel Notley & Alberta's 2015 Election

Melissa Cole

On May 5th, 2015, after forty-four years of provincial Progressive Conservative (PC) governments, Albertans shocked the rest of Canada, electing an NDP majority under Rachel Notley's leadership (Sutherland, 2019, p. 1; Taras, 2019, p. 16). The NDP swept to power, winning fifty-three of the province's eighty-seven ridings, reducing the incumbent PC party to just ten seats (Maclean, 2015). The 2015 election was a historic moment for Alberta, bringing an end to the province's "Conservative dynasty," during which the PCs remained in power longer than any other political party in Canadian history (Taras, 2019, p. 15; Bratt, 2019, p. 35). Alberta's right-wing tradition predates the PC Party. Small-c conservatives governed the province since the Social Credit Party's first electoral victory in 1935 (Sutherland, 2019, p. 2). Thus, not only did the 2015 election unseat the long-reigning PC party, but for the first time in eighty years, "Canada's conservative heartland" would not be governed by a conservative party (Sutherland, 2019, pp. 1-2).

Although the polls predicted an NDP victory, the election's outcome still came as a surprise to many who echoed PC leader Jim Prentice's sentiment that Alberta is "not an NDP province" (Graveland, 2015). Alberta's abrupt swing to the left prompted political

scholars to puzzle over the factors that contributed to this ideological shift. In the literature, the prevailing explanation is that the NDP benefitted from factors outside of their control. Many scholars claim that the PCs were the architects of their defeat, crediting the NDP's victory with an anti-PC vote (Sutherland, 2019, p. 4). Other common explanations include economic downturn and the disorganization of other parties (Sutherland, 2019, p. 4). However, the literature largely ignores the role that the NDP played in their victory.

Although there is limited scholarship on the NDP's role, Melanee Thomas (2019), in her article "Ready for Rachel: The Alberta NDP's 2015 campaign," begins to unpack how the NDP contributed to their success (p. 57). This paper seeks to build off of Thomas' work, asking, "to what extent was the NDP's victory in Alberta's 2015 election a result of Rachel Notley's leadership"? This essay will argue that although external factors created a window of opportunity for another party in Alberta's 2015 provincial election, the NDP would not have been victorious without Rachel Notley's strong leadership. We will begin with an overview of the literature surrounding Alberta's 2015 election, followed by a look at the scholarship on leadership as a determinant of vote choice. Next, this paper will analyze the effect of Ra-

chel Notley's leadership in the 2015 election and will conclude with a comparison of Alberta's 2015 and 2012 elections.

Dominant Scholarship on the 2015 Election: The Window of Opportunity

Although this essay seeks to move beyond the narrative that the NDP did not play a large role in their success, without the conditions created by external factors in the lead up to the 2015 election, there would not have been an opportunity for an opposition party to form government. Scholarship on Alberta's 2015 election predominantly points to economic downturn, failures of the PCs and ineptitude of other parties as the conditions that contributed to the desire for a change in government.

a. Alberta's Economy

In 2015, the state of Alberta's economy increased the likelihood that voters would oust the incumbent government (Taras, 2019, p. 31). When casting their ballots, voters will often take a cue from the success of the economy, re-electing the incumbent when the economy is perceived to be doing well, and voting them out when it is doing poorly (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2007, p. 519). At the time of the election, Alberta's economy was suffering. The price of oil had plummeted from \$110 a barrel in 2014, to below \$50 a barrel in March of 2015 (Sutherland, 2019, p. 3). The oil and gas industry is the largest sector of Alberta's economy, making up 26.7% of Alberta's GDP in 2014 (Alberta Government, 2015). By May 2015, Alberta's unemployment rate sat at 5.9%, which was the highest it had been

since the wake of the 2008 recession (Unemployment Rate, 2021). 19,600 Albertans lost their jobs that year, which had increased from 14,600 in 2014 (Bickis, 2016). Thus, pocket-book voting would have hurt the PCs, many voters would have arrived at the conclusion that they were financially worse off since the incumbent was elected, and would punish them accordingly (Gidengil et al., 2002, p.75). Interestingly, during the Tories' forty-four years of dominance, they came staggeringly close to defeat only twice, both times during economic downturns, in 1993 and 2012 (Taras, 2019, p. 31).

b. PC Failures

However, coming into the 2015 election, the state of the province's economy was far from being the only source of Albertans' dissatisfaction with the PCs. The Tories had been on the decline since 2006, when Ed Stelmach became the first of a series of unpopular party leaders (Taras, 2019, p. 32). In 2008, internal strife caused a more socially conservative faction of the party, led by Danielle Smith, to splinter off, merging with the Alberta Alliance to form the Wildrose Party (Bratt, 2019, p. 38). During their electoral debut in 2012, the Wildrose came close to defeating the Tories, winning 34.49% of the vote (Alberta Votes, 2012). In contrast, the PCs earned 43.95% of Albertans' support (Alberta Votes, 2012). Allison Redford, the PC's new leader, had narrowly led her party to victory by assembling a coalition of "two-minute Tories," voters who were usually left of centre but feared the possibility of the Wildrose forming government (Flana-



gan, 2014, pp. 177-178). Although Redford helped her party cling to power in 2012, she became wildly unpopular, damaging the PC brand in the lead up to 2015 (Bratt, 2019, p. 43).

In the long run, the “two-minute Tory” strategy, which had enabled the PCs to fend off the Wildrose in 2012, backfired. After making deep cuts to education in her first budget, Redford appeared untrustworthy, breaking her campaign promise of increased funding for school boards (Bratt, 2019, p. 42). Throughout her term, Redford did not earn back voters’ trust. In 2013, her image was damaged beyond repair after Albertans became aware that she had used party funds for personal expenses, such as renting expensive hotel rooms and renovating a government penthouse as a “special Premier’s residence” (Bratt, 2019, p. 42). It was members of the PC party caucus who had leaked the information to the press (Bratt, 2019, p. 42). In 2014, Redford resigned, turning a broken party over to Jim Prentice (Bratt, 2019, p. 43).

Under Prentice, Albertans’ perception of the PC party did not improve. Shortly after Prentice took the helm, Danielle Smith and eight of the Wildrose’s MLAs crossed the floor to join the PCs, leaving the official opposition without a leader (Bratt, 2019, p. 47). This union did not sit well with voters, who either felt betrayed by the fact that their former political rivals were invited into their party or that the PCs had behaved undemocratically by gutting the opposition (Bratt, 2019, p. 48). Those holding the latter view were further angered when Prentice moved up the election date, going against the spirit of provincial election legislation and forcing the Wildrose to scram-

ble to find a new leader (Bratt, 2019, p. 49). Additionally, the PCs’ proposed budget, taking the middle ground between the Wildrose and NDP plans, displeased Albertans (Bratt, 2019, p. 49; Thomas, 2019, p. 64). A survey conducted during the campaign period revealed that the majority of Albertans felt that of the three front-running parties, the PCs cared the least about taxpayers’ interests (Ipsos Canada, 2017).

c. Ineptitude of Other Parties

Dissatisfaction with the PCs created an opportunity for another party to break through in 2015; 87% of voters agreed that Alberta needed a strong opposition to keep the government honest (Zagoumenov, 2015). With only five MLAs remaining in the early stages of the campaign, the Wildrose did not offer Albertans the strong opposition they desired (Bratt, 2019, p. 47). Voters who were serious about making change began to look elsewhere (Bratt, 2019, p. 47). Although Albertans were seeking an alternative, the literature suggests that they were unlikely to turn to the Liberals, whose reputation in the province had never recovered from outrage at Pierre Trudeau’s National Energy Program of the 1980s (Taras, 2019, p. 23).

Additionally, in 2015, the Liberals were a weaker alternative than usual, the party needed to recover from a poor showing in the 2012 election. The PC’s “two-minute Tory” strategy had effectively drawn voters away from the Liberals, reducing the party to just five seats (Grenier, 2012). The Liberals also faced the added challenge of having a new leader. Raj Sherman, the former Liberal leader, resigned in January 2015, forcing the party to quickly appoint an interim leader, David Swann,

five months out from the election (Sayers and Stewart, 2019, p. 409). Thus, even though the NDP were in fourth place at the time the election was called, the right conditions existed for Albertans to carefully consider all of their options (Bratt, 2019, p. 35). However, to capitalize on this opportunity, the NDP could not sit idly by; they needed a strong leader to draw voters to their camp.

The Impact of Leadership on Electoral Outcomes

Leaders play a critical role in election outcomes. Scholarship on Canadian voting behaviour points to leader evaluations as a key determinant of vote choice (Gidengil et al., 2012, p. 101). Political scientists have found that many voters cast their ballot based on their feelings toward a party leader (Gidengil et al., 2012, p. 101). To put it simply, the more an individual likes a leader, the more likely they are to support their party (Gidengil et al., 2012, p. 112).

Leadership influences all voters; its effects are not limited to the less “politically sophisticated,” as political scientists once thought (Bittner, 2011, p.3). In reality, avid consumers of politics are more likely to consider party leaders when casting their ballots (Bittner, 2011, p.3). The media’s tendency to frame elections as a “horserace”, reporting on “who is ahead, who is behind, who is gaining and who is losing,” amplifies the effect of leaders on electoral outcomes (Matthews, Pickup, Cutler, 2012, pp. 261; Gidengil et al., p. 103). The horserace frame leads voters to

equate a successful campaign with the leader’s potential to govern (Gidengil et al., p. 103). However, the effects of leadership should not be overstated. A host of complex factors play into vote choice (Perella, 2010, p. 222). Alone, no singular factor can be held responsible for an election’s outcome (Perella, 2010, p. 222). Although, in Canada, the impacts of leadership, partisanship, values and beliefs dwarf the effects of other determinants of vote choice (Gidengil et al., 2012, p. 112).

In fact, during an election’s campaign period, leadership can be primed to have a greater effect on the outcome (Gidengil et al., 2002, p.78). Gidengil and colleagues find that leadership and partisanship have an inverse relationship. (Gidengil et al., 2002, p.78). When one is more salient during an election, the other’s effect is diminished (Gidengil et al., 2002, p.78). Thus, partisanship will play a less substantial role in vote choice if leadership is primed or vice versa (Gidengil et al., 2002, p.78). Partisanship is primed when an election is dominated by a particularly divisive salient issue, pitting parties holding opposing positions against one another and demanding that voters side with the party who best reflects their position (Gidengil et al., 2002, p. 80). To prime partisanship, the election’s most salient issue must be evident and identified by the majority of voters, such as in the 1988 federal election, where 62% of the electorate saw free trade as the most salient issue (Gidengil et al., 2002, p. 81). If the conditions to prime partisanship are not satisfied, priming will default to leadership (Gidengil et al., 2002, p. 78). The



Role of Leadership in Alberta's 2015 Election

In Alberta's 2015 election, the right conditions existed for leadership to significantly impact vote choice. The election's most salient issue, accountability, was only identified by 19.7% of Albertans, not coming close to meeting the threshold needed to prime partisanship (Bellefontaine, 2015; Gidengil et al., 2002, p. 81). Instead, partisanship's effect was muted, preventing the PCs' reputation as Alberta's "natural governing party" from carrying them to victory (Bratt, 2019, p. 43). Additionally, provincial partisanship had been volatile since the 2012 election. A surge of "two-minute Tories," made up of NDP and Liberal supporters, and PCs who jumped ship to the Wildrose, revealed instability in the party system (Flanagan, 2014, pp. 177-178). In 2015, partisan volatility contributed to undermining the effect of partisanship on electoral outcomes. Against the backdrop of Allison Redford's scandal, Albertans' desire for accountability helped to solidify leadership as the clear determinant of vote choice (Bratt, 2019, p. 42). Accountability is a leadership centered issue, voters tend to hold politicians accountable rather than parties or policies (Bittner, 2011, p. 3.). In 2015, the electorate was searching for a leader they could trust, a void which the NDP recognized, and Rachel Notley expertly filled.

Rachel Notley became the NDP leader with ample time to charm the electorate, winning the party's leadership race with 70% of the vote a year out from the election (Bennett, 2014). Although 2015 would be her first election in her new role, Notley was no stranger to Alberta's political scene. In addition to serving two terms as Edmonton-Strathcona's

MLA, Rachel Notley was also recognized as the daughter of Grant Notley, the party's former beloved leader, who headed the provincial NDP from 1968-1984 (Bennett, 2014; Warnica, 2015). Rachel Notley was fortunate that Albertans were familiar with her before she faced the electorate for the first time, sidestepping the anonymity problem that often negatively affects new leaders' popularity (Gidengil et al., 2012, p. 104). Coming into the 2015 election, Notley hit a sweet spot, having the advantage of recognition usually enjoyed by seasoned leaders, without suffering from a decline in popularity that tends to come with each successive election, known as the "fallen heroes" effect (Gidengil et al., 2012, p. 107). However, recognition only goes so far where party leaders are concerned; being well-known needs to translate into being well-liked (Gidengil et al., 2012, p. 107).

Rachel Notley successfully made this transition in her electoral debut, becoming Alberta's most popular party leader. A week out from the election, 43.8% of survey respondents selected Rachel Notley as the leader who would make the best Premier of Alberta, compared with 26.0% who chose Jim Prentice and 16.5% who picked the Wildrose's new leader Brian Jean (Ipsos Canada, 2017). According to Gidengil and colleagues, if one party leader is much more popular than the rest, the effect of leadership on the election's outcome is amplified (Gidengil et al., 2012, p. 101). If all party leaders' popularity is similar, a vote calculus based on leadership will not sway voters in one direction (Gidengil et al., 2012, p. 104). Thus, in Alberta's 2015 election, where leadership was predisposed to be on voters' minds, more often than not, when a voter considered leadership, it

would result in a ballot for Rachel Notley.

The same survey revealed that Notley was far more popular than her party, which is another good indication that leadership played a substantial role in the NDP's win (Clarke et al., 2019, p. 97). When voters were asked which party they leaned towards, the majority, 56%, responded that they "did not know" (Ipsos Canada, 2017). The NDP was the most popular choice amongst the parties, favoured by 16.8% of survey takers, compared with the PCs and Wildrose, who only attracted 7.4% and 8.4% of respondents, respectively (Ipsos Canada, 2017). In comparison with Notley's impressive leadership evaluation, the party was not as far ahead. Other polls conducted around the same time also indicated that the NDP was in the lead; one reported that the NDP was pulling 31% of the province's vote (Leger, 2015). Regardless of which poll was consulted, Notley's personal popularity soared above that of her party, demonstrating that she was primarily responsible for drawing traction toward the NDP.

Competence & Character

Organizers involved in the NDP's 2015 campaign credit their success with Rachel Notley's likeability, which begs the question, what made her so popular with Albertans (Thomas, 2019, 67)? When evaluating leaders, scholarship shows that voters make calculations across two trait dimensions, competence and character (Bittner, 2018, pp. 298). Political scientists have found that character evalua-

tions, measured by personal appeal, honesty, trustworthiness, empathy and compassion, hold greater weight for leaders to the left of the political spectrum (Bittner, 2018, p. 298). Whereas on the right, competence traits such as intelligence and leadership strength are prioritized (Bittner, 2018, p. 298). Bittner shows that leaders' ratings on competence and character are directly correlated with electoral outcomes, "parties tend to gain or lose between two and five percent of the vote depending on how voters perceive leaders on these trait dimensions" (Bittner, 2018, p. 298). Although polling firms did not ask voters to evaluate party leaders based on competence and character, we can still make inferences about how they were perceived on these traits. In 2015, Notley's advantage stemmed from both her character and competence.

a. Notley's Character

From the first moments of Notley's campaign, it was evident that her personal appeal would be a tremendous asset. Sally Houser, a seasoned federal campaign strategist who was brought in to work on Notley's campaign, later reflected that upon meeting Rachel, she had an inkling there was "something special" (Warnica, 2015). Houser's suspicions proved to be correct on day two of the campaign trail when a launch event at the campaign office attracted so many supporters that the crowd spilled outside and filled the parking lot (Warnica, 2015). Notley was able to amass a large following in part due to her natural charisma and thanks to her ability to understand the needs of Albertans. The NDP



campaign took Alberta's difficult economic times to heart and campaigned on the promise of "making life better for Albertans one family at a time" (McIntosh, 2015).

When Jim Prentice told Albertans to "look in the mirror" in regards to the province's financial troubles, Notley came to Albertans' defence, echoing what many were thinking, calling Prentice's remarks "profoundly insulting" (Hollet, 2015). In contrast to Prentice, Notley appeared both empathetic and compassionate, as she expressed concern that many Albertans were struggling "to make ends meet" (Hollet, 2015). In 2015, the NDP made the wise strategic decision to focus on populist messaging, which has proven to resonate with Albertans (Thomas, 2019, p. 77). The NDP's platform focused on "creating jobs through tax incentives, promoting oil-refining jobs at home and restoring cuts to health care and classrooms" (McIntosh, 2015). Notley carefully avoided taking a stance against the province's oil and gas industry; instead, she homed in on Albertans' livelihood (Thomas, 2019, p. 77). In addition to her personal popularity, empathy and compassion, voters also perceived Notley as trustworthy and honest, rounding out her idyllic character evaluation. An in-campaign survey revealed that respondents felt that of all parties, an NDP-led government was most likely to be open and honest (Ipsos Canada, 2017).

b. Notley's Competence

Although Rachel Notley's character certainly helped propel her party to victory, overall voters value competence above character (Gidengil et al., 2012, p. 110). Character may be the trait dimension most strongly

associated with politicians to the left on the political spectrum, but on the whole, competence is a stronger determinant of vote choice (Gidengil et al., 2012, p. 110). Fortunately for the NDP, Rachel Notley was equally as strong in both trait dimensions. Albertans became acutely aware of Notley's intelligence and leadership strength after her stellar performance in the leader's debate on April 23rd (Thomas, 2019, p. 68; Sutherland, 2019, p. 4). Notley's popularity came to a head after the leader's debate. An NDP strategist referred to the debate as the moment when Notley was no longer "just seen as the NDP leader, but as a political symbol in the province" (Thomas, 2019, p. 70).

When it comes to the political impact of leadership debates, Alberta's 2015 election was an outlier (Thomas, 2019, p. 70). Scholarship on voting behaviour suggests that debates do not usually strongly influence electoral outcomes (Thomas, 2019, p. 70). However, in the 2015 election, the debate was a pivotal moment. For the remainder of the campaign, all polls firmly showed that the NDP had pulled far ahead (Brown and Santos, 2019, p. 94). There was a clear consensus that Notley had not only won the debate but delivered finishing blows to Jim Prentice (Bratt, 2019, p. 50). When questioning Notley on the NDP's proposed corporate tax rate, Prentice infamously quipped, "I know math is difficult," which came across as chauvinistic, especially considering that it was Prentice who had made an error (Thomas, 2019, p. 70). Prentice was heavily criticized on Twitter, and most polls saw the PC's vote share dip even further below where they ended up on May 5th (Brown and Santos, 2019, p. 94).

Although, Prentice's out of line comment was not his worst mistake of the debate, he made the far graver error of directing all his attacks at Rachel Notley (Bratt, 2019, p. 50). While fending off Prentice, Notley expertly displayed her quick wit. A Calgary Herald columnist wrote of Notley's performance that she "was all over the others – aggressive without being unpleasant, constantly interjecting without seeming rude, throwing even Premier Jim Prentice off his game" (Braid, 2015). While Prentice was getting dragged on Twitter, google searches for Rachel Notley dramatically increased (Thomas, 2019, p. 70). Voters were anxious to learn more about the debate champion (Thomas, 2019, p. 70).

The debate helped solidify that the NDP were a real contender. Never before had a PC leader targeted the NDP in Alberta's leaders' debate (Bratt, 2019, p. 50). In the aftermath of the debate, the PCs released a series of attack ads against the NDP, in an attempt to win back voters (Thomas, 2019, p. 70). Yet another gross miscalculation on the PCs' part. As an NDP staffer put it, the PCs had "spent millions of dollars legitimizing the idea that we could form government" (Thomas, 2019, p. 70). Although the PCs unintentionally helped to legitimize the NDP at the tail end of the campaign, they cannot be credited with creating the NDP's reputation. It is Rachel Notley who is primarily responsible for building her party's credibility.

Notley played an instrumental role in developing the NDP's strategy. She advocated early on for the party to focus on establish-

ing themselves as a real contender (Thomas, 2019, p. 68). When announcing her candidacy, Notley was the only party leader, besides Jim Prentice, to state that she was running for Premier, setting up the NDP to be the Tories' only serious challenger (Thomas, 2019, pp. 68-69). Notley was also insistent on running a full slate of candidates, recognizing that this was a prerequisite for any party who wished to form government (Thomas, 2019, p. 60). The NDP was the only party besides the PCs to name a candidate in every riding (Thomas, 2019, p. 60). Notley was wise to establish credibility for her party right off the bat, as positive leadership evaluations only translate into vote choice when a party is seen as a real contender (Gidengil et al., 2012, p. 113). Thus, if voters had not believed that the NDP had a hope of forming government, Notley's strong competence and character ratings would have gone to waste.

Alberta's 2012 Election: A Case Study

Although it is apparent that Rachel Notley's leadership played a role in Alberta's 2015 election, many academics continue to argue that when compared with factors outside of the NDP's control, Notley's leadership had little effect. Authors such as Duane Bratt hold the PCs wholly responsible for their loss, naming only Prentice's "major mistakes" and "PC decline" as the "combination of factors" that led to the NDP's victory (Bratt, 2019, p. 52). Although we cannot isolate the effect of leadership to understand the extent to which it mattered in 2015, we need not look further than Alberta's 2012 election to understand its



role (Bittner, 2018, p. 297).

Alberta's 2012 election serves as the perfect comparison for 2015, as a similar set of volatile conditions that usually illicit a change in government existed in both elections (Thomas, 2019, p. 57). In 2012, like in 2015, economic conditions favoured the opposition (Gidengil et al., 2002, p. 76). The economy was unstable as the province continued to recover from the 2008 global recession (Gidengil et al., 2002, p. 76; Taras, 2019, p. 31). By 2012, the PC's decline was already well underway, in large part due to Ed Stelmach (Bratt, 2019, p. 52). During his first year as Premier, Stelmach saw his approval rating plummet from 77% to 25% (Harasymiw, 2014, p. 225). Like in 2015, the PCs came into the election with a new leader, after disposing of an unpopular premier (Bratt, 2019, p. 36). In addition to these nearly indistinguishable circumstances, just like in 2015, the 2012 election was primed for leadership. Issue saliency did not trigger partisanship. The election's dominant issue was not evident; it was a close call between education, identified as the most important issue by 42% of voters, and healthcare identified by 56% (MacDougal, 2012).

If the outcome of Alberta's 2015 election were only a result of dissatisfaction with the PCs, then arguably the province "would have changed governments in 2012" (Thomas, 2019, p. 66). The conditions credited with toppling the PCs in 2015 emerged in the previous election, but in 2012 no party was able to capitalize on this opportunity. Although the Wildrose narrowly lost the election and were polling ahead of the PCs for the majority of the campaign, ultimately, Albertans' fear of the Wildrose outweighed their desire to get the

PCs out of office (Grenier, 2012). In the last few weeks leading up to the election, the media began to question Danielle Smith's leadership skills. She faced criticism after claiming that climate science was "not yet settled" and for failing to condemn candidate Allan Hunsperger for a blog post in which he insinuated that members of the LGBTQ+ community would "suffer the rest of eternity" in purgatory (Franson, 2012; Warnica, 2012). Smith was ineffective in leading her party away from the narrative that the Wildrose were too extreme on social issues, ultimately scaring away moderate voters. Thus, even with many factors working against the PCs, Albertans would not opt for a change in government unless they were presented with a credible alternative headed by a leader deemed fit to govern.

In 2015, the NDP provided Albertans with this opportunity. Equipped with a strong leader, the party was able to earn the respect of the Albertan electorate. Rachel Notley expertly drew in voters with both her competence and character. Without the promise of an adept leader, Albertans would not have been comfortable straying from the PC party's familiarity, despite its recent incompetence. Although anti-PC sentiment was a significant factor in Alberta's 2015 election, alone, it was not enough to drive voters into the arms of another party. If it were not for Rachel Notley's strong leadership, the NDP would not have been victorious.

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Anthropocentric and Biocentric Narratives in the Context of Neoliberalism and the Catastrophe Narrative

Kaia Depelteau

Introduction

Human activity has irreversibly damaged the natural world and will continue to do so if significant change does not occur within a short period of time. Prominent thinkers who grapple with the politics and philosophy behind climate change and its man-made origins, such as Naomi Klein and Brian Elliott, argue that neoliberal governance and capitalism are the engrained features of society which significantly exacerbate climate change and prevent a viable solution from being realized. Drawing largely from the work of Elliott and his concept of the ‘catastrophe narrative,’ this paper will explore how language and narrative impact approaches to mitigating climate change within the neoliberal order. Specifically, I will analyze two opposing narratives which frame the relationship between human beings and the natural world: anthropocentrism, which dominates the human race as a dominant entity separate from nature; and biocentrism, an alternative ideology which situates human being within the grander scheme of the natural world. In this paper I will argue that actors in the neoliberal order instrumentalize narratives of anthropocentrism and biocentrism in order to continue the socially and environmentally harmful practice of perpetual economic growth. Further, I will argue that biocentrism

has the potential to act as a counter-hegemonic force which challenges neoliberal capitalism, especially in those instances when it is advanced by marginalized groups – namely, Indigenous peoples – and transnational global justice movements.

Foundational Framework

I will begin by outlining the concepts foundational to my argument, which include the following: neoliberalism and its connections to climate change, Elliott’s catastrophe narratives, and the ontologies of anthropocentrism and biocentrism. These foundations will inform my analysis of how the portrayal of humankind’s relationship with nature can be strategically used to fulfil certain aims.

Neoliberalism is a dominant economic and social paradigm which has been solidified in the majority of the world’s institutions since the end of the Cold War (Benatar et al. 2018, 156). The central tenets of neoliberalism are freedom of the market and freedom of the individual, and it is these values which have fueled the expansion of global capitalism (Benatar et al. 2018, 157). Principles such as privatization, free market, individualism, consumerism, and competition contribute to the fulfilment of neoliberal goals such as perpet-

ual economic growth and profit maximization (Parr 2015, 70). As a result, growth-seeking markets ultimately gain control over natural resources, rather than citizens or their political leaders – a practice which leads to ecological harm as well as social inequality (Elliott 2016, 26). Social inequalities take local forms, as class divides within a region intensify as a rich minority grows their wealth. However, international equalities occur as well, especially in the face of rising globalization under neoliberalism, as industrialized countries benefit from outsourcing production to developing countries in the “periphery,” typically the global South (Harvey 2007, 42). As I will discuss below, uneven development is a particularly relevant problem in the context of climate change, as exploited populations at the local and international level are disproportionately impacted by the physical and social consequences of climate change.

Climate change is impacted by neoliberalism because goals such as profit maximization and endless growth depend on the appropriation of nature under the guise of unlimited resources. Environmental destruction in pursuit of political aims is not a new phenomenon, nor is it unique to neoliberalism: in pre-Cold War Soviet countries, socialist and communist ideologies contributed to the degradation of the natural world as human progress and industrialization were favoured over the environment (Zvosec 1984, 103). However, this paper is concerned with neoliberalism as the dominant economic and social framework of the 21st century; a vital stage in

which inadequate responses to climate change result in irreversible damage. As such, this system elicits criticism from the likes of environmentalists and academics, who recognize the structural roots of environmental degradation and voice their concerns by demanding “system change not climate change” (Smith 2014, 2). It has recently become clear, and argued by the likes of Klein and Elliott, that the system of neoliberal capitalism has not only contributed significantly to environmental damage, but, further, is incapable of supporting the drastic changes required in order to save the planet (Elliott 2016, 34; Klein 2014, 20-1). Despite these calls for change, many people continue to vie for a sustainable future by advancing environmental activism within the narrow confines of neoliberalism, including calls to implement a “green economy” (Smith 2014, 15). Parr argues that these tactics are inadequate: “solving the climate change puzzle cannot be achieved under the rubric of neoliberalism. [...] Life will never be sustainable if the structural violence of capital accumulation goes unchecked” (2015, 71).

The connections between neoliberalism and climate change become clear by analyzing this phenomenon within the context of international disaster politics; specifically, through the lens of Elliott’s catastrophe narrative (2016, 22). Climate change plays an increasingly pivotal role in international disaster politics by increasing the occurrence of short- and long-term weather events and patterns which are harmful to ecosystems and human societies alike (Hannigan 2012, 85). Hannigan notes



that in the short run, climate change will spur more extreme weather events, such as flooding, hurricanes, and heat waves (2012, 86). In the long run, however, climate change will cause additional social and economic problems by drastically impacting industries such as agriculture (ibid.). It is clear that disaster “hot spots,” particularly countries on the periphery of the global economy, will be unevenly impacted – an unfair disadvantage which mirrors the shortfalls they experience economically under neoliberalism (Hannigan 2012, 83). Thus, climate change poses risks which require intervention and mitigation strategies on behalf of governments worldwide (Hannigan 2012, 85). However, as per Klein’s ‘shock doctrine,’ there is a tendency for elite actors to use period of chaos or uncertainty – as will inevitably be created by climate change – in order to accumulate more power and wealth (2014, 8). Analyzing climate change through the lens of disaster politics raises concerns about the extent to which neoliberal governance is equipped to alleviate – and prevent – the harmful risks associate with global warming.

One major insufficiency in responses to climate change includes the “catastrophe narrative” (Elliott 2016, 22). Given the risks noted above, climate change has a tendency to “engender apocalyptic visions” (Elliott 2016, 59). Thus, politicians, environmentalists, and scholars alike have succumbed to the habit of presenting climate change as a catastrophe, or even a natural disaster (ibid.). Elliott argues that the use of this narratives helps to perpetuate neoliberal capitalism by ignoring the political and social roots of climate change (2016, 26). His argument against engaging in this narrative is threefold: first, crises are diffi-

cult to harness for the political transformation necessary to save the environment; second, this narrative does not address that climate change is largely man-made; and third, those most blameworthy for climate change are the least likely to be impacted by it due to uneven development (Elliott 2016, 62-3). For these reasons, he alternatively posits “capitalism as a catastrophe” (2016, 55).

Finally, I will explain the ontologies of anthropocentrism and biocentrism. Anthropocene is a term which characterizes the present age, in which humans are conceived of as separate entities from the rest of the natural order (Scholte 2012, 11). This separation is often hierarchical, with the human race assuming a superior position over nature. Anthropocentrism describes and justifies the exploitation of natural resources for the advancement of the human race; under neoliberal capitalism, this is conceived of as the financial growth of a global elite (Benatar et al. 2018, 156). Anthropocentric assumptions, such as the domination of man over nature, are incompatible with adequately combatting climate change. Thus, it is useful to analyze neoliberal governance within the framework of this ontology to reveal the extent to which this system is unfit to respond to the problems associated with climate change (Scholte 2012, 11). Biocentrism, on the other hand, is an alternative ideology which considers the relationship between human beings as the earth as one based in mutual respect; a collaboration rather than a hierarchy (Scholte 2012, 21). It is exactly this notion of “overcoming the constitution of the human being as subject” which is called for in order to adequately respond to climate change (Elliott 2016, 39). Biocentrism largely draws from Indigenous ideas and modes of life (Smith 2014,

7). For example, the belief of animism attributes a soul to non-human objects, and consequently encourages a relationship of respect between people and nature (Ibid.). As such, as I will discuss below, Indigenous peoples play a significant role in climate activism by raising alternative ideas about people and their situation in the natural order.

Below, I will discuss how each of these ontologies, in conjunction with the catastrophe narrative, are employed by neoliberal actors in order to advance a certain agenda. Further, I will discuss how biocentrism in its most genuine form may serve as an antidote to anthropogenic climate change and insufficient efforts to combat it, especially when it is advanced by the groups oppressed under neoliberalism who truly understand it.

Anthropocentric Narratives in Neoliberal Catastrophe Discourse

Anthropocentrism hinges on an ontological separation of people and nature, situating humans as the main actor within the natural world. We can understand this notion by looking at Hobbes' theory of the creation of human civilization and governance in *Leviathan*. At first, the state of nature for man, in which he is considered equal to other living things, is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (Lie 2007, 234). However, humans rise to become a dominant entity in the natural order by overcoming forces of nature and harnessing them for the sake of their own growth (ibid.). This distinct separation between man and nature is

a key feature of neoliberalism which perpetuates environmentally harmful practices. Relying on this anthropocentric framework results in inadequate responses to global climate change, such as the catastrophe narrative.

To begin, I would like to discuss one counterintuitive understanding of anthropocentrism where human beings and nature are considered separate, but nature can be considered the dominant entity. We can return to Hobbes' state of nature to inform this discussion, and that is the ability of nature to act as a sublime force capable of overcoming man. This includes the likes of extreme weather events and natural disasters which are impossible to control and cause massive destruction. This is a distinct separation of man and nature which is depended on by the catastrophe narrative; an idea which is anthropocentric at its core but understands the hierarchy differently. Relegating humans to a position of vulnerability in the face of nature allows climate change to be understood as a "natural catastrophe" grouped with the likes of typhoons, hurricanes, and earthquakes, effectively removing climate change from the sphere of human activity (Elliott 2016, 22). This specific dichotomy of man and nature effectively removes the blame would should be awarded to neoliberal capitalism and relocates it to uncontrollable forces of nature. Climate change effectively becomes an "empirical state of affairs, a fact of nature," which is exactly why the catastrophe narrative is inadequate in replying to this threat (ibid.). The neoliberal order relies heavily on the anthropocentric language of separation in



order to propagate the catastrophe narrative and avoid assuming blame, which allows the continuation of profit maximization and the agenda of growth. One specific framing tool intensifies the ability of neoliberal actors to conceptualize climate change as a catastrophe removed from the sphere of human activity. This is the tendency to separate externalities, or “undesirable environmental by-products,” from human consumption, and frame these externalities as environmental crises rather than a direct result of the neoliberal order (Elliott 2016, 47). Furthermore, Elliott notes that there is a tendency to label by-products as unintentional in order to alleviate blame; however, the mere fact that damage is not “intentional” does not mean that damage has not been done (ibid.). The neoliberal tactic of the catastrophe narrative hinges on anthropocentric premises in order to alleviate blame, and continue practices related to economic growth. Furthermore, it benefits elite figures who profit not only from neoliberal capitalism, but from the instabilities produced by climate change (Klein 2014, 8).

The neoliberal order can be understood as anthropocentric by looking at its central features and how they inform our understandings of human identity. Neoliberal practices and the language we use to describe them can perpetuate environmentally harmful practices, and tactics such as the catastrophe narrative. For example, the central neoliberal tenet of freedom of the individual is understood by Benatar in modern society as hyper-individualism: “individualism exercised by the most privileged in pursuit of their own short-term gratifications and expectation of endless economic growth” (2018, 163). Neoliberalism and capitalism conceive of the human being as an indepen-

dent figure, advocating for the existence of an entire species which is self-concerned and consequently inconsiderate of the environment surrounding them. This makes it easier for humans to dominate the natural world for the sake of their own growth. In addition, within neoliberal capitalism, the individual is encouraged to exercise their personal freedom from the specific position of a consumer; their identity is tied to what they buy, and how much they are worth (Barr et al. 2011, 1225). Thus, narratives of individualism are fundamentally anthropocentric, and cater to neoliberalism by persuading citizens to define their self-worth in terms of values which are harmful to nature.

Many notions of environmentalism are grounded in an anthropocentric, neoliberal conception of humankind. For example, the “catastrophe” of climate change is commonly understood as a challenge which the central human actor must strive to overcome. Elliott refers to this idea as the “war on climate change,” in which humans are meant to metaphorically battle nature, rather than collaborate with it (2016, 23). Furthermore, governments and businesses alike encourage the individual to engage in efforts to combat climate change, deflecting attention away from necessary systemic changes. People are called on as autonomous, liberal agents to singlehandedly solve the problem by altering their lifestyles and patterns of consumption. However, this is yet another tactic which reduces blame from those in power and allows the continuation of environmentally harmful practices such as uneven development, profit accumulation, and competition. These practices will only continue when the problem of climate change is approached using the tools of capitalism and the framework of anthropocentrism.

Biocentric Narratives in Neoliberal Catastrophe Discourse

I will now turn to the methods by which some biocentric narratives are adopted by neoliberalism. However, I will argue that this language is often manipulated in order to serve neoliberal purposes, which prevents the implementation of substantive changes required to combat climate change.

In recent years, given indisputable scientific evidence and the looming pressure of disasters presented by climate change, governments and corporations have begun to accept that climate change is a problem which largely derives from human activity (Parr 2015, 70). Even conservative institutions such as the World Bank, which previously promoted the fossil fuel industry, issued warnings that humanity is threatened if more environmentally friendly sources of energy are not pursued (Smith 2014, 1). This reaffirms the biocentric notion that human beings are entwined with the natural world, and their actions have consequences. However, these recent revelations lack an understanding of the extent to which the exploitative relationship between humans and earth has been gradual and longstanding; there is a tendency to frame climate change as a product of the last decade or so, rather than a centuries-old development based in an understanding of human progress as being more important than the well-being of the planet. In line with the catastrophe narrative, climate change has been “grasped naïvely as the sudden revelation that capitalist development is damaging to ecological systems” (Elliott 2016,

62). By accepting human causes behind climate change but understanding this problem as sudden and unexpected rather than gradual, biocentric premises are distorted as actors ignore the long history of human exploitation of the environment. This practice serves the neoliberal order by once again alleviating blame; as well as by producing an atmosphere of panic generated and controlled by global elites, as per the catastrophe narrative (Elliott 2016, 62-3).

Neoliberal capitalism also borrows from biocentric narratives by advancing the likes of a “green economy,” in which consumption is re-conceptualized in order to adapt to the changing climate (Smith 2014, 2). This includes the tendency for companies and products to be presented as environmentally friendly – a practice known as “greenwashing” – in order to adapt to pressures from consumers, NGOs, governments, and other corporations. This results in the likes of General Electric’s “Ecomagination” campaign, which promoted the corporation’s environmental progress while simultaneously lobbying against clear air EPA requirements; or Green Mountain Power Corporation’s marketing of “green energy” sources, which they executed by using polluting combustion technologies (Delmas & Burbano 2011, 65-6). Further, neoliberal citizens which engage with these companies and products are applauded for engaging in apparently eco-friendly consumption patterns. They are encouraged to “exercise their consumer power – not by shopping less but by discovering new and exciting ways to consume more”



(Klein 2014, 212). However, labelling consumerist activities as “green” – more often for the sake of competition or pressure rather than any actual benefit to the planet – is an insufficient means to respond to climate change. Rather than being a viable solution, sustainable development is a front, or a “political mythology,” that masks the neoliberal agenda of free market and perpetual growth (Elliott 2016, 57). This is especially problematic within the realm of environmentalism, as activists blindly accept and advocate for the band-aid fix of sustainable development in pursuit of caring for the planet without considering the extent to which this practice might cause harm (Elliott 2016, 93).

A final note on the instrumentalization of biocentric language by neoliberalism refers to a more general feature of this ideology, and that is the tendency to posit the order itself as natural. Fukuyama’s “The End of History” in 1990 famously argued that, following the end of the Cold War, mankind’s evolution would in Western liberal democracy as the final, universalized form of human government (Elliott 2016, 58). Likewise, Thatcher frequently suggested that there was “no alternative” to market-based neoliberalism, and that this was the best (and only) possible model for the future (Benatar et al. 2018, 157; Klein 2014, 39). Evidently, neoliberalism is understood as our only option, and as a global hegemony it is so deeply engrained in social and economic institutions that it is taken for granted. I argue that this constitutes a manipulation of biocentric language, as neoliberalism is presented as something which is naturally occurring despite it being a constructed phenomenon (Parr 2015, 71). Using the false label of being “natural” undermines the notion that neoliberalism is

a system which can be countered in order to mitigate climate change and protect what is actually natural.

Biocentrism as a Counter to Neoliberalism

Above, I argued that biocentric language might be used by neoliberal elites in order to preserve this system. However, I will argue that the narrative of biocentrism, at its roots and removed from the mouths of elites, provides a potentially powerful counter to material capitalism, neoliberal governance, and the catastrophe narrative.

Biocentrism, as an ontological account which frames humans’ relationship with the earth as equal and reciprocal, can act as a counter-hegemonic force against material and neoliberal capitalism in what Gramsci refers to as a “war of position” (Smith 2014, 2). This concept describes a clash between a dominant narrative – in this case, the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism – and a force which challenges its ideological premises (Smith 2014, 4). Biocentrism is capable of counteracting the notion that neoliberalism is a ‘natural’ order, and can be used to advocated for a social structure which is better suited to handle the lofty demands of mitigating climate change. This viewpoint additionally works to question the catastrophe narrative of neoliberalism by recognizing that climate change is the result of generations of interaction between humans and the natural world, rather than some new and pressing problem which could not have been foreseen (Elliott 2016, 62).

Indigenous groups worldwide, specifically in South America, Australia, and Canada, are loud voices in environmental movements which base their demands in biocentrism, such

as the new phenomenon of demanding “legal rights for Mother Earth” (Smith 2014, 16). As mentioned above, the ideology of biocentrism is notably present within Indigenous culture, lending from beliefs such as animism as well as creation stories which post human beings on equal footing with other living things (Smith 2014, 4). Indigenous peoples are not only more vulnerable to physical and social risks associated with climate change as a marginalized community, but are more intensely impacted by climate change because neoliberal practices which cause ecological harm are closely tied to the destruction and theft of traditional lands. Thus, calls for Indigenous sovereignty are closely tied to the environmental movement, as in the case of protests at the Unist’ot’en Camp in 2019 in response to the proposed construction of the Coastal GasLink pipeline on the traditional lands of the Wet’suwet’en Nation (CBC News 2019, para 2).

Indigenous calls for biocentric approaches to climate change are most clearly reflected through their participation in international forums. Indigenous peoples across the globe create and participate in intersectional global justice groups concerned with climate change, such as the Indigenous Environmental Network and the World Social Forum (Smith 2012, 2). In addition, they have become increasingly prevalent voices in international conferences concerned with climate change. Although they were previously ignored or even silenced by many international conferences concerned with climate change, such as the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, Indigenous

peoples are now featured as key players in combatting climate change (Etchart 2017, 2). The Rio+20 Outcome Document of 2012, for example, stresses the importance of this community’s expertise in responding to climate change (ibid.). More notably, Indigenous groups have also directly challenged insufficient approaches to climate change such as those advanced by mainstream organizations such as the United Nations (ibid.). For example, in Bolivia, Indigenous communities influenced President Evo Morales’ call for a global meeting called a “World People’s Summit on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth,” which was created as a direct alternative to the failed Copenhagen Agreement of 2009 (Smith 2012, 16). This conference can be considered an example of a counter-hegemonic force because it challenged an approach raised by a dominant organization, raising biocentric ideas rather than striving to solve climate change through means which prevent accountability and promote neoliberal ideals: “it challenged the idea that the United Nations is the only arena where serious discussions of international politics can happen” (Smith 2012, 15). Thus, Indigenous voices are gaining the traction necessary to shift the discourse surrounding human’s relationship of the earth, reflecting a “war of position” by pushing norms and offering alternative perspectives within the current institutional framework.

Indigenous perspectives, rooted in biocentrism, promote the mitigation of climate change not within a framework of neoliberalism and consumption; but within a framework



based in community and equality between living things. Adopting the perspectives of Indigenous people and similarly marginalized groups in the context of climate change also highlights other inequalities, such as sexism, racism, and classism, which go hand-in-hand with environmental issues. This strengthens biocentrism in the war of position by questioning the exploitative and oppressive features of neoliberalism on a broader basis, as well as by allowing social movements to band together in opposition to institutionalized norms (Elliott 2016, 111-2; Parr 2015, 70). This counter-hegemonic side of the “war of position” is deeply rooted in bottom-up organizations, such as the Grassroots Global Justice Alliance, which come together on the grounds of climate justice as an entity which binds together various issues: though the Alliance “began with a mobilizing framework that was largely a global justice/anti-neoliberalism frame [...] its work more recently has focused on the need for ‘climate justice’” (Smith 2014, 9). Therefore, biocentric ideals of equality challenge not only the hierarchy between humans and nature which is envisioned by neoliberalism; but also, hierarchies between people which result in the pursuit of profit.

Conclusion

As I have demonstrated, narratives pertaining to humankind’s relationship to the Earth are central to understanding climate change under neoliberalism, and the so-far inadequate approaches to mitigating it. Anthropocentrism is found among the roots of neoliberal governance and material capitalism, and biocentric ideas are selectively manipulated in order to cater to neoliberal objectives. Howev-

er, I have argued that biocentrism in its purest sense can present a solution to the inadequacies of human responses to climate change up until this point and might even solve problems beyond the demise of nature. My analysis reveals that the problems posed by climate change may not be completely solvable within the framework of neoliberalism, but rather, require a reconceptualization of our relationship with nature: “only now, ‘we, the people’ must be radically expanded to ‘we, who inhabit the earth’” (Elliott 2016, 88).

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NATO Membership and Russian Influence: Instruments of Reform in Georgian Civil-Military Relations

David Ingram

Introduction

The history of Georgia is defined by its struggle to secure independence from the political and economic influence of Russia. While the Georgian identity dates back to the 4th and 5th centuries, the past two hundred years has seen the Georgian state go through a variety of violent upheavals, invasions and revolutions, causing severe instability in the region of the South Caucasus. The first incursions of Russian activity in Georgian territory took place during the invasion of Tsar Paul I in 1801 which brought Georgia into the Russian Empire against their will. This period of Russian rule ended with the collapse of the Empire on the outset of the Russian Revolution in 1917. This marked a brief period of independence for Georgia until its second invasion by the Bolsheviks in 1921 resulting in Georgia becoming part of the USSR. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 Georgia has been attempting to distance itself from Russia's influence (Kyle, 237). While Georgia and Russia have historically maintained close ties, popular discourse in Georgia still treats Russia as "the main threat to the existence of the country" (Darchiashvili, 2).

Evidence of this threat is illustrated by several events including Georgia's failed military campaigns against Russian-backed separatist forces in Abkhazia in 1992-93, and the continued existence of Russian military bases within Georgian borders even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, tensions between Georgia and Russia resulted in the latter invading Georgia's 'breakaway' region of South Ossetia in 2008. In order to combat this threat, Georgia has been turning towards western institutions, namely NATO, for assistance in distancing itself from Russia. Georgia has been attempting to join NATO for almost two decades. In 2002, Georgia's President Shevardnadze announced his government's intentions of securing NATO membership as a priority for the country (Kyle, 237). The Rose Revolution of 2003 saw the newly elected President Mikheil Saakashvili and his government declare their intentions to further increase their efforts to integrate with the western nations (Nichol, 1). NATO membership has since been at the forefront of Georgia's foreign policy goals.

In order to join NATO, several reforms were necessary to allow Georgia's armed forces to integrate and operate alongside oth-



er NATO counterparts. These reforms have included several improvements to 1) professionalize the military in order to make it a more versatile, flexible, modern fighting force capable of integrating with the current NATO member forces; and 2) to increase the degree of civilian control and oversight of Georgia's armed forces.

Russia fears that continued NATO expansion will further contribute to a diminishing sphere of influence as former Soviet-bloc states are being increasingly drawn towards NATO; especially during the last round of expansions that saw the admittance of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia into the alliance (NATO [b]). In response to Georgia attempting to gain NATO membership, actions such as economic sanctions have been taken by Russia in order to dissuade Georgia from pursuing further actions to join the alliance. Even in the face of "persistent diplomatic, economic and military pressures from Russia" (German, 603), this has not stopped Georgia from further seeking NATO membership and adopting many of the recommended reforms needed to join. It is here that we can see the tensions between Georgia's further integration with NATO, and Russia's efforts to prevent this from happening. Even though Georgia has been unwavering in its persistence to join NATO, their path to membership has encountered significant difficulty since the war in 2008, largely due to the fact that European states are wary about admitting Georgia to the alliance and potentially inciting armed conflict with Russia (Nichol, 6).

Despite this hesitancy to admit Georgia into the alliance, this paper argues that NATO should move ahead and admit Georgia as a

NATO member; primarily because Georgia has successfully reformed its political and military bureaucracy according to NATO's specifications, thus allowing interoperability with existing NATO forces while maintaining sufficient civilian control and oversight of its forces; and that further stalling or outright refusal of admission will give the perception that western institutions still capitulate to pressure from authoritarian states such as Russia.

First, this paper will examine the civil-military relations in Georgia from 1992 to 2018, showing how Georgia's military transformed from an entity possessing neither adequate civilian oversight and control, nor military professionalism, to one that currently mirrors other Western militaries within NATO in both aspects. Throughout this paper, professionalism is often referred to as the Georgian military's ability to integrate with existing NATO forces in terms of operational capability, but more specifically given that it adheres to the elements of professionalism as espoused by Samuel Huntington in his classic work *Soldier and the State*. To be a professional, one must possess the traits specific to a profession. A profession is "an exclusive group of people who possess and apply a systematically acquired body of knowledge derived from extensive research, education, training and experience... have a special responsibility to fulfill their function competently and objectively for the benefit of society...[and] are governed by a code of ethics that establishes standards of conduct while defining and regulating their work... [which is] enforced by the members themselves and contains values that are widely accepted as legitimate by society at large" (Defense). Civilian oversight is defined by civil-military relations scholar Peter Feaver as

the ability of the civilian government to ensure that its military adheres to the legally given orders it receives without undermining the ability for the government to make decisions in the future (Feaver, 408-410).

Second, this paper will explore how tensions with Russia led Georgia to seek NATO membership as a bulwark against its northern neighbor and present two of the criteria that Georgia would have to meet in order to become eligible for NATO membership, that of civilian oversight and military professionalism; third, how Russian influence is preventing Georgia from attaining full membership; and finally, why NATO should accept Georgia as a member despite the reservations it may have.

History of Georgian Civil-Military Relations

Georgian civil-military relations began one year before the dissolution of the USSR. On 20 December 1990 the Georgian National Guard was created by the Supreme Council of Georgia, headed by President Gamsakhurdia. At the time of the Guards' creation, there were several armed factions within the country that had been created during the last years of Soviet rule and the Guard was meant as a way of bringing about some stability within Georgian borders by concentrating some power into the hands of the state. Unfortunately, the creation of the guard brought about new problems. One such problem was the lack of professionalism within the officer corps.

While those within the officer corps were largely chosen based on their prior ex-

perience with the Red Army, many of these former army officers had little to no actual battlefield experience, nor did they serve very long that ideally would have brought about a degree of competence and professional experience (Darchiasvilli, 7). Young and inexperienced officers with no military education saw themselves admitted into top military positions despite their lack of formal training and education and as a result, had no professional ethics.

Another problem was the lack of administrative control and oversight of the National Guard. While there were governmental departments created with the sole purpose of exercising control over the Guard such as the Commission of Defence, the committee of law and security, and the Department of the National Guard, the specific functions of these departments were not clearly defined, thus resulting in the lack of control and oversight that the departments were charged with upholding (Darchiasvilli, 8). As a result, many groups within the military exhibited traits of insubordination and even participated in illegal activities such as extortion of civilians, and participation in black market activities. Political decisions were often ignored or implemented only formally, never to actually be followed up nor practiced (Darchiasvilli, 9). But as tensions with Russia began to increase, the Georgian government felt it necessary to begin distancing themselves from them and look west towards NATO as a solution.

According to Georgia, admittance into NATO as a permanent member would challenge continued Russian aggression through



the protections of NATO's Article 5 clause which states that 'an attack on one, is an attack on all'. Article 10 under the North Atlantic Treaty states that "any state so invited may become a Party to the Treaty" (NATO [f]). This creates a sort of open-door policy for any state to pursue NATO membership if they choose to do so. But due to the lack of professionalism and oversight over the Georgian military, future NATO membership would take some time to formalize. Thus, in order for them to integrate with the existing NATO forces, the Georgian military would have to undergo significant organizational transformations.

Understanding the contemporary theories on Professionalism and Oversight

In order to be officially granted NATO membership, aspiring states need to meet several criteria. Criteria including democratic processes, civilian control over the military, and the assurance that the aspiring state can strengthen NATO forces currently engaged in its peacekeeping missions, counterterrorism operations, or any other activity authorized by the UN Security Council (NATO [e]). The importance of these criteria rests on the contemporary theories of civil-military relations currently being practiced by many Western states such as Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. This section will present the theories of Samuel Huntington and Peter Feaver currently influencing the contemporary practices of Western civil-military relations and why they are important to NATO membership.

In his classical work *Soldier and the State*, Samuel Huntington advocates for an objective control of the military and argues that military professionalism would allow the

civilian masters to control state forces (Feaver [b], 370). Professionalism, according to Huntington, is a trait specific to the officer corps that delineates them from the rest of civil society given that they have the three characteristics required to achieve the status of a profession: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness (Huntington). These characteristics in conjunction with one another bestow upon the officer the required tools necessary to lead his/her troops into battle (expertise), reflect the attitudes and values of their society (responsibility), and perform their individual specializations with competence and ease (corporateness) (Hartel, 13-21). While Huntington's model of civil-military relations focuses on the officer corps specifically, the concept of the profession of arms, that both the officer corps as well as their non-commissioned counterparts are professional entities working together to further the aims of the organization and the society they serve, is more popular in its influence on the Western application of civil-military relations (Defense).

Peter Feaver's agency theory illustrates the relationships between the principal and the agent. The principal (the civilian authority), through its use of monitoring mechanisms and legislated powers, influences the agent (the military) to perform its duties as prescribed by the principal. The agent will either comply with these orders or 'shirk' them entirely. Shirking can be defined as: "when the military, through laziness, insolence, or preventable incompetence, does not do what the civilian has requested... or [does so] in such a way as to undermine the [decision-making] ability of the civilian [in the future]" (Feaver [a], 408-410). The principal has the right to determine what they consider to be shirking, and how they

act accordingly. Ideally, the principal seeks to trade off its authority over the agent so that the military can complete their tasks without any interference from the principal through micromanaging. However, there is the fear that the military will see how far they can go, thus exploiting their newfound freedom to accomplish their own selfish interests. Thus, how the principal responds to this insubordination will set the precedent for all future relationships (Feaver [a], 409). Various forms of punishments for ^{insubor}d^{ination} in many Western militaries range from fines and reduction of pay, to career limitations and even prison terms dependant on the degree of insubordination.

Georgia's military reforms and NATO aspirations

Improvements in government oversight and civilian control

What the next section will show is that where insubordination was rampant throughout the ranks, the reforms instituted by Georgia at the behest of NATO increased civilian authority and oversight as well as the professionalism of its forces that was absent during the 1990s.

In their effort to transform Georgia's military into one more compatible with NATO forces, Georgia has made several important bounds in establishing the civilian oversight necessary as well as achieving the level of proficiency mirrored by other NATO member states (NATO [a], 15). These changes include the appointment of a civilian defence minister, as well as actively participating in NATO

defence programs to further strengthen governmental oversight and accountability (NATO [g]). In light of these much needed organizational changes, NATO "positively assessed Georgia's progress on [their Individual Action Plan (IPAP)] goals" in January 2008 (Nichol, 3). Unfortunately, that same year witnessed the invasion of its sovereign territory of South Ossetia by Russia in August 2008. This resulted in the creation of the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) in 2009 that would replace the IPAP and expand on the reforms to further "discuss Georgia's post-conflict democratic, economic, and defence needs" (Nichol, 3).

Improvements in professionalism

Because of the continuous exposure that the Georgian military has had with NATO since the late 1990s, they have been able to professionalise their forces as well as gain recognition and praise from NATO member states for Georgia's participation in the alliance. While Georgia is not a member of the NATO command structure, nor is it represented on the North Atlantic Council, Georgia's relationship with and contributions to NATO far exceed that of any other aspiring state (Coffey). For example, Georgia began sending troops to supplement German and Turkish forces during the Kosovo mission from 1999-2008 (NATO [a], 11); in 2001 Georgia hosted a variety of multinational military training exercises as part of NATO's Partnership for Peace forum and subsequently in 2002 and 2007 (Nichol, 1); as part of the NATO mission in Afghanistan, Georgia is currently providing a full infantry battalion that is serving with US forces, and



an infantry company serving alongside the French. These contributions make Georgia the “second-largest NATO partner contributor to [the Afghanistan mission]” (NATO [a], 11).

In addition to the increased proficiency and tactical acumen of their troops, Georgia also begun to adopt a professional military ethos and military doctrine in order to further strengthen its capabilities to contribute to international security alongside NATO (German, 611). Various defence white papers known as the Strategic Defence Reviews (SDRs) were written to address the specific objectives the Georgian military would be undertaking. The 2013 SDR focused on furthering interoperability with NATO partners in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the 2014 SDR put an emphasis on providing ongoing support to missions that help promote global security and stability (German, 611).

Because Georgia has continuously made progress in reforming its military to meet the standards prescribed by NATO to further professionalize their troops and reinforce civilian oversight, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has stated that Georgian membership is still a welcome possibility (Janeliūnas & Kirvelyte, 152-153). However, Georgia’s admittance to NATO is largely mitigated by Russia’s influence in the region.

Russian Influence as a mitigating factor for Georgia’s NATO membership

While these reforms within the Georgian military have shown that Georgia is committed to the pursuit of NATO membership, they have also drawn the ire of Russia looking to expand its influence as well. According to Tracey German, “in spite of significant prog-

ress in terms of both political and military reforms, Russian antipathy towards Georgia’s membership of NATO and any further expansion of the alliance continues to act as a roadblock to Georgian accession” (German, 612). But despite popular discourse that portrays Russia as the main threat to their existence, there have been several agreements between Georgia and Russia solidifying cooperation and good neighborly relations; arguably made to mitigate negative Russian influence over Georgia. One such agreement is the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); a free-association alliance promoting various co-ordinations of economic, foreign, and defence policies between Russia and former Soviet-bloc states (Britannica). Even though Georgian attitudes towards Russia were and still are overwhelmingly negative, Georgia was too weak to deal with Russia either economically or militarily by itself at the time the deal was struck (Kyle, 237). So even though the CIS agreement with Russia was described by Georgian President Shevardnadze (92-03) as a “desire to neutralize the expected negative influence of the country’s northern neighbor”, it was seen as a necessary evil (Darchiashvilli, 3).

Another issue that exists is the encroachment of Russian troops deeper into Georgian territory (Darchiashvilli, 4); a problem persisting to this day solely to dissuade Georgia from seeking further integration with the NATO and the West (Kyle, 245). But no action has insofar as much geopolitical significance than Russia’s current relationships with Georgia’s separatist states of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, where Russian influence in these territories constitute Georgia’s main challenge to stability (Tereoff, 47). In the

immediate post-Soviet era of 1992, Abkhazia refused to accept Tbilisi's authority over them which resulted in a failed Georgian military operation to take back control of the territory from the rebels. After the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest where Georgia was promised a seat on the North Atlantic council 'eventually', tensions between Georgia and Russia escalated to the point where Russia invaded South Ossetia on 8 August of that year. Although a ceasefire was soon negotiated by NATO, this incident has had lasting negative repercussions on Russo-Georgian relations (NATO [a], 6). In the aftermath of the 5-day conflict, Moscow has recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as sovereign states in their own right while the rest of the international community continues to recognize the regions as separatist entities within Georgian sovereign territory.

While Janeliūnas and Kirvelytė believe that the 2008 war occurred because "Russia sought to destroy the military and economic infrastructure of Georgia" Georgian political and civil society perceived it as a result of the reforms taken further integrate with NATO and the West (Janeliūnas & Kirvelyte, 154). Ironically, Russia's actions in attempting to dissuade Georgia from seeking NATO membership are having the opposite effect. A majority of Georgian society continue support their aspirations to NATO membership (NATO [a], 15). As recently as March 2018, President Giorgi Margvelashvili further emphasised Georgia's continued interest in joining, saying that "We want membership. ... we say we deserve to be there... we have done everything

to be there" (Kyle, 238).

Prescribed actions for NATO - In defence of Georgian NATO membership

To be sure, NATO and Georgia both find themselves in difficult positions. From Georgia's perspective as a former Soviet state seeking to distance itself from its historical aggressor, NATO membership and integration with the Western liberal-democratic system will act as a bulwark against Russia continuously seeking to solidify its own sphere of influence in its own backyard, despite the short-term repercussions that may occur as a result (Kavadze & Kavadze, 23-25). But from NATO's perspective, the furthered expansion of its own sphere of influence against Russia's demands, something that Moscow considers a "red line", may lead to further conflict and violence if Georgia's NATO membership aspirations lead to it becoming a permanent member of the alliance (Kyle, 245). While these views are understandable, NATO should continue to admit states, including Georgia, who aspire to be part of the Western model of liberal-democracy despite pressures from Russia.

In his analysis on NATO enlargement, Kramer believes that NATO involvement will lead to increased stability within former Soviet-bloc states that want out of Russia's sphere of influence (Kramer, 753). Nine former Soviet-bloc states have been admitted into the alliance since 1990, clearly showing a demand for NATO influence in the region of the Baltic states (NATO [c]). With regards to Georgia, the country has quite literally transformed its



military capabilities and capacity, in addition to its relationship with the civilian government according to NATO's demands in order to prove that they truly desire a place amongst other states that prescribe to the liberal-democratic value system. By not admitting Georgia, what hope does any other aspirant country to NATO such as the Ukraine or Bosnia-Herzegovina have?

While one of NATO's primary missions is to diffuse and prevent conflict in the long run, it can create unnecessary and sometimes violent confrontations in the short-medium term. Take for example the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia in 2014. At this time, Ukraine was also seeking further integration with the West through NATO membership as well as trade deals with the European Union (NATO [c]). It is in the Ukrainian context in that we see Oğuz's argument that the annexation of the peninsula was a direct result of NATO's lack of deterrence towards Russia; which further stemmed from an inadequate defensive reaction during the 2008 invasion of South Ossetia (Oğuz, 10). To be fair, NATO's Operation Enhanced Forward Presence mission was launched in the aftermath of the annexation to further deter Russia from seeking to physically extend its influence (NATO [b]). However, denying membership to Georgia despite the transformation of its professional military capabilities, the establishment of effective civilian oversight, and the participation in several NATO missions only further gives air to Russian propaganda that Western institutions are weak and work against Georgia's best interests (Madej, 6); even when Georgian civil society and senior politicians have clearly expressed their Westward intentions.

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Gender-Based Violence in Urban Contexts: Segregated Public Transit Solutions in São Paulo

Helena Kanga

Introduction

Public transportation is a social and physical urban space where women are at a significantly high risk of experiencing gender-based violence. The city of São Paulo sought to address this issue by implementing a gender-segregated transit project in the 1990s aimed to protect women through the designation of female-only cars on subway trains (Pati 2008). Although the project was shut down in 1997, Brazil's second largest urban agglomeration Rio de Janeiro, was influenced to implement gendered transit cars in its metro system in 2006 (Pati 2008). São Paulo has looked to revisit the strategy as an approach to protect women from gender-based violence in the wake of increased violence in the city. However, discussions have been raised by feminist groups and international organizations arguing that the strategy needs to be revised in order to be sensitive to the complexities of deeper social issues such as those linked to infrastructure, poverty, gender-gaps and cultural values. Particularly, there is a need for São Paulo to focus on the unique dependency of pink-collar working women, or *empregadas*, and the metro.

Gender-segregated transportation

is a superficial and temporary solution to gender-based violence that can increase gender-disparity in communities by limiting spaces of public interaction between men and women in the city. I argue that although physical segregation prevents violence against women on public transportation, this strategy is not a solution to gender-based violence because it fails to disrupt deeply systemic patriarchal and cultural attitudes. Throughout this paper, the concept of the “right to the city” will be used as a backdrop to frame an intersectional feminist lens to examine how social relationships to space are shaped by intersectional identities, particularly how class and gender contribute to precarious physical mobility in urban spaces. The “right to the city” is a theory originally conceptualized by Henri Lefebvre but has been expanded on in contemporary academia by David Harvey to understand the exclusive access to the city as a social construct. The “right to the city” is a call to action on local authorities to co-create urban spaces by stressing the need for urban planning to be centered around local social relationships (Harvey 2012).

This paper will first contextualize the history of gender-segregated transit initiatives



in São Paulo and situate the mobility and experience of empregadas in São Paulo. Following, it will weigh contrasting opinions on gender-segregated transportation strategies that have been brought forward by various Latin American feminist social groups. I will then conclude with an analysis and critique of the debate and make a recommendation on how São Paulo should proceed so it may become an exemplary model for other urbanized areas, with respect to local gender relations.

Female-Centered Transit Projects

Public transit is what connects a city. Heavily relied upon by those who enjoy its infrastructure, public transit is able to dictate the social and physical mobility of the majority of an urban population. However, it is also a space where women are more vulnerable to violence because of high rates of congestion and constant interaction that impose prolonged, reduced interpersonal distances in an enclosed space (Tillous 2020, 1156). The logic behind gender-segregated transit is to attempt to reduce violence against women by promoting a safe space to empower female mobility in the city. Segregation projects hope to reduce the interaction between men and women to determine if voluntary segregation in urban settings can improve women's access to public spaces (Tillous 2020, 1156).

Female-only transit is not a revolutionary or new infrastructure project. It has been around since the beginning of rail transit, as early as 1836 in London, followed by New York and Tokyo, designating rail cars for upper-class women not only for physical security, but to reinforce patriarchal

organizations by isolating women (Tillous 2020, 1157). The unique vulnerability of women in cities is a societal phenomenon that is not solely characteristic of the Global North or South. Sexual harassment in public spaces is a social problem of the greater global patriarchy, a power structure that reminds women of their inferior place in the sexual hierarchy (Tillous 2020, 1156). Issue has been raised in recent scholarship that gender-segregation could be an obstacle to gender equality because it limits public spaces where men and women interact, consequentially legitimizing stereotypes of women as helpless victims who need to be protected from men's uncontrollable sexual aggressions (Tillous 2020, 1168).

Contextualizing São Paulo

In order to understand the debate around gendered-transit segregation, it is critical to discern why the city of São Paulo was chosen for this paper. São Paulo has not only recently implemented contemporary gender-segregation transit projects, but it is also a prime urban context as the largest city in Latin America. The city is one of the most important and dynamic economic regions in the country, generating about 20% of Brazil's GDP (World Bank 2019, 3). São Paulo is also home to the most expansive and busiest metro system across the continent (Moreira and Ceccato 2020, 204). The metro was built in the 1970s, the first gender-designated cars emerging in 1995 when Companhia Paulista de Trens Metropolitanos (CPTM) took over the public rail system (Pati 2008). However, CPTM began receiving backlash, notably from married couples, claiming that active segregation violated Article 5 in Brazil's Constitution which guarantees equality among

citizens (Pati 2008). The result of such strong opposition forced the end of the female-car campaign in 1997 (Pati 2008). Today, the CPTM transports almost four million people every day, with 55% of its transit riders identifying as female (Moreira and Ceccato 2020, 211).

The Mobility of Women in São Paulo

Mobility is not gender neutral. According to Moreira and Ceccato (2020), women and men have vastly different sets of routine activities, leading men on average to travel farther, while women more frequently within São Paulo (216). A large factor contributing to these habitual differences is the gender dynamics of the paid and unpaid labour forces that exist in São Paulo. Men assume a place in the paid labour force as breadwinners, a psychological and social dynamic rooted in ideas of machoism which translates to their primary need for public transportation as commute to work. Women on the other hand participate in unpaid and paid labour in Brazil's economic and social sectors as caregivers, domestic life as constitutive of the broader social divisions (De Santana Pinho and Silva 2010, 90). Brazil is currently recovering from one of its worst economic crises, pressuring women, who already assume multiple roles in the family and community, to take on “pink-collar” domestic labour jobs to contribute to household income. For this reason, the middle to lower class female population in the city is largely dependent on the affordability of public transit to fulfil

physical and social mobility attached to the multiple roles they assume.

Pink-collar jobs are paid caregivers and cleaners called *empregadas* who work in the private sector in their employers' homes (Tillous 2020, 1165). Latin American women more broadly have a unique dependency on public transit because the domestic labour force is a huge part of Latin American urban economies. More than 90% of Brazil's domestic labour force are women (De Santana Pinho and Silva 2010). Domestic work is stereotyped as a female labour force because the nature of the work mirrors that of household and caregiving duties working-class women already take on unpaid in their own homes. *Empregadas* are a significant demographic of public transit riders because they often take on jobs in multiple houses. *Empregadas* take on more jobs not only because of the inherent pay discrepancy between men and women across Latin America forcing them to make up for the income difference, but because of the limited, gender-specific job opportunities in most Latin American cities due to lack of education. The jobs that are available to women are typically low wage, deepening the already significant gender income disparity (De Santana Pinho and Silva 2010, 95). The convergence of gendered labour forces and the recent economic depression in São Paulo have directly led to the increase in female ridership and dependency on public transit.



Harassment of Empregadas on Public Transit

Socially constructed gender roles have made women, particularly empregadas, vulnerable targets of sexual harassment in São Paulo. The nature of such demanding jobs force women to commute at odd hours and travel frequently between multiple jobs, all while maintaining their burden of “invisible work” (Moreira and Ceccato, 2020; Vera-Gray and Kelly 2020, 268). “Invisible work” encompasses the domestic work in the triple burden women take on balancing community, career, and household responsibilities. The “invisible work” of household responsibilities is linked to the transportation habits necessary to fulfil grocery shopping, attend doctor’s appointments, night classes and taking children to school (Moreira and Ceccato, 2020).

Women’s vulnerability has heightened in recent decades because of the circumstantial convergence of their transportation dependency with the spike in crime in São Paulo. Unemployment rates as repercussions of the economic crisis have caused stress and desperation for any means of income and an increase in leisure time, leading to high rates of participation in criminal activity, including harassment on public transit. The São Paulo metropolitan region was one of the most violent cities in the 1990s which resulted in a proportional increase in threats to women’s safety (Moreira and Ceccato 2020, 207). However, harassment is rarely reported, stemming from a further systemic issue across Latin America: wavering trust in police forces and judicial institutions (Sotelo 2014). Therefore, gender-based violence is informally recognized in São Paulo; it is not something

addressed by judiciary institutions or legal enforcement bodies as an issue.

As previously noted, women tend to have more public transit dependent activities compared to men, but women have less access to it due to the added psychological effects of fear (Moreira and Ceccato 2020, 205). Metro stations are focal points of crime and violence and are known to be attractive for searching out suitable victims in a high traffic public space (Moreira and Ceccato 2020, 205). Busy trains and overcrowded stations cause irritation which according to Moreira and Ceccato (2020), are proven to lead to heightened aggressive behaviour (209). According to Sotelo (2014), when women feel physically threatened, their public transportation habits change, often to the detriment of personal and greater urban economic success. Fear for personal safety dictates women’s travelling, spending, and working habits in the urban economy. Hindrances to women’s mobility determines how or if they participate in the economy at all compared to how they would if they enjoyed the same freedom of social or physical mobility as their male counterparts.

Self-discipline is the informal practices and change in habits to maintain physical protection and psychological security in instances or environments where the State or society fails to protect particular individuals. In a gendered context, Vera-Gray and Kelly (2020) argue these natural adaptations based in intuition are in fact a psychological response to gendered-systems forcing women to self-discipline themselves as less; “less vocal, less visible, less free – in order to be safe” (266). The relational impact of the act of self-disciplining is what Vera-Gray and Kelly (2020) theorize as “safety work”:

the work women do to claim space by protecting themselves and promoting their own freedom (266). In 2018, Brazil's Institute for Transportation and Development (ITDP) conducted a study on women and children's access to São Paulo and the Recife urban agglomeration via public transportation. The study found that local women used the following informal tactics to prevent harassment in day-to-day life: avoiding social events or public transit at all during late or early hours of the day, travelling with another person, and planning different routes through better areas with well-lit stations even if it takes longer to get to their destination (ITDP 2018, 26). The study noted that not only time of day, but factors such as prolonged waiting time, distance living from the station, and presence of metro employees at stations played a part in the likelihood or reduced risk of violence (ITDP 2018, 21-26). The ITDP report reveals that physical gender segregation on public transportation is not wholly effective as a multitude of other transportation-related habits are impacted by negative gender-relations that exist, preventing the empowerment of female mobility and comprehensive safety of women in the city.

São Paulo's societal gender roles have manufactured the dependency of empregadas on public transportation. The country-wide economic depression and failure to recognize gender-based violence by judicial institutions has made empregadas vulnerable to violence or harassment on public transportation. São Paulo's response to the issue has been to

physically separate men and women on public transit by the designation of female-only cars on subway trains.

Critiques of Gender-Segregated Transit

The recent proposal to reinstate gender-segregated subway cars in the São Paulo metro has provoked public debate over the effectiveness of the strategy through feminist discourse. The following is a summary of arguments from São Paulo-based feminist social groups Movimento Mulheres em Luta (MML) and Marcha Municipal das Mulheres (MMM). Both agree that the transit project needs adaptation and improvement from its original structure; however, they diverge on the issues of temporality versus durability of preventative measures for equally valid reasons. On the one hand, tackling gender-based violence is a shift in mentality across multiple generations and institutions that does not change overnight, and so preventative methods like physical segregation are justified tactics to protect women from immediate physical threat. On the other hand, these deep social shifts need to start happening to prevent the continuation of gender disparity in future generations, requiring proactive, not reactive strategies to be enforced instead.

Preventing Immediate Harm Through Tangible Change

Movimento Mulheres em Luta (MML), or the "Women in Fight Movement", is a working-class feminist organization originating from São Paulo, that has had



a notable influence on domestic violence policy. In 2006, the activist group helped to ratify a law acknowledging domestic and family violence as a violation of human rights (Tillous 2020, 1167). MML has taken a supportive stance in the debate around female-designated transit cars, claiming it is a political means to counteract sexual violence by giving women an escape from being held responsible for aggressions made towards them (Tillous 2020, 1163). They have vocalized that nothing can solve the underlying issues deeply rooted in cultural sentiments around gender and subordination of women, so the community must improve the situation instead through political counteraction (Tillous 2020, 1166). The feminist collective called for the designation of a proportionate number of segregated train cars from the previous one-car plan in order to better support the volume of female passengers to effectively protect them (Tillous 2020, 1166). Taking the neoclassical rational economic stance of financial optimization, MML has argued that making the metro feel safer translated to higher ridership, thus higher annual fare profits, and a regional economic boost by promoting access to jobs and shopping via train commute (Tillous 2020, 1170). Therefore, promoting women's mobility through safety measures also promotes the inclusion of women in the economy and thus improves the overall economic health of a city. MML hoped to reimplement the female-car program in the metro system again as a tactical solution to prevent immediate threats of violence against women, arguing that at the minimum, it is in the interest of the city's economic growth to invest in it.

How Segregated Transit Ignores Gender Disparity

Critics of gender segregated transit describe the approach as merely superficial, resolving sexual violence by reducing spaces of opportunity for harassment, but failing to alleviate gender disparity on the whole because it ignores interconnected and underlying local and cultural dynamics. Physical segregation does not prevent sexual violence and derogatory perceptions of women from continuing to thrive in other social spaces. One of the most prominent voices against the gender segregation project is the feminist group *Marcha Municipal das Mulheres* (MMM), or the "World March of Women". MMM argues that by creating voluntary spaces of segregation, if a woman sits in mixed train cars and is harassed, she is shamed for having "asked for it" by choosing to take up space in the co-ed car when she had the opportunity to avoid it (Tillous 2020, 1166). Co-ed cars are spaces women should feel free to occupy without fear for their safety in the first place. Furthermore, the past designation of one female-car per train is physically insufficient for the sheer capacity of female passengers who make up just over half of all riders in São Paulo in the first place, forcing many women to have to ride on co-ed cars (Tillous 2020, 1166).

A study of violence in São Paulo's metro revealed that women are targets of violence at central stations at all hours, whereas men are targeted at end stations at night, particularly in parking lots near stations due to the fact that very few women have licenses to drive cars; another gender role that exists (Moreira and Ceccato 2020, 215). Although male and female mobility are vastly

different, sexual violence cuts across race and class, hindering female mobility in the city in different ways than it does men. Segregation tactics accept that gender inequality cannot be changed or resolved, and instead puts energy into merely protecting the targeted bodies from harm, violence which only exists because inequality does. The proposed alternative temporary solutions MMM recommended was to continue to protect women through the implementation of female-only cars, but in the meantime, commit to improving physical aspects of public spaces. By implementing cameras in stations and train cars, better lighting, sanctions to rail staff, better quality and more frequent transportation, and education, women's safety and mobility on public transportation can be enhanced (Tillous 2020, 1165). Transit segregation is further criticized for its normalization of dominant social sexual relations. By making men out to be harassers who cannot control their impulses, binaries of gender roles are reinforced by focusing on heteronormativity, failing to acknowledge that men are also victims of harassment and also deserving of security (Tillous 2020, 1166). MMM further raised the concern that transit segregation is also a classist feminist approach, failing to accommodate for sexual violence that occurs beyond just the working class (Tillous 2020, 1168).

An Analysis of the Gender-Segregation Debate through Feminist Discourses

Both MML and MMM seek to promote

women's mobility rights in the city. On the issue of gender-based violence, the feminist groups raise distinct critiques and thus diverge on their solutions to the São Paulo metro gender-segregation project proposal. MMM makes a strong case for durable solutions to alleviate gender-based violence in São Paulo through public intolerance. However, they fail to provide explicit solutions on how to further approach classism, violence against men, and disruption of gender roles in the move toward comprehensive gender equality. This is an immense issue to tackle which is deeply embedded in culture, history, and place. Yet without tackling this gap, MMM leans toward the same method of solution as MML: changing transportation infrastructure, not unequal societal perceptions of gender.

Next Steps

In 2019, the World Bank released a Project Information Document (PID) outlining a proposed development project in support of implementing gender-segregated transport cars in the São Paulo metro again. The newly proposed objective aims to improve inclusive public transit delivery along the Aricanduva corridor in São Paulo which runs through the city (World Bank 2019). It emphasizes gender inclusion and gender-based violence mitigation, supporting women's improved mobility and access to employment, acknowledging that women suffer disproportionately more from longer commutes (World Bank 2019, 5). The World Bank's plan relies on enhancing and adapting



the former success of the Via Lilac project in Rio de Janeiro by promoting investment in public transit and female mobility through the reimplementation of gender-segregated buses as a preventative method against gender-based violence. The new project would move to establish designated road lanes along the Aricanduva corridor to promote faster commute of female-use buses and female-station entrances specifically designed for their access (World Bank 2019, 6). The World Bank claims the project is a modern, enhanced solution that recognizes and focuses on the female experience in the city. However, much like the female subway cars in the 1990s, the project does not in any way aim to resolve the underlying issue of gender-disparity in São Paulo that is based on social and cultural factors.

Although gender-disparity is a complex and deeply rooted issue that would require a shift in entire generational sentiments, institutional reaction is the first step towards gender-equality as it legitimizes the values society enforces and tolerates. Therefore, in agreement with the MMM's argument, gender-segregated transportation is a good temporary tactic to aid and protect women from systemic harassment, but more meaningful tactics should be planned to replace it through policy and action. The CPTM should move to conduct more comprehensive research which can inform productive change by identifying and testing particular variables to determine solutions for enhancing the safety and mobility of female riders. These variables could include: the environment around stations, increased surveillance, employee presence, and sensitivity to the nature and habits of particularly vulnerable rider populations such

as empregadas. It is imperative that the city of São Paulo does not rely on gender-segregated transportation as permanent infrastructure as in the way the World Bank plans to incorporate female segregation in rigid functions such as designated bus lanes and stations for women (World Bank 2019, 4). It is not only costly, but a fruitless investment that further divides men and women in society, with perceptions and treatment of one another as mirrors of the institutional structures that shape their relations.

Public transportation plays a crucial role in maintaining efficient city operations; however, its role cannot be fulfilled if safety concerns prevent half the population from using it (Moreira and Ceccato 2020, 204). The use of public transit relies on the sentiment and perception that it is reliable, effective, and safe (Moreira and Ceccato 2020, 204). According to the Origin and Destination survey, 74% of daily trips made by women are by walking or using public transportation (ITDP 2018, 34). Crime prevention initiatives need to be gender informed and sensitive to the particular spatial and temporal features of rapid transit environments (Moreira and Ceccato 2020, 203) There exists a lack of research that considers gendered victimization in Latin America, as most data that informs urban planners and policymakers comes from crime records and socioeconomic data from censuses (Moreira and Ceccato 2020, 204). But as previously noted, not many women report sexual harassment, leading to inaccurate data through the sheer number of harassment cases that go undocumented. Current data sources also fail to acknowledge that the environment around transit stations contributes to violence rates (Moreira and Ceccato 2020,

207). For example, informal observational research suggests there is less risk in the morning at stations that have green spaces nearby due to the fact that these environments are typically populated in the early morning thus increasing guardianship, an important piece of data that could change where stations and stops are located (Moreira and Ceccato 2020, 208). But the core underlying issue that needs to be addressed is institutional change. Urban planning roles in Latin America are significantly male dominated, ignoring issues and unique experiences women face in the city and therefore failing to divert attention towards building infrastructure to resolve issues like sexual violence (Sotelo 2014). As a result, current planning models favour and attune to men and their mobility, presuming it to be a universal experience.

When infrastructure does include female mobility in urban planning, it focuses on upper class women who are more dependent on privatized infrastructure such as travel by car (ITDP 2018, 34). Privilege and patriarchy have a disproportionate influence on urban planning and as consequence, reinforce inequalities by limiting social interaction among diverse groups, in this case, failing to build the city for working-class women (ITDP 2018, 7; Valentine et al. 2014, 403). Understanding intersectionality of experience and identity is essential to effective urban planning for Lefebvre's "right to the city". Harvey furthers Lefebvre's original concept by arguing that the "right to the city" promotes urban planning that is not measured by individual access to

resources, but its creation of a community as desired by the people, for the people; collective urbanization processes as a human right (Harvey 2012, 3-4). Women in São Paulo must be included in public transportation planning not only at an administrative level, but on a user level as well, empregadas being only one intersection which happens to be the focus of this paper, but furthermore a need to include race, age, and family demographics in planning.

Beebejaun (2016) argues that although unequal gendered mobility is not fully within the power of urban planners to solve, they can play a critical role as mediators to emphasize rights of space, place, and access (329). Participatory Action Research (PAR) is a research method based around implementing context-appropriate strategies by empowering those directly affected by the issue to collaborate with researchers to identify and formulate solutions (Kindron et al. 2007, 1-3). Participatory social auditing through the approach of mapping proved successful in a study done on gender and employment in Kenya (Opondo et al. 2007, 80-87). Mapping is a method that has participants visualize their environment, drawing on local knowledge and revealing personal relationships to space. In the Kenyan study, mapping strategies built an effective rapport with women, allowing them to discuss their experiences, relationality to space in terms of sexual harassment, and perceptions of gender difference in the workplace (Opondo et al. 2007, 85). This research was of significant value, identifying



key information and culturally specific understanding of contexts of female labourers in tea, fresh-cut flowers, and garment industries. It contributed to creating codes of conduct that enforced improved working conditions and a heightened awareness of workplace conditions on farms (Opondo et al. 2007, 86).

The Metropolitan Action Committee on Violence Against Women and Children (METRAC) is a Canadian organization that promotes safety for women and other high-risk groups from violence and harassment by working with individuals and communities to change policies and provide services. Their safety audit data collection system on transit has proven the effectiveness of participatory methods directly in gender and mobility research contexts. The system is effective for its highly accurate identification of key risk spaces by the people who use the transit system, information that presumptive generalized data often misses because it is too far removed from the issue source. This is not to say São Paulo has not conducted meaningful research initiatives around harassment and transportation. In 2018 the Institute for Transportation and Development published the policy Women and Children's Access to the City which aimed to provide necessary information on mobility, violence, harassment, and the unique place of women in the city to help inform and assist policymakers and urban planners in change. However, little of this research has been actively used for policy change and could soon be inaccurate and outdated data sources.

São Paulo could consider modelling its data system after Canada, which has conducted audits using participatory research

with women to understand exactly where riders feel safe, and where they do not, as well as including mapping methods such as the Kenyan research study to further understand local female associations with safety and space. That being said, it is important to recognize that this recommendation is generalized; these research methods are broad solutions that have worked in other geographic regions to provide data that informs policy, but that does not guarantee they will be effective for the specific context of São Paulo. Therefore, I recommend that if these data collection efforts are to be implemented, they should be done so in partnership with, and informed by Em Movimento por Elas. Em Movimento por Elas is a non-profit program partnered with the Government of São Paulo and the CPTM to address violence against women on public transit by formulating policies and creating a protection network, providing a platform for women that is localized to São Paulo (Companhia Paulista de Trens Metropolitanos, n.d). The gap in the program however is that previous campaigns such as SOS Mulher (a mobile alert app for women), Espaço Acolher (the allocation of private services at stations for victims of violence or sexual harassment), and education pamphlets are directed at a primarily female audience. With the local sensitivity and platform of Em Movimento por Elas, participatory research methods could contribute to new proactive, rather than reactive policy measures as well as create educational resources on sexual harassment for the consumption of both men and women.

Conclusion

Gender-segregated transit is no longer

a form of sustainable infrastructure as it is not a permanent solution to relieving gender disparity. São Paulo has the unique opportunity to become a revolutionary urban leader in tackling gender equality by envisioning a new approach and model to prevent gender-based violence on public transit. By tackling issues both socially and institutionally, a shift in tolerance and values can promote safety in shared public spaces for both men and women to interact and use equally for optimal mobility and access to the city. Better informed data on intersectional ridership demographics and physical environment impacts can enhance São Paulo's shift away from physical segregation tactics and towards punitive intolerance and acknowledgement of gender-based violence in public urban spaces. The "right to the city" is also the right of each individual to contribute to shaping the city. Through participatory methods, education and approaching urban planning with a feminist lens, female experiences can be recognized and legitimized. This is a model which can be applied to better inform other areas of urban planning within São Paulo and other urban contexts to empower the mobility of women in the city.



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Inequality Reduction or Inequality Facilitation: An Analysis of the Migrant-Remittance Global Economy

Ema Popovic

The increased presence and impact of globalization in the twenty-first century has transcended the realm of labour markets and cultural development, and has shaped the global patterns of migration. With the expansion of liberal democracies, and by extent, liberal values, the economic benefits spawned from the mass movement of people have superseded the recent rise of right-wing populist anti-immigration political rhetoric. Although liberal migration policies have flourished in an era dominated by a political logic of immigration restriction, the influence of anti-immigration discourse perpetuated by historical-structuralist theory proceeding the 1973 Oil Shock (a “migrant syndrome” perspective) has left an imprint on the way migration is perceived in contemporary scholarly discussion.

Oftentimes structuralist theorists label migration as a propeller of global inequality, serving as a facilitator of class-division. Migration, in this view, perpetuates inequality when remittance recipients fail to be low-income families- seeing as people can only become migrants with sufficient resources. Some structuralists imply that remittances themselves are not spent on productive investment and state-building, but rather conspicu-

ous consumption. However, these arguments undermine the actual consumption patterns of remittance-receiving households as well as the economic benefits remittances establish for non-migrants in origin states- both of which lead to increased levels of economic stability and inequality reduction. While the standard rhetoric around migrant remittances indicates a negative impact on origin-state inequality, a closer examination of case-study data demonstrates that the opposite occurs in practise, indicating that remittances serve as a key contributor to origin state development. This paper will demonstrate remittances’ role in origin-state economic inequality reduction by analyzing (a) remittance-receiving households’ consumption patterns, (b) indirect employment generation for non-migrants, and (c) the distribution of income in origin countries.

What Does a Twenty-First Century Migrant-Remittance Economy Look Like?

Before I address the symbiotic relationship between remittances and origin state inequality reduction, the twenty-first century neoliberal migrant-remittance economy will be outlined. This section of the paper will provide insight on globalization’s impact on economic integration (as well as how it expedites migra-



tory processes), the presence of a liberal paradox, and the historical-structuralist critique to help provide context for the ongoing debate of remittance efficacy in the contemporary political and economic climate.

The Stability of Remittances

According to a 2006 OECD report, remittances compensate for human capital loss in developing countries and boost economic growth- a trend which scholars began to recognize in the 1980s (OECD 2006, 140). But what are remittances and a migrant-remittance global economy exactly? International migration scholar Dilip Ratha explains that remittances are a less volatile source of exchange earnings compared to capital flows which prosper in promising economic cycles and decrease in turbulent ones (Ratha 2010, 160). Remittances are said to show higher levels of stability. For example, during 1998 to 2001, private capital flows were stunted as a result of the Asian financial crisis, while remittances continued to aid origin states (Ratha 2010, 160). For many developing countries, remittances serve as an indispensable source of external funding that provide a financial safety net. The OECD report states that in 2002, remittance-sending from international migrants reached 149.4 billion USD (OECD 2006, 141). Remittances may have been smaller than foreign direct investments, but they contributed more than three times that of official development assistance (loans and credits devised to enforce economic growth) (OECD 2006, 141). Remittances stimulate economic growth in origin states- most of which are still in the process of development and depend on the migrant-remittance economy for compensatory transfers.

Globalization's Impact on Integrated Economies

The rise of globalization in the twenty-first century has led to an era of integrated economies as the flow of goods and services among nations is met with fewer barriers. Although levels of migration have remained relatively stable during the last two decades, globalization has encouraged the financial flows associated with migration- particularly in the form of remittance transfers (German 2004, 555). Winters, Walmsley, Wang, and Grynberg argued that “a rise in labour migration leading to a 3% increase in the labour force within labour-importing countries would boost world GDP by \$156 billion” (Basik 2013, 403). Moreover, in the early 2000s more scholarly studies revealed that with the introduction of complete open-border policies, the world economy would expand by \$3.4 trillion USD (Basik 2013, 403). Iregui's 2005 analysis asserted that the elimination of global restrictions on labour mobility would result in efficiency gains of over 50 % of world GDP (Basik 2013, 403). The literature of the 2000s indicates a general optimism towards integrated economies (a product of globalization), which are ultimately assisted by free migratory flows and vice versa. Globalization has directed the narrative of much scholarly work and solidified its impact on twenty-first century labour markets and migration patterns.

International economic forces of trade and investment have successfully overpowered the rising anti-immigration political rhetoric perpetuated by right-wing populist groups. Prior to the 1980s, coalitions between left-liberals and libertarian-conservatives enforced the maintenance of liberal immigration policy.

However, following the Cold War, a wave of protectionist rhetoric surfaced, manifesting itself in the form of right-wing populism. Despite the rise of economic protectionism and right-wing populism amongst state electorates, the political elite maintain a global liberal model economy. As Hollifield (2008) outlines, the vitality of competitive advantage has secured states' liberal migration policies and has resulted in labour market globalization, despite the emergence of restrictive-policy discourse (Hollifield 2008, 67-98). Although states might appear keen to sustain sovereign regulation of their borders, liberalism and capitalism have successfully pushed for labour market globalization and enshrined human rights into national immigration legislation. As a result, international and internal migration have not been substantially affected by anti-immigration politics. As seen in the case of the European Union, member states' protectionist politics are often overridden by supranational institutions' and interest groups' economic pursuits (Cini 2019, 70-82). Nevertheless, the migrant-remittance global economy still faces severe backlash.

The Historical-Structuralist Critique

This section will provide a theoretical analysis of the historical-structuralist approach to migration and the remainder of the paper will dismantle the following arguments. Migration and development pessimism, coinciding with the structuralist approach which states that migration solely serves the interests of the wealthy, took flight after the 1973 Oil Shock

when the Western world entered a period of economic recessions (de Haas et. Al 2020, 334). These arguments, however, reached their peak dominance in the 1990s. Migration pessimists assert that migration leads to the underdevelopment of origin states, as opposed to their development. Some common critiques projected by migration pessimists and structuralists are that (a) remittances do not boost economic development in origin states as a whole because these transfers are invested in non-productive spending patterns, (b) remittances exclude non-migrants from economic benefits and result in the creation of a 'migrant elite' (which refers to origin state remittance-receiving families who then have additional capital flow) and (c) remittances fail to economically benefit low-income households as recipients tend to be families with already-sufficient resources (usually middle-income homes), thus fortifying class division. Although it can be said that the twenty-first century is marked by a neoliberal political discourse influenced by globalization, the critiques perpetuated by historical-structuralist theory remain an important part of migration discourse.

Remittance-Receiving Household Consumption Patterns

One of the objections of the migrant-remittance global economy, as outlined in the previous section, is that remittance-recipients fail to participate in productive spending and investment, and instead engage in conspicuous consumption. This form of spending strictly



advances the economic prosperity of migrant households and entrenches already existing inequality in origin states. Construction, real estate speculations, and commerce are understood as “non-productive” investments, as well as luxury goods (de Haas 2006, 566). Conspicuous consumption is said to redirect financial resources from investment activities and contribute to the “development of underdevelopment” (de Haas 2006, 566). Some scholars argue that the “productive” spending of remittances (investments in agriculture and industry) are minimal (de Haas 2006, 566). According to this narrative, even when remittances are spent on productive investment such as agriculture, this investment supposedly takes an economically infeasible form- one that is labeled as “sentimental” (de Haas 2006, 566). However, as Zarate-Hoyos (2004) indicates, there has been little empirical evidence to back these arguments. In order to disprove these claims, Zarate-Hoyos studies the spending patterns of remittance-receiving households (RRHs) in Mexico.

Through the collection of systematic data at the household level, Zarate-Hoyos examines the consumption patterns of RRHs at the national rank (Zarate-Hoyos, 557). The study uses the population of households who are not remittance-recipients (non-RRHs) as the control group in order to compare the consumption patterns of RRHs. A number of important conclusions are drawn from this research. Firstly, the empirical analysis of household expenditure patterns in Mexico indicates that, on a percentage basis, RRHs tend to spend more on investment and savings than non-RRHs (Zarate-Hoyos, 563). This finding refutes the claim that RRHs spend the resources collected abroad instantaneously

and strictly on luxury goods or consumption, thus ameliorating their own economic standing and fortifying class divisions in origin states. Even further, the study finds that RRHs have lower income elasticities than non-RRHs for current consumption and durable consumer good expenditures (Zarate-Hoyos, 563). This result indicates that the conclusion some studies draw which find that migrant households lack productive investment patterns may not be a universal phenomenon applicable to all RRHs in all origin states, but rather the consequence of a particular circumstance that apply to that study’s region (Zarate-Hoyos, 564). For example, expenditures tend to be directed to more dynamic economic centers in urban areas which do not lack basic infrastructure. Moreover, Zarate-Hoyos’ study argues that oftentimes what is labelled as “non-productive” spending shows itself to be productive. Spending on new housing raises labour productivity and increases property values (Zarate-Hoyos, 564). This form of spending does not strictly lead to inflation without adding to the capital stock of the nation, as implied by some scholars. The claim that RRHs tend to spend more on consumption than non-RRHs is also a claim that was not supported by the results of Zarate-Hoyos’ study. RRHs in Mexico were not more likely to divert resources away from production-related activities than non-RRHs (Zarate-Hoyos, 564).

The notion behind the argument of migrant-households participating in conspicuous consumption is that this spending pattern advances the economic prosperity of households that have sufficient resources to begin with and fortifies class divisions for low-income households which do not reap the economic benefits of these expenditures. However, there has been

little evidence of this spending pattern from remittance-receiving households. In practise, the spending patterns of remittance-receiving households are similar to non-remittance receiving households.

Indirect Employment Generation for Non-Migrants

A defining feature of the migrant-remittance global economy, one that is frequently undermined by critics, is the indirect employment generation for non-migrants in origin states. Some scholars assert that the migrant-remittance economy creates a 'migrant elite' - which refers to a select demographic of households that (1) have the resources to emigrate, and (2) receive the economic benefits garnered from migration. This results in a class division between migrant households (remittance-receiving) and non-migrant households in origin states, furthering inequality. However, this claim disregards the job opportunities produced from migration and remittances, which ultimately reduce inequality and boost economic development. Remittance expenditures have multiplier effects that can generate income for non-migrants.

De Haas' (2006) study of the Todgha valley in Morocco demonstrates how remittances have led to increased employment rates and, in turn, have transformed the region into one of immigration as opposed to strict emigration. 40.4 percent of households in the Todgha valley are international migrant households and 20.5 percent are internal migrant households (de Haas, 571). Internal

migrants cross administrative borders within a given state, a common result of urbanization or counter urbanization. Only 34.1 percent of households in the region are non-migrant (de Haas, 571). However, the valley has not seen an increase of inequality. De Haas points out that not only do migrant households have a higher ability to invest, but the frequently branded "non-productive" spending methods (in housing, small businesses, etc.) have multiplier effects which aid non-migrants (de Haas, 567). Examples of these effects, including job creation in the crafts industry, retail trade, and the service sector, are outlined below (de Haas, 567-571).

The remittance-receiving households of the Todgha valley, like many others, have a high likelihood of investing in houses. There has been an increase in spending on spacious and luxurious homes, with international migrants at the center of their development. According to De Haas, between 80 and 90 percent of international migrant households have invested in construction since 1975. Scholars have commonly critiqued the investments of Moroccan migrant households on ornate houses, claiming they are an irrational use of money that encourage an ultra-consumption craze. Nevertheless, the migration-induced construction expansion has generated local employment for non-migrants in the region. The valley has seen a spike of jobs in the construction and crafts industry, car repair shops, hardware stores, retail trade in building materials, etc. Electricians, plumbers, and other service sector jobs have also seen significant employ-



ment opportunity increases. Moreover, these jobs are occupied by non-migrants, countering the potential creation of a migrant elite. 86.2 percent of non-migrant households have local, non-agricultural sources of income, and 32.6 percent gain income from the construction industry. (de Haas, 576-577)

These statistics explain why despite high levels of migration, the valley has not seen a large decrease in population. As a result of increased employment opportunities, the region's emigration levels have been counterbalanced by an increase in immigration. Economically, the region has prospered and attracted both international and internal migrants. The migrant-remittance global economy has helped increase employment opportunities and generate income for non-migrants in the origin state, thus diminishing the prospects of poverty and inequality. Contrary to the structuralist 'migrant elite' argument, remittances have not disadvantaged non-migrant households. In fact, they have secured income and economic stability for households unable to migrate through the same investments critics describe as non-productive.

The Distribution of Income in Origin States

The distribution of income in origin states is the most direct indicator of economic inequality levels. Overwhelmingly, studies have revealed that migrant-sending states do not experience disproportionately higher levels of income inequality. This paper, however, acknowledges the limited number of twenty-first century studies analyzing the impact of remittances on income inequality levels. Contemporary studies focus on the relationship between remittances and development levels, which differ from inequality levels. The

impact of remittances on income distribution, however, is the result of both (a) the consumption patterns of migrants, and (b) the multiplier effects of remittances, which allow us to apply the data collected from previous years to current remittance-inequality-reduction discourse. Moreover, economists have found that there is a negative relationship between remittance-receiving states and increased levels of income inequality.

Portes (2009) used a panel of 46 countries which received remittances from 1970 to 2000 to examine the correlation between remittances and income inequality levels. The study found that the effect of remittances is non-universal across the distribution of income and strongest in low income states. The primary result of the study indicated that "all else equal, remittances decrease inequality as their effect is mostly felt among the poor and they are negatively related to the income of the rich". The effect of remittances is most strongly felt by the bottom 70 percent of the population's income earners, and least strongly felt by the top 20 percent of income earners. The income-increasing effects of remittances are most strongly felt by the first decile, but then decline across the bottom half of the distribution of income. Based on empirical findings, Portes estimates that a 1 percent increase of remittances would increase the first decile's (lowest income earning groups) income by 0.43 percent, while that same 1 percent remittance increase would only boost the seventh decile's income by 0.04 percent. As the income-increasing effects apply to low-income deciles more, the global-remittance economy has an equalizing effect on income distribution. (San Vicente Portes 2009, 127-134)

Ahlburg's (1996) study of income distribution in Tonga also indicates that a migrant-remittance global economy leads to income inequality reduction. He presents his data with The Lorenz curve function. As Ahlburg explains, "if income were equally distributed among households, then the Lorenz curve would be a 45 degree line...Lorenz curves show whether inequality of a distribution of income is large or small relative to some other distribution of income". Using data collected from Tonga, he finds that "the Lorenz curve including remittances lies above that for all income minus remittances at every point, while the Lorenz curve for cash income plus remittances is equal to cash income excluding remittances at the 60th and 70th percentiles, but lies above it all other points". In other words, inequality decreases when remittances are added to other sources of income. Thus, remittances in households in Tonga have an equalizing effect. Alburgh also points to studies which say Gini Coefficients are raised when remittances are revoked. Remittances, contrary to the theoretical arguments of critics, have a positive relationship to inequality reduction in origin states. (Ahlburd 1996, 395)

Conclusion

Migration in the twenty-first century has been shaped by the effects of globalization. The integration of economies has encouraged the international flow of people and secured the liberal nature of migration policies. As a result of this seemingly perpetual stability, it is not surprising that some theories (such as historical-structuralist approaches) have devel-

oped negative perceptions of the migrant-remittance global economy. The migrant syndrome perspective suggests that remittances bolster economic inequality in origin states. The main arguments behind this approach claim that (a) remittances themselves are spent on non-productive spending, (b) remittances lead to the creation of a 'migrant elite' which is exclusionary to non-migrants and (c) remittances are received by middle-income families more than low-income families (those which have the resources to emigrate initially), thus entrenching class divisions. However, this paper has focused on a collection of case studies and data analyses to counter these theories. I have assessed how the previously stated claims disregard the genuine consumption patterns of remittance-receiving households and the indirect economic benefits non-migrants receive through remittances. This essay has illustrated remittances' function in reducing fiscal inequality levels in origin states when considering that (a) remittance-receiving households partake in productive investment and have similar current consumption patterns to non-migrant households, (b) remittances increase local employment levels particularly for non-migrants, and (c) the income-increasing effects of remittances are disproportionately felt more by low-income deciles. Remittances not only directly ameliorate the socio-economic standing of migrant households, they produce multiplier effects which increase the household income of non-migrants as well. These transfers serve as an indispensable safety net and economic growth instigator for a growing number of states.



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Racial Capitalism in Canada: The Surfacing of Medical Racism in the Wake of COVID-19

Megan Sieroka

Introduction

“I’m convinced that my partner is dead because systemic racism contaminated the Joliette Hospital,” said Joyce Echaquan’s partner shortly after Ms. Echaquan’s death in a Montreal hospital (Godin, 2020). On September 28th, 2020, a Facebook live video posted by Ms. Echaquan depicted the racist behaviour of hospital staff while Ms. Echaquan lay in pain on her hospital bed. Unfortunately, Ms. Echaquan’s experience echoes that of other Black and Indigenous Peoples of Colour (BIPOC) across Canada. COVID-19 has disproportionately affected BIPOC. According to the City of Toronto, BIPOC make up 83 percent of the city’s COVID-19 cases, despite only representing 50 percent of the population (2020). These statistics demonstrate a larger issue of medical racism in Canada — an issue that has existed long before COVID-19. They are emblematic of racial capitalism, the process of deriving social and economic value from the racial identities of other groups (Leong, 2013). Racial capitalism is the historical and deep-rooted practice of the creation of inequities between different groups of people perpetuating a system of privilege (Leong,

2013). Lastly, racial capitalism contends that racialized exploitation and capitalist accumulation are mutually constructive (Robinson, 1983). The COVID-19 pandemic has unveiled numerous inequities in Canada’s healthcare system, which have marginalized and disadvantaged BIPOC.

This paper will argue that systemic medical racism has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and reflects the broader system of racial capitalism in Canada. This paper will be organized into four main sections. Firstly, this paper will demonstrate how both Indigenous and minority populations are more at risk of serious illness during the COVID-19 pandemic by examining legacies of European colonization and ongoing racialized work. Secondly, this paper will analyze the socioeconomic barriers to healthcare which have been exacerbated by numerous forms of systemic racism. Thirdly, it will interrogate the bias and racism of many of Canada’s healthcare workers by examining recorded accounts of racist recounts of BIPOC in Canada’s medical system. Lastly, this essay will analyze leading policy recommendations to protect BIPOC going through the healthcare system during and after the COVID-19



pandemic.

Poor COVID-19 Health Outcomes in BIPOC Communities

Since European colonization, assimilationist policies have had detrimental health impacts on Indigenous populations across Canada (Indigenous Corporate Training Inc. (ICT), 2020). Previously self-sustaining and self-governing peoples were forced out of their traditional lifestyles and cultural practices resulting in loss of habitat, knowledge transfer, and increased poverty rates (ICT, 2020).

Articulations of race and racism are products of the transnational project of colonization and imperialism (Grewal & Caplan, 2000). Indigenous populations across Canada had once thrived off of sophisticated methods of hunting, harvesting, managing, and preserving foods (First Nations Health Association (FNHA), 2015). Pre-European contact healthcare methods included a thorough knowledge of the local environment, the use of plants for healing a wide range of illnesses, and other forms of holistic medicine (FNHA, 2015; Douglas, 2021). The epistemic racism in Canada's healthcare system dismisses Indigenous knowledge (Douglas, 2021). Pre-European contact in Canada, Indigenous peoples had experienced nearly no evidence of common diseases such as diabetes, dental cavities, arthritis, among many others (FNHA, 2015). Following European colonization, Indigenous populations were exposed to numerous new diseases and viruses. Epidemics spread across Indigenous populations in Canada from as early as the 1500s (FNHA, 2015). Smallpox, influenza, measles, and whooping cough were

among many recorded epidemics that had reoccurring and devastating long-term effects on Indigenous populations (Richardson et al., 2012). This exposure weakened Indigenous people's immune systems and killed a high amount of Canada's Indigenous peoples. Mortality rates ranged from 50 percent to 90 percent across Indigenous populations (FNHA, 2015).

Numerous Canadians believe in the narrative that Canada is inclusive and multicultural, oblivious to the racism within the country's borders (Dua et al., 2005). This image has allowed representatives and Canadians more broadly to escape retribution for a culture of racism. This façade of innocence has undoubtedly allowed medical institutions to remain complacent to institutional racism in Canadian healthcare. Grewal and Kaplan (2002) argue that we must recast and scrutinize the legacies of imperialism that exist within the capitalist project within Canada and globally.

European invasion has residual effects to date on BIPOC such as poverty, unemployment, lesser opportunities for work and education, higher food and water insecurity, and devastating health conditions — all of which contribute to weaker mental health (Government of Canada, 1996). Legacies of colonialism plagued by racial capitalism are deeply woven into Canadian society—scaring and shaping the lives of Canada's Indigenous population. Canadians often speak of assimilationist policies towards Indigenous peoples as offences of the past, however racial capitalism has undoubtedly woven itself into the COVID-19 pandemic.

Racial capitalism has also played a critical role in the health outcomes of Black

people in Canada. BIPOC have higher contraction rates and mortality rates of COVID-19 (Subedi et al., 2020). To begin, 21 percent of Black Canadians stated that they know someone who has died from COVID-19 compared to 8 percent of non-Black Canadians (Woo, 2021). According to The United Nations Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent (2017), Black Canadians “continue to live in poverty and poor health, have low educational attainment and are overrepresented in the criminal justice system.” Moreover, in a study conducted by the University of Leicester and Nottingham, researchers have discovered evidence that Black people are two times more likely to contract COVID-19 than White people (Sze et al., 2020). The findings of this study are mainly attributed to the higher contraction rates in BIPOC communities (Sze et al., 2020). Ethnic minorities are more likely to live in small and populous environments, often with multiple generations in the same household (OCASI, 2019). Ethnic minorities are also more likely to have a lower socioeconomic status which often corresponds with living in more crowded living conditions (Sze et al., 2020). The higher contraction rates are an urgent research priority with an impending need to reduce the burden of disease for Black Canadians.

BIPOC are also more likely to work in industries that make them more at risk of exposure. Immigrants are overly represented in essential service work — representing 34 percent of front-line workers, compared to 21

percent in other industries (Government of Canada, 2020). Secondly, 20 percent of front-line workers are Black Canadians whereas 14 percent of all other Canadians are employed in this industry (Government of Canada, 2020). Additionally, BIPOC are more likely to work in service industries, such as food and accommodation services, which compounds their health risks (Government of Canada, 2020).

An additional contributing factor to the high COVID-19 contraction rates is the high rate of comorbidities for BIPOC. Comorbidities are broadly defined as the overlapping and coexisting conditions in a patient (Valderas et al., 2009). Comorbidities in BIPOC communities have been created and exacerbated by historical and environmental racism and unequal access to healthcare (Artiga et al., 2020). In a study conducted by Millett et al. (2020), even when comparing the comorbidities of BIPOC and White people, BIPOC have an 18 percent higher chance of fatality due to COVID-19. Indigenous peoples experience higher rates of hypertension, heart disease, diabetes, and cancer (Colour of Poverty, 2019).

Moreover, Indigenous peoples in Canada suffer from far worse health than all other groups in Canada. Indigenous peoples have a five to seven-year lower life expectancy than non-Indigenous Canadians (StatCan, 2017). For example, in rural Indigenous communities, the need for emergency healthcare requires travel outside the community due to a lack of qualified staff



(Oosterveer & Young, 2015). The government continues to tacitly accept the disparities in Canada's healthcare system, which have been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic (Ring & Brown, 2003; Rajendra et al., 2020).

Lastly, racialized labour trends have seen negligible progress over the past fifteen years (Block et al., 2019). In 2016, for every dollar a White Canadian made, a racialized Canadian made 78 cents (Block et al., 2019). Moreover, BIPOC are overrepresented in front-line work, placing them at an increased risk of contracting the virus (Robertson et al., 2020). Front-line work is often under-paid and undervalued work (CLC, 2020). The racialized labour system accentuates the racial capitalist conditions for the perpetuation of capitalist expansion and profitability (Bledsoe & Wright, 2018).

Socioeconomic Barriers During the COVID-19 Pandemic

This section will analyze the systemic inequalities that marginalize certain groups in accessing and using healthcare services. Systemic racism is often caused by institutional biases that disadvantage certain groups, creating different access to goods and services, usually without a perpetrator but rather through colonial policies (Colour of Poverty, 2019; Anderson-DeCoteau, 2016). Some of the structural inequalities include delayed access to testing, problems with transportation to health facilities, and higher chronic disease burdens (McGuire et al., 2020). During health crises like the COVID-19 pandemic, inequities often increase for disadvantaged communities (McGuire et al., 2020).

The financial burdens of healthcare are

significant concerns for BIPOC in Canada. Firstly, disadvantaged groups will delay seeking medical attention due to the strain of losing their jobs, lack of accessibility, and time barriers (McGuire et al., 2020). Secondly, the ability to comply with social distancing measures demonstrates the privileges that some groups have over others (Artiga et al., 2020). Lastly, the funding for healthcare facilities and protective equipment, such as masks and gloves, is lower in BIPOC communities (Artiga et al., 2020).

This connects with Bledsoe and Wright's (2018) concept of internal colonialism. Internal colonialism argues that poor areas remain spaces of colonial administration and imperial violence through the capitalist activities of the state (Bledsoe & Wright, 2018). While structural and institutional inequities are more visible during times of crisis, they exist in periods without crisis as well (McGuire et al., 2020). According to Liebman et al. (2020, 332), "a lens of racial capitalism shows how COVID-19 travels along terrain etched by the historic and ongoing systemic inequalities and violence that accumulated wealth through Black, Brown, and Indigenous suffering". Racial capitalism is embedded into the Canadian healthcare system.

Specifically, Indigenous peoples experience severe socioeconomic inequalities as compared to non-Indigenous peoples in Canada. According to the 2005 Census, Indigenous peoples in Canada have on average a 33 percent lower income than non-Indigenous peoples (Statcan, 2005). Higher poverty rates of Indigenous peoples are a direct result of the settler-colonial population stripping their lands, taking away

their traditional livelihoods, taking away educational opportunities, and placing less value on their lands as reserves (Neu & Therrien, 2003).

Moreover, regular collection of race and socioeconomic data is resisted by the Canadian government, demonstrating the state's failure to acknowledge the inequality across the country (Dhuga & Pyle, 2020). As a result, numerous scholars refer to medical school admissions statistics as a source of data on the discriminatory practices within Canada (Dhara, 2020). BIPOC medical students are vastly underrepresented in medical schools across Canada (Dhara, 2020). For example, Queen's University's Medical School had a ban on Black medical students from 1937 to 2018 (Woolf & Reznik, 2019). Although the ban had not been enforced since 1965, it is telling of the complicity of racialized policies in the medical community. Moreover, in the 2019 to 2020 Queen's MD program, out of 415 students, 4 students identify as Black, and 10 as Indigenous (Woolf & Reznik, 2019; Scace, 2020). While Ontario is one of the most diverse provinces in Canada, it lacks representation in healthcare and has persistently marginalized groups (StatCan, 2018). Increasing representation in medical schools across Canada is an essential step forward in bringing down the systemic forms of discrimination and inequity in the Canadian healthcare system. The disparity between Black and non-Black medical students in Canada is representative of the racial capitalist system that remains present in the society to

date.

Medical Racism and Bias

COVID-19 has unveiled medical racism in the North American healthcare system that has existed long before the pandemic. Healthcare provider bias also plays a significant role in the disease burden and health outcomes of BIPOC (McGuire et al., 2020). For example, as introduced earlier in this paper, Joyce Echaquan, an Atikamekw woman living in Manawan, died in a Montreal hospital while medical staff made racial slurs at her side. Before Ms. Echaquan's death, she recorded hospital staff who can be heard saying that she was only good for sex, stupid, and better off dead (Godin, 2020). Numerous women across Canada have since stepped forward stating that they've experienced similar forms of racism in Canadian healthcare (LeClair, 2020). Ms. Echaquan's story connects to a larger issue of systemic racism across Canadian hospitals.

It is essential to recognize that racism in healthcare is not contained within the scope of COVID-19. For example, in an interview with City News, Matthew John Derrick-Huie stated, "Had I not been Black, there was a much higher chance I would've gotten better treatment," after being denied treatment from five Ontario hospitals (Amin, 2019). Derrick-Huie went to the doctor in 2017 for chest pain and shortness of breath and never expected to have to wait two years before a proper diagnosis. Derrick-Huie was stereotyped and misdiagnosed numerous times by healthcare



professionals, and unfortunately, the recount of his experience in Ontario hospitals parallels those of numerous BIPOC across Canada.

OmiSoore Dryden of Dalhousie University and Onye Nnorom from the University of Toronto, state that medical professionals in Canada passively observe the inequities between Black and White patients in Canadian healthcare (2020). The passive and insufficient treatment from medical professionals leads to a lower quality of care. Anti-Black racism predisposes BIPOC to poor health outcomes, which has been exacerbated by the current COVID-19 health crisis. Racial capitalism has the power to replicate and exacerbate historical patterns of inequities during periods of crisis, superseding medical advancements (Pirtle, 2020).

Moreover, due to the inequities in Canadian hospitals, many BIPOC will avoid hospital visitation to avoid unwanted interactions with healthcare workers (Zussman, 2020; Timothy, 2020). The avoidance of Canadian healthcare largely stems from the historical use of eugenics in Canadian healthcare (Timothy, 2020). Many individuals will postpone their visitations until absolutely necessary, which heightens the risk of increased critical illness (Zussman, 2020).

Policy Recommendations

This section will address policy suggestions that can counteract and reduce medical racism. Firstly, meaningful and long-term reconciliation does not simply end with the acknowledgement of wrongdoings (Shaheen-Hussain, 2020). Following Joyce Echaquan's death, two national apologies were made, yet the apologies did not come alongside actionable items (Godin, 2020).

The Atikamekw Nation Grand Chief stated earlier this year that national apologies will not suffice (LeClair, 2020). Reconciliation requires actionable changes across the country, not empty promises and symbolic changes.

One of the primary ways Indigenous leaders and communities are calling for reconciliation is through counteracting epistemic racism in healthcare (Anderson-DeCoteau, 2016). Epistemic racism, in the context of Indigenous healthcare, is the "imposition of Western knowledge systems and particularly the use of Western "science" to demonstrate the supposed inferiority of Indigenous peoples and Indigenous ways of knowing" (Allan & Smylie, 2015, 5). Western and Eurocentric frameworks are privileged over Indigenous holistic approaches to healthcare (Anderson-DeCoteau, 2016). Canada needs to rethink what medicine and healthcare should look like so that everyone in Canada can have fair and good quality care.

Lastly, according to the United Nations Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007), Indigenous people should have the right to be able to self-determine the good of their communities. The UN (2018) lists three solutions to Indigenous sovereignty and self-determination: firstly, to take control of their own personal health to achieve balance in life, secondly, assume authority and control over the health and social services which impact their lives, and thirdly, design and implement a sustainable healthcare system which meets their unique needs. Overall, the UN recommends that health changes need to be led by Indigenous peoples for Indigenous peoples.

Conclusion

This paper demonstrated the current

and continuing racial capitalist tendencies in Canadian healthcare. Since the European invasion, Indigenous peoples in Canada have experienced higher poverty levels and health burdens. Racial capitalism and systemic racism in medicine is not a new phenomenon, but rather a historical practice that is woven into the COVID-19 pandemic. Far too little is being done to help improve the lived experiences of BIPOC in Canada. While protests and social movements gain the attention of governments, concrete policy changes are a necessary way forward out of the pandemic. COVID-19 serves as a reminder of the need to redistribute resources to socioeconomically disadvantaged groups. Canada continues to disregard the pressing issue of racial injustice in healthcare, and citizens and policy-makers must use the current crisis as leverage to bring forth changes in the current system, and fight against racial capitalism. Medical racism connects to a larger issue of systemic racism in capitalist countries that disenfranchises some while benefiting others. Too many Canadians believe that racism and colonialism are practices of the past, ignoring the current lived-experiences of Canada's BIPOC. Passive and surface-level reconciliation will not be tolerated and Canada needs to address the deep-rooted issues in our society at large. The country needs to address the issues within our borders rather than perpetuating a deceptive innocent facade.



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Understanding Provincial Leaders and Laggards in Climate Policy

Daniel Wolffe

Introduction

Ever since Jean Chrétien's federal Liberal Party engaged Canada in the Kyoto Protocol debates in 1997 and later ratified the agreement in Parliament in 2002, coordinating a unified set of federal and provincial policies on climate change has proven incommensurable. According to recent research, federal political systems, such as Canada, consistently face political barriers to implementing coherent climate policy across multiple levels of governance (Brown, 2012; Harrison, 2007, 2012; Lachapelle et al., 2012). Common policy constraints such as overlapping jurisdiction or competition between federal and subnational governments can result in diverging trends in climate policy action. In Canada, the federal government's jurisdiction in climate policy is limited to its Constitutional right to taxation (includes a carbon tax) and its ability to regulate specific industries such as aviation or shipping. Combined with its consistent resistance to push its federal powers on the provinces, the Government of Canada has exhibited an abdication of responsibility to produce aggressive climate policy. This has left provinces with considerable latitude to expand/retract its own climate policies through its jurisdiction over energy and environmental policy. This paper

will investigate which the strength of climate policy regimes produced by the Canadian provinces, and predict the political factors most influential to the strength of those policy regimes.

Primary research conducted for this study suggests that while most Canadian provinces have created a climate policy portfolio on, or after the Kyoto Protocol came into effect in 2005, they vary considerably in the types of policies adopted, and the relative strength of the climate policy framework. As such, this paper will make a two-part hypothesis about each province's policy regime strength and the factors most pertinent to that outcome. First, it is predicted that provinces will exhibit significant variance in strength of climate policies. Second, it is hypothesized that the political factors most influential to policy regime strength will be (a) the extent to which the governing provincial parties are ideologically positioned for a progressive agenda and (b) the political dynamic between the provincial and federal government. These hypotheses will be tested first in a case study framework which first categorizes provincial policy regimes to identify provincial leaders and provincial laggards in climate policy. Secondly, relying on the case study analysis, I will argue that political party ideology, federal-provincial dynamics, and bureaucrat-




ic capacity influence a province's ability to become a leader or laggard. And finally, the paper will conclude with a discussion exploring political outliers and policy lessons for key provinces.

(RFS); Tier III – Price on Carbon and Coal Phase-Out. Since these policies vary dramatically by types of mechanisms and industries or individuals they target, provincial policies will be compared to each other based on lev-

Percent Change (%) in GHG per Capita Emissions in

Canadian Provinces: 2008 to 2018



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Figure 1

Methodology: Measuring Policy Intensity and Comprehensiveness

This project analyzes provincial policy development between 2008 and 2018. Based on the extent of their uptake by provinces, the policies have been organized into three tiers: Tier I – Net Metering, GHG targets, Climate Change Action Plans (CCAPs), and Public Benefit Funds; Tier II – Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) and Renewable Fuel Standard

example, a carbon tax policy uses entirely different mechanisms to reduce GHG emissions than a policy on small-scale solar generation. However, these policies can both be evaluated by the extent to which they are intense – how stringent the policy mechanisms are (i.e. a comparatively high rebate on electrical vehicles) – and comprehensive – how broad the scope of the policies mechanisms are. This qualitative grading approach can

be easily quantified where the level of comprehensiveness and intensity attributable to a policy will be scored from uncomprehensive or lacking intensity (1) to completely comprehensive or ambitiously intensive (3), with zero constituting no active policy. The resulting policy regime strengths are displayed in Table 1.0. The table also compares regime strength to provincial changes in GHG emissions per capita during the same period (2008 to 2018) and changes in GDP to evaluate the relative success of these policies.

Figure 1. A scaled-to-zero representation of provincial policy regime strength data from Table 1.0 by the intensity and comprehensiveness of their respective Tier I, II, and III policies.

Case Study: Comparison of Climate Policy Leaders and Laggards (2008 to 2018)
Based on my analysis of the policy regimes present in each of the provinces, I argue that British Columbia and Québec are the ‘leaders’ in climate policy amongst the major provinces. This mapping of climate policies at the provincial level, however, raises two key questions: (1) how do provincial policy frameworks impact GHG emissions outcomes at the provincial level, and (2) what political or administrative factors are shaping these policy outcomes and the variation we see between the provinces. I will explore these two questions in depth in the next two sections of the paper.

Provincial Policy Frameworks and Emissions Outcomes

What is the relationship between a

province’s policy regime strength and its change in GHG emissions per capita displayed in Table 1? The data shows that across the six major provinces, those provinces which led in strength of climate policy regime (BC, QC, ON) also had a far greater aggregate reduction in GHG emissions over the ten year period than the laggards (AB, SK).

The graphic suggests that there is an important relationship between stronger provincial policy regimes, and greater GHG emissions outcomes. But to better understand how the policies of provincial leaders are tangibly more intense and comprehensive than provincial laggards, this paper will briefly compare regime strength according to policy tiers (III, II, and I) between British Columbia (BC), Québec (QC), Alberta (AB), and Saskatchewan (SK).

Tier III

Tier III policies (carbon pricing and coal phase-out) are areas of strength for BC and QC who have both successfully implemented ambitious carbon prices whereas AB and SK have – as yet – largely missed the opportunity to create policy aimed at large-scale emissions reductions. Through my comparison of the different Tier III policies introduced by each province, I find that BC’s carbon tax and QC’s cap-and-trade systems are more intense and comprehensive than the policies in AB and SK because of their ability to cover more provincial emissions at a higher rate of stringency. BC’s carbon tax was enacted by Premier Campbell’s Liberal government in BC, North America’s first broad-based carbon tax, at \$10 per tCO2e in 2007



with rising annual intervals reaching \$40 per tCO₂e by April 1, 2019 (Lindsay 2019). In QC, their cap-and-trade system has been similarly progressive with initial cap was set at 23.2 Mt CO₂e in 2013, rising to 65.3 Mt in 2015 and offering allowances via emissions credits or auctionable credits (Legis Quebec, 2020). The early installation of the BC carbon tax via Regulation (B.C. Reg. 2021) and the QC pricing scheme sets these provinces apart even before comparing each policy's mechanisms. Their pricing has both been more stringent than provincial average and the policies both apply to over 75% of provincial emissions since their inception (Wood, 2018). Comparatively, AB's carbon tax is drastically less ambitious and comprehensive despite also being enacted in 2007. Its Specified Gas Emitters Regulation (SGER) (Alta Reg 2007) applied only to emitters over 100,000 ktCO₂e per annum, which amounted to about 12% of the province's emissions in 2007 at \$15 per tCO₂e until the Carbon Competitiveness Incentive Regulation (CCIR) replaced the SGER and applied to about 50% of emissions at \$20 per tCO₂e in 2017 (Alta Reg 2019). Here, AB's legislation covers a significantly lower proportion of its provinces emissions and far less restrictive rates. Finally, the SK government during the scope of this project has been highly disinterested in the application of a carbon price, even alleging a court challenge to the federal imposition of a tax in 2019 (Baxter & Giles 2019).

The coal phase-out policy is worth noting in only its absence or limitation in AB and SK rather than BC and QC because the two latter provinces have had almost, or more than 90% of their electricity generation sourced from renewables during this time period. Therefore, a coal phase-out plan would be relatively redundant. However, a coal phase-out plan is arguably most significant in

the provinces of AB and SK where coal-fired generation accounts has accounted for more than 50% of both provinces generation. In AB, the NDP government in 2015 committed to complete coal cessation by 2030, but this commitment was quickly redacted under Premier Jason Kenney's UCP government (Turner 2017). Additionally, SK again lacks any policy on cessation of coal production and has instead increased its economies reliance on coal-fired generation. For the reasons mentioned, the coal phase-out policy area is not seen as a negative to either BC or QC but a significant missed opportunity for AB and SK to show leadership. Cumulatively, SK's lack of any policy and AB's inability to legislate or release intense and comprehensive policies in Tier I highlights the distinct difference between the leading and lagging provinces.

Tier II

The same trend can be observed in the renewable portfolio target/standard (RPS) and the renewable fuel standard (RFS) policies where provincial leaders have implemented the most intensive and comprehensive RPS and RFS policies in Canada, while provincial laggards' policies will be shown to be largely non-intensive and incomprehensive across the board.

Amongst the leaders, RPS policies in BC and QC were developed and deployed early with recorded, tangible, and specific project development goals. BC went from a 2002 Energy Plan (B.C. Energy Plan 2002) with a 50% target for provincial energy production to be renewably sourced, increasing to its 2007 Energy Plan (B.C. Energy Plan 2007) with a 90% target by 2016. Importantly, BC well exceeded this timeline, and achieved its 2007 target by 2010. Although QC already had the largest hydroelectricity

generation in Canada, it continued to expand its portfolio of renewables in 2006 with plans to develop 4,500 MW in hydroelectric projects, 4,000 MW of wind-generation by 2015, and targets for biomass and solar expansion (Government of Quebec 2008). In contrast, AB was able to meet its unimpressive target of 12% renewable production by 2008 (Holmes 2012), and failed to produce an explicit RPS thereafter. Although SK's RPS is far more ambitious, 50% renewable energy production by 2030, it was not announced until 2015 and was not accompanied by tangible plans to implement that target (Energi Staff 2018). Measuring up the RPS policies of these provinces, BC and QC were able to produce policies that placed more ambitious goals on renewable energy production with specific project plans to achieve their RPS.

Next, the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) is a policy where BC and QC have unique strengths and AB and SK lag in stringency and scope. In 2008, BC established its Renewable Fuel Regulations which required a minimum of 5% ethanol in gasoline produced for sale and 4% biodiesel in diesel. These numbers quickly rose to 10% on the former and 5% on the latter (B.C. Reg. 2008). In 2018, QC it enacted Canada's first Zero Emissions Vehicle (ZEV) legislation (Government of Quebec 2020) which obligates automakers a minimum number of 'green' vehicles and passed a RFS Draft Regulation in 2018 that would require 15% ethanol in gasoline and 4% biodiesel in diesel (Government of Quebec 2019). It is notable that these policies were not as institutionally engrained despite being high in intensity and comprehensiveness. In contrast, AB's Renewable Fu-

els Regulation in 2010 was unimpressive with requirements of 5% renewables in gasoline and only 2% biodiesel in diesel (Alta Reg 2010) while SK's RFS is incomprehensive only allotting a minimum of 7.5% ethanol in gasoline (Environmental Investigation Agency n.d). These policy notes show that both BC and QC have more restrictive requirements and cover both gasoline production and diesel production while SK only features an ethanol in gasoline requirement.

Tier I

Finally, Tier I policies can be quite important to micro-level emissions reduction despite their limitation to produce tangible reductions when enacted in the absence of more impactful Tier II and Tier III policies. Further, Tier I policies are also the highest in commonality and therefore, their variation in intensity and comprehensiveness is more important to note than the comparative presence/absence of the policy.

First, Net Metering policies can be measured in intensity and comprehensiveness by their customer compensation value, financial assistance in customer capital costs, and coverage of generation system size and type. BC has offered billing reductions at 9.99 cents per kWh, bidirectional meter installation credits via the Standing Offer Program, and covers five system types (solar, wind, bioenergy, geothermal, and hydroelectric) since the inception of their Simple Net Metering and Complex Net Metering programs in 2002 (BC Hydro 2016). Also, QC's Self-Generation Option I, II, and III have been in operation since 2006, offering consistent market-value compensation, installation



credits, and broad variation in generation size and coverage under each option (Hydro Quebec 2021). SaskPower's net metering mechanism covered only three types of generation and up to 25% of installation costs from 2008 to 2019, when it dispensed of all installation coverages and reduced customer compensation to 7.5 cents per kWh (Sask Power n.d). Finally, AB's Micro-Generation Regulation is the least impressive comparatively. Active since 2008, billing compensation is left to the private retailer without regulatory structure, and renewable types of systems covered must produce less than or equal to 418 kg CO₂e per MWh which allows for production from sources which would be considered non-renewable federally (Alta Reg 2008). Altogether, the policy comparison shows that the programs in BC and QC are far more intense and comprehensive than those AB and to a lesser extent, SK.

Another important policy to Tier I is the Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP). The CCAP is typically an announcement of a government's plan to address climate change through policy, legislation, or other changes. A CCAP should be considered leading when its principles and action items are aggressive, tangible, and when it covers comparatively more policy action areas than other provinces. Here, B.C. has led by addressing emissions targets, policy on energy efficiency and renewable energy, efficiency in building codes, transportation policy, addressed its highest-emitting sector/industry, and funding allocations. Similarly, QC has covered similar policy areas while having the most intensive targets and funding allocations of any province (Holmes 2012). Unfortunately, neither AB nor SK's CCAP policies have been able to alleviate their economies' reliance on their most significant source of emissions – coal-fired power generation and oil production.

Additionally, these two provinces have not yet attached each action item in their CCAPs with monetary allocation, suggesting that the CCAPs are statements of intent rather than confirmations of provincial action.

GHG Targets are often included in the CCAP, though they can be announced by government policy statements or enacted as 'goals' in legislation. As mentioned, QC stands out for having the most aggressive emissions reductions targets because of the how ambitious the targets are, and how comprehensively they cover the key dates from international agreements. BC also stands out with a targets that are either consistently in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement, or exceeding those benchmarks from their 2008 Climate Action Plan to their 2018 CleanBC Plan (Government of BC 2008; Government of BC 2018). These plans are particularly intensive because they also effectively designate allocation of carbon tax funds. AB should be commended for having an active CCAP since 2002 which have covered a breadth of policy items (Government of Alberta 2002). However, these plans have not been followed up by tangible actions according to these areas and in the case of the 2015 Climate Leadership Plan from Rachel Notley's NDP government (Government of Alberta 2018), it was entirely denounced by the following government. Finally, SK's 2007 Energy and Climate Action Plan and 2017 Prairie Resilience CCAP fail to address the province's large industry carbon emissions and do not provide detail on funding allocation according to action items (Government of Saskatchewan 2007). For these reasons, the CCAP policy area sees distinctive difference in likelihood of effectiveness between the provincial leaders and laggards.

The final policy to be analyzed is the Public Benefit Fund (PBF). These are often created

by provinces to manage fund distribution into efforts of climate adaptation, emissions reductions, and research and development. Although it is unclear if fund allocation through a PBF is driving more or less monetary value into climate policy projects than the private market in any of the Canadian provinces, the presence of a PBF with a mandate to provide significant funds to a wide range of policy projects on climate change indicates a progressive climate agenda of the sitting provincial government. Here, both BC and QC have had a PBF in place (BC's CleanBC and QC's Green Fund) which collect funds from their respective carbon pricing regimes and distribute across a highly comprehensive mandate. AB created a PBF in 2008 as part of its CCAP. This fund, the Climate Change and Emissions Management Fund (Government of Alberta 2009), was not given a mandate to distribute funds into specific projects, but rather broad principles of innovation. Notably, its mandate also did not explicitly include emissions reduction as a purpose. While it is clear that AB's PBF is likely to have had a lesser impact on its emissions than those in BC or QC, SK's decision not to create a fund speaks to its unwillingness to produce a comprehensive climate agenda.

Results

This case study has shown that British Columbia and Québec are provincial leaders because they have consistently outscored Alberta and Saskatchewan, provincial laggards, across three tiers of climate policy regimes in policy intensity and policy mechanism comprehensiveness. I first described how BC's carbon tax and QC's cap-and-trade system

sets them apart from the AB tax in price restrictions and the proportion of emissions covered by the policy. I then argued that this provides a base of understanding for what a strong or weak climate policy regime looks like provincially. The analysis will expand upon the active political factors which have influenced these policy outcomes, and whether the policy data holds consistent with each province's change in GHG emissions per capita.

Analysis

The relative strength of a provincial climate policy regime is a product of government decision making and government action. The designation as a leader or a laggard is then inextricably linked to politics. This section will discuss the extent to which three key political factors influence the strength of provincial climate regimes. First, it will be argued that the interprovincial ideological distance between its dominant parties is indicative of regime strength. Second, the federal-provincial dynamic affects a province's political motivation to produce competitive climate policy.

Political Party Ideology

In comparing the leaders (BC and QC) and laggards (AB and SK), perhaps the clearest explanation for provincial leadership and lagging behind are the economic interests of the province. Alberta is best known as Canada's oil-producing province, with an economy and politics that is intrinsically linked to this dominant industry. However, economy in and of itself does not explain leading and lagging, particularly when it comes to provinces in



the “middle of the pack” in terms of climate policy. Ideology alone, similarly, does not seem to directly explain policy leadership (or lack thereof). While we might expect climate policy to progress under left-of-centre governments, it was BC’s right-of-centre Liberal Party that first enacted major climate policy through the introduction of its carbon tax. Moreover, the economy and the political dynamics of provinces are linked in important ways.

While at the federal level, party politics tends to take on the structure of a two-plus party system, most provincial party systems differ in that they are largely dominated by two party systems (Stewart and Carty, 2006), with one party occupy the right-of-centre and one the left. At the provincial level, partisanship is a strong indicator support for climate policy (Lachapelle et al., 2012). (I think you need to add a bit more in here to justify the hypothesis). Here, I argue that the distance between these parties’ ideology is likely to indicate strength of a province’s climate regime. This section will use the examples of BC and SK to explore this hypothesis further. First, as Stewart and Carty (2006) note, BC – like other provinces – had two electorally competitive major parties through 2008 and 2018 have been the Liberal Party (LP) who held a majority through the ten-year period with the New Democratic Party (NDP) holding the opposition. In BC, the LPs are considered the right-leaning party while the New Democrats lean to the left. However, since the early-to-late 1990s both parties have held pro-climate policy agendas resulting in provincial coherence on the issue. The governing LP in BC notably produced both the 2008 and 2016 Climate Action Plans, two of the most intense and comprehensive CCAP policies in Canada, showing a similarly progressive climate agenda from the province’s right-of-

centre party. When combined with the province’s NDP, who consistently pushed for a more progressive climate agenda than what was offered by the LP, the cross-party coherence on the importance of climate change has resulted in climate policies which contributed to its ability to take a leadership role amongst the provinces.

The importance of cross-party coherence on climate policy is not unique to BC. In the Atlantic provinces, there has been a Contrastingly, SK’s major parties – the NDP and the Saskatchewan Party (SKP) – are highly distanced ideologically and in their support of strong climate policy. This distance is directly responsible for weakening the overall policy agenda in the province. A strong ideological divide can weaken policy frameworks in two ways: (1) it can disincentivize governing parties from implementing new policies, as the divide leads to significant politicization and potentially places them at electoral risk; and (2) changes in government can undermine any forward progress made. The latter is particularly true in the case of SK. The NDP held a majority from 2003 to 2006 where they established a strong net metering policy and voiced support for introducing a carbon pricing mechanism. However, the SKPs united the right-of-centre parties in Saskatchewan, taking an anti-climate policy stance. Their government reduced the compensation value and installation credit of the net metering policy and failed to produce a strong CCAP between 2007 and 2018. This shows a clear ideological divide between the two dominant parties and the resulting strength of SK’s climate regime is relatively weak.

These two examples illustrate that interprovincial party ideology is a key factor in the policy regime strength because BC’s case shows that where parties are closely aligned

on climate change, the government is more likely to produce coherent policy whereas SK has a deep division on climate change resulting in the ‘clawing back’ of important climate policies.

Federal-Provincial Relationship

A province’s political relationship with the federal government can also significantly influence a province’s climate policy because of frequent overlapping jurisdictions in this area, and the province’s political motivation or capacity to take ownership of its policy. This section will argue that the specific intergovernmental, provincial-federal political dynamics heavily shape the policy outcomes

since’s likelihood to develop a strong climate policy regime. The relationship between these factors will be shown to hold across multiple provinces, where their political dynamic with the Government of Canada will be shown to have either caused them to pursue more aggressive policies or abdicate in some areas. First, it will be shown how multiple, strong climate policies in Québec were an aspect of its competitive relationship with the Government of Canada. This point focuses on the institutional development of QC and the climate policy outcomes that have been produced. Although party politics have often differed in stance on the province’s relation to




Figure 2.0



tone which is unique to QC-Canada's relationship that has been steady across climate policy strategies. QC stands out in its relationship with the federal government because it is clear that it engages in a uniquely competitive policy development process resulting from its historical development and negotiation tool of sovereignty and nationalism. According to Taucar (2000), QC's institutions have become more fiscally and constitutionally independent than those in provinces such, causing a greater avenue for QC to apply sovereignty and nationalism as bases for independent policy creation. Consequently, QC has more institutional capacity to challenge federal policy, or take ownership of a policy jurisdiction which is unclear in its division. Béland and Weaver (2019) also argue that the unique dynamic of competitive federalism has caused Québec and Canada to engage in an "intergovernmental race" in public policy. While they make this argument with reference to the development of competitive benchmarking in the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans, this competitive form of federalism appears to have influenced Quebec's climate policies as well. Indeed, QC's CCAP policies were consistently benchmarked above the federal government's targets. The combination of QC's historical institutional independence and its propensity to engage in competitive policymaking with the federal government are two reasons why the province had developed such aggressive climate policies. For example, Newmann and Howlett (2008) note that QC had been the only Canadian province at the time to push a climate agenda more progressive than the targets ratified by the federal government, citing rhetoric from the QC government of its accomplishments in light of federal failures to meet its own targets. These authors impor-

tantly note QC's tendency to cite the federal government's failures and its own successes in reducing GHG emissions. For these factors of competitive federalism and institutional sovereignty, QC's climate policies have consistently been more likely to be more progressive than the federal government's plans and the national average.

In the case of Ontario, their policy portfolio is greatly affected by its relationship to the federal government through the rate at which its provincial parties are elected inversely to their federal counterparts. More specifically, this paragraph will show that the progressive climate agenda of Dalton McGuinty's ON Liberals was influenced by the relative inaction of the federal government and Doug Ford's PC Party opposition to Justin Trudeau's federal carbon tax perpetuates the pattern of defiance to the centre. Federally, between 2006 and 2014 Stephen Harper's federal Conservative Party criticized and withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol and produced Canada's own emissions reduction targets below the international standard (De Souza 2014). During this time, Dalton McGuinty enacted the province's aggressive coal phase-out strategy, which stands out as the most successful climate policy in Canada. The phase-out reduced the province's emissions by 17% and moving from a dependence on coal-fired electricity generation to complete cessation in 2014 (Harris 2015). Here, a regressive climate agenda appears in the federal government and is followed up by a comprehensive, intensive Tier III policy from a climate-progressive ON government. ON's defiance to the centre trend continued after Trudeau's federal Liberals advanced a progressive climate regime with ratification of the 2015 Paris Agreement (international agreement at the UNFCCC) followed by federal legislation imposing a price on carbon in

all provinces (Prime Minister Justin Trudeau on Climate Change n.d). Again, the ON government's climate policy defers to the centre by producing a regressive regime under Doug Ford's PC government, who has failed to produce meaningful policy on fuel emissions, clean technology, and also launched an appeal in opposition to the federal carbon tax (Crawley 2019). This paragraph has outline two different timelines of climate policy relevant to the figures in this study where the ON government's climate agenda has taken the opposing stance in response to the federal government's policy regime, constituting a deference to the centre which causes ON to make only marginal progression over time in comparison to leaders such as BC.

It is notable that both PEI and NS score similarly with Manitoba and closely with Ontario in intensity and comprehensiveness, including a progressive net metering policy, CCAP, and the largest proportion of wind power developed in Canada between 2008 and 2018. Also, if controlled for the number of policies in each province, PEI and NS are competitive with ON (see Figure 2.0). The presence of these policies are replicative of the provincial leaders, but still effective where the Maritimes have produced some of the largest reductions in GHG emissions between 2008 and 2018. These factors combine to show that the some of the smallest bureaucratic structures in Canada are able to replicate provincial leaders' policies with significant success in policy strength.

Discussion & Conclusion

This investigation posed two hypotheses: (1)

in the absence of federal ownership of climate policy jurisdiction, there would be an emergence of provincial leaders and laggards in policy regime strength; and (2) the factors most determinative of a province's climate policy regime would be interprovincial party ideological distance and federal-provincial political relations. This paper employed a comparative analysis of provincial climate policies in Canada between 2008 and 2018 to evaluate which provinces had established a policy regime that led in intensity and comprehensiveness. These measures were then compared to a province's change in GHG emissions over the ten year period and analyzed by the factors most influential in the policy outcomes. These results have shown that those provinces with the most intense and comprehensive climate policy portfolio are also those who have made larger reductions in annual GHG emissions than provincial laggards. Consequently, the extent to which a province produced a strong policy regime is a key factor for any attempt to reduce GHG emissions in a Canadian province or collectively amongst Canadian provinces. These findings provide two distinct policy lessons and insight for future research. First, Ontario and Manitoba's respective ability (Manitoba standing out in Western Canada) to reduce emissions through a coal phase-out policy despite being middle-of-the-pack in strength of climate policy regime indicates a greater importance on introduction of this policy for some provincial laggards. Being the most effective policy in Canada between 2008 and 2018, a policy to reduce emissions from coal-fired production and coal-generated electricity could have its largest impact in Al-



berta and Saskatchewan where economies are more reliant upon coal than any other region in Canada. Secondly, British Columbia and Québec also exhibited a unique political factor which influenced their success to a significant degree. Both provinces were governed by political parties which were ideologically less polarized than the lagging provinces. When BC or QC transitioned between sitting parties in government, there was less “institutional claw-back” of the strong climate policies which had already been in place. Interest groups may be the mechanism by which this gap can close. For example, Alberta’s NDP government under Rachel Notley held a far more progressive climate agenda than Jason Kenney’s UKP government to follow. Here, the ideological distance between the governing parties is far greater than the Liberal to NDP shift in BC or the Liberal to PQ shift in QC.’

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
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